Burying the Lede: North Korea Conceals That “Spy Satellite” Tests Are First Launches of New Large ICBM
As previously reported on 38 North, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on February 27 and March 5 launched unidentified ballistic missiles it said were used to loft components of a reconnaissance satellite up briefly for testing at operational altitudes; the range and altitude of the launches suggested that medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) were used. On March 10, however, the US reported that the launches actually involved the new, large Hwasong-17 liquid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), first revealed at a military parade in October 2020.
We still do not know if both stages of the new ICBM were tested or only the first, or what payload was flown. We also do not know why Pyongyang concealed the fact of the first Hwasong-17 test and the first ICBM test since 2017, although it may have been seeking to limit the political and potential sanctions blowback. The primary value of the new missile is its larger payload capacity, which could facilitate the deployment of multiple warheads, very-large-yield single warheads, or more and more capable missile defense penetration aids. This crossing of the ICBM testing Rubicon also opens up the possibility of resumed testing of the earlier Hwasong-14 and/or -15 ICBMs, one or both of which may already be operationally deployed.
One key purpose of the US statement at this time was likely to spoil the success of any North Korean attempt to portray a future Hwasong-17 or other ICBM test as just a space launch. Pyongyang probably wants to resume ICBM testing and develop a reconnaissance satellite capability, and conducting both activities under the guise of a space launch could help minimize the potential political and economic backlash to these actions. Going forward, there are four likely options (not mutually exclusive) for further Hwasong-17 testing to advance the North’s ICBM and space objectives:
- Conduct another Hwasong-17 test in a highly lofted trajectory akin to those of the 2017 ICBM tests, with an ICBM payload, but claim it was related to space launch.
- Conduct such a highly lofted test without a reentry vehicle (RV), claim it was related to space launch, and actually demonstrate satellite-related capabilities like those claimed for the February and March 2022 launches.
- Use the Hwasong-17 to launch a prototype or operational reconnaissance satellite.
- Pursue additional testing of the Hwasong-17 in an ICBM mode (either highly lofted or to full range) in parallel with the use of the Hwasong-17, the Unha booster used in prior satellite launches, or a new purpose-built booster to test satellite components and/or orbit a reconnaissance satellite.
It remains to be seen whether the apparent early in-flight failure of a liquid-propellant ballistic missile launched March 16 from the same general area as the two Hwasong-17 tests is related to that ICBM program.
The New Information
On March 10, the US Department of Defense released a statement concluding that the two unidentified ballistic missile launches “involved a new [ICBM] system that the DPRK is developing, which was originally unveiled during the Korean Workers Party parade on October 10, 2020.” According to the statement, “The purpose of these tests, which did not demonstrate ICBM range, was likely to evaluate this new system before conducting a test at full range in the future, potentially disguised as a space launch.” It also noted:
While the DPRK chose not to publicize information on the systems involved in these launches, the United States is revealing this information publicly…because we believe that the international community must speak in a united voice to oppose the further development and proliferation of such weapons by the DPRK.
In an accompanying press backgrounder, a “senior administration official” added that:
- the new ICBM also was unveiled in the October 2021 Pyongyang Defense Exhibition;
- the launches did not demonstrate “ICBM range or capabilities”;
- they were likely intended to test “elements” of the new system;
- the North “tried to hide” the ICBM tests, “unlike its past tests”;
- the US exposed the ICBM tests “because we prioritized the reduction of strategic risk”; and
- this assessment was made “in close coordination” with South Korea and Japan.
The senior official did not comment when asked whether the tests were for maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs) or hypersonic missiles.[1]
Almost a day before the US statement, North Korea reported that Kim Jong Un had “inspected” the National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA), North Korea’s space agency.[2] He reportedly “heard reports on the major test results recently conducted by the NADA” and “expressed his great satisfaction at the fact that they confirmed the aerospace photographing method, the operating characteristics of high-resolution photographing equipment and the reliability of image transmission system.” He also was shown “the vertical and oblique high-resolution images on specific ground regions taken through the major tests.” Kim noted:
“…that the purpose of developing and operating the military reconnaissance satellite is to provide the armed forces of the DPRK with real-time information on military actions against it by the aggression troops of the U.S. imperialism and its vassal forces in south Korea, Japan and the Pacific,” and “fully supports…diversely putting a lot of military reconnaissance satellites into sun-synchronous polar orbit in the period of the five-year plan so as to possess the strong capability for gathering intelligence by satellites.”
About the same time as the US statement was released, the North issued a report of Kim giving “field guidance” to the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground, the North’s primary space launch facility.[3] He reportedly “gave concrete instructions on rebuilding” the facility “on a modern and expansion basis,” including “to launch the military reconnaissance satellite and other multi-purpose satellites by diverse carrier rockets in the future” and “launch large carrier rockets.”
Analysis
Based on the US information, the North Korean ICBM system “involved” in the tests was the new large road-mobile liquid propellant system apparently designated by the North as “Hwasong-17.” This was the only ICBM “unveiled” at the October 2020 parade and October 2021 defense exhibition. (The Hwasong-15 ICBM was also seen on both occasions but had previously been “unveiled” during its first and only launch in November 2017.)
These were the first flight tests involving the Hwasong-17. It is unclear from the US information whether a full-up missile was flown—and if so, whether it only reached the 270-300-km range and 560-620-km altitudes reported for the two launches because it was not fully fueled, or because engine thrust was deliberately terminated prematurely (which is readily done on liquid systems). It also is possible that only the first stage of the missile was flown.
We do not know why the North apparently decided to conduct an “evaluation” test of the Hwasong-17 prior to a full-capability test. The Hwasong-17 is believed to use two twin-chambered rocket engines in the first stage versus only one in the Hwasong-15. These evaluation tests may have been intended to ensure the two engines could work in unison, prove out the second stage (the attributes of which are largely unknown to outside analysts), and/or prove out payload-related components that have not been tested in an actual launch (see below).
The US did not describe the payloads used in these launches. It is possible that the launches lofted ballast or a dummy ICBM payload, or a payload of ICBM “elements,” imaging satellite components as reported by the North, or some combination. As some analysts have noted, the “attitude control devices” North Korea claimed had been tested on these launches for use in a future satellite could also be useful in the development of a post-boost vehicle (PBV, or “bus”) to dispense multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). In January 2021, Kim reported that the North was researching “the guidance technology for multi-warhead rocket[s],”and a MIRV is one type of multiple-warhead system.[4] (Interestingly, the two new North Korean statements did not mention “attitude control devices,” only imaging and data transmission.)
Pyongyang’s motivations for concealing the use of ICBM boosters in the claimed “satellite component” tests are unclear, especially given the seemingly straightforward technical and operational North Korean reporting of the seven rounds of missile launch activity it conducted in January. It probably expected US intelligence would be able to detect the use of the Hwasong-17. If Pyongyang was conducting MIRV-related “attitude control device” tests, however, it might have thought it could get away with portraying them as satellite-related. Perhaps North Korea was seeking to limit the political and potential sanctions blowback from ICBM testing. This might also help explain why the missiles were flown in lofted trajectories characteristic of an MRBM rather than the longer and much higher trajectories it used in the lofted ICBM tests of 2017, which still did not overfly Japan.
Implications
If the North launched full-up Hwasong-17s, they would be the first ICBMs it has launched since November 2017. This would follow through on repeated threats to conduct such launches since its December 2019 renunciation of its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear weapons and long-range missile testing, declared in April 2018, including a pointed “reconsideration” of such launches on January 19, 2022.[5] As noted in previous analyses, on 38 North the DPRK probably now sees refraining from ICBM testing as imposing greater costs and providing fewer benefits than it has in recent years.
Based on the specs observed during the parade and exhibition, a successfully developed and deployed Hwasong-17 would be able to deliver a payload of about 1,700 kg to anywhere in the US. This is significantly greater than the smaller Hwasong-15, which is estimated to be able to deliver about 1,000 kg to the same range. North Korea might want to use the greater payload capability of the Hwasong-17 to loft:
- a MIRV payload, where the weight of the PBV as well as the RVs it dispenses must be carried;
- a multiple reentry vehicle (MRV) payload, where the RVs are dispensed shotgun-style without being independently targeted by a PBV;
- a very-large-yield single RV, as China and Russia still deploy;
- highly realistic (and therefore heavy) decoy reentry vehicles to help one or more standard RVs penetrate missile defenses; or
- more missile defense penetration aids of other types in conjunction with any of the above payloads.
The larger payload capacity of the Hwasong-17 could be particularly important for North Korea’s use of MRVs or MIRVs if Pyongyang is technologically constrained to use a heavier PBV and/or if it intends to use more robust and blunt-shaped (and thus heavier) RVs to help ensure the warheads can survive reentry at ICBM ranges with limited or no full-range flight testing.
The resumption of ICBM testing also opens up the possibility of additional tests of the Hwasong-14 and/or -15 ICBMs. This would be particularly attractive to North Korea if one or both of these systems have already been deployed, as Kim Jong Un essentially claimed in 2018 and the Foreign Ministry implied in February 2022 and as apparently assessed in October 2021 by the US Defense Intelligence Agency.[6] After more than four years without flight testing, the credibility of any deployed ICBM force has objectively declined, although Pyongyang probably regarded the three tests of the two systems in 2017 as establishing a sufficiently credible and reliable ICBM threat to meet its objectives at the time without further flight testing. Resumed testing of these ICBMs would also be consistent with North Korea’s push in other missile tests since Fall 2021 to demonstrate that its missile force is technically capable and operationally credible.
One key purpose of releasing the US statement at this time was likely to spoil the success of any North Korean attempt to portray a future Hwasong-17 or other ICBM test as being a civilian space launch, just as it released intelligence to spoil impending Russian “false flag” operations against Ukraine. That said, Kim Jong Un has doubled down in the two new North Korean media reports on the recent launches being for satellite development and on his intention to “diversely [put] a lot of military reconnaissance satellites into sun-synchronous polar orbit” using “diverse” space launch vehicles (SLVs), including “large” ones.[7]
In all likelihood, Kim wants to both resume ICBM testing in order to reinforce nuclear deterrence and a range of political objectives and develop a reconnaissance satellite capability to improve intelligence-gathering and generate domestic and international prestige. Doing so under the guise of a space program would help minimize the potential political and economic backlash from these actions.
With these two goals in mind, further Hwasong-17 testing is likely to take on at least one or more of the following four forms:
First, North Korea may conduct another test of the Hwasong-17 in a highly lofted trajectory akin to those of the 2017 ICBM tests, with an ICBM payload, but claim it was related to space launch. This would advance the full-up testing of the ICBM booster and payload while avoiding overflying Japan and use the space launch claim to limit the international blowback. Nonetheless, the flight on an ICBM-relevant trajectory of a system previously acknowledged by North Korea to be an ICBM would be condemned by the international community, albeit mitigated by probable Chinese and Russian blockage of major action by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
Second, it could conduct such a highly lofted test without an RV, claim it was related to space launch, and actually demonstrate satellite-related capabilities akin to those claimed to be on the February and March launches (we do not currently know if they actually were). This would advance the full-up testing of the ICBM booster, advance development of a PBV for MIRVed ICBMs if an “attitude control device” is tested, make progress on the reconnaissance satellite, and avoid overflying Japan. It would probably produce fewer consequences than the previous option given the lack of an RV and make it easier for China and Russia to deny there is a problem.
Third, it may use the Hwasong-17 to launch a prototype or operational reconnaissance satellite. This would still advance development of the ICBM booster while making good on Kim’s satellite objective. It would not advance development of ICBM RVs and probably would be of less value for PBV development than the previous option unless the North launched or claimed to launch multiple satellites from a “bus”-like dispenser. As noted in the North Korean statement, an imagery satellite would almost certainly be put into a “sun-synchronous polar orbit,” meaning it would likely be launched to the South. If launched south from the Sohae Satellite Launching Station, where satellite launches have been conducted since 2012, it would not overfly any other country. Although it would truly be a “space launch,” the use of a system previously acknowledged by North Korea to be an ICBM would lead to substantial international condemnation, potentially mitigated by Chinese and Russian opposition to major UNSC decisions.
- Because it apparently uses more capable rocket motors and more energetic liquid propellants (at least in its first stage), the Hwasong-17 should be able to place a heavier satellite in orbit than is possible with the Taepodong-2/Unha-3 used in previous North Korean satellite launches. The new ICBM may be able to loft a satellite about twice as heavy as the Unha can (the latter is believed to be able to boost 200 kg into an orbit of about 500 km). A heavier reconnaissance satellite presumably would be able to carry a larger camera, more maneuvering fuel, etc., than one able to be lofted by the Unha.
- The Hwasong-17 thus far has been launched from a road-mobile launcher, which would allow it to be launched more quickly and with less warning than the large, fixed-launch Unha. To help with the story that an SLV was being launched rather than an ICBM, the North could also launch the Hwasong-17 from the launch pad at Sohae. This probably would require some modest alterations to the launch pad and tower, and perhaps some compatibility testing, which the North could conduct openly or seek to conceal—in either case, the modifications would be consistent with Kim’s recent “guidance” to “rebuild” the launch facility.
Finally, the North could pursue additional testing of the Hwasong-17 in an ICBM mode (either highly lofted or to full range) in parallel with the use of the Hwasong-17, the Unha or a new purpose-built SLV to test satellite components and/or orbit a reconnaissance satellite. This would offer the most direct path to meeting both objectives but would have the most international blowback.
It remains to be seen whether the apparent early in-flight failure of a liquid-propellant ballistic missile launched March 16 from the same general area as the two Hwasong-17 tests is related to that ICBM program.
- [1]
“Background Press Call on North Korea,” Office of the Vice President, March 10, 2022. (Unpublished transcript.)
- [2]
- [3]
- [4]
- [5]
- [6]
See: “Kim Jong Un Makes New Year Address’,” KCNA, January 1, 2018; and “DPRK Report on the Third Plenary Meeting of the Seventh Central Committee,” KCNA, April 21, 2018; and “Great Victory Wong by Great Courage and Pluck,” DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 8, 2022. The statement cites the Hwasong-12 IRBM and Hwasong-15 ICBM have the “ability to strike the U.S. mainland.” Also see “North Korea Military Power: A Growing Regional and Global Threat,” Defense Intelligence Agency, October 15, 2021, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/NKMP.pdf. For example, page 20 of the Defense Intelligence Agency report refers to “ICBMs now in the North Korean inventory”; page 22 states that “The Strategic Force includes units operating…ICBMs…” and that “This force also is responsible for the…Hwasong-14 ICBM, capable of reaching the continental United States”; and page 41 states that “North Korea’s ballistic missile units control a wide selection of SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs, and ICBMs.”
- [7]