North Korea’s Flawed but Winning Strategy in Ukraine

Source: Korean Central News Agency

Much attention has focused on how North Korea’s illicit arms shipments have boosted Russia’s ability to prosecute its invasion of Ukraine and prolong Russian war efforts. In May, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin recently said the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK or North Korea) assistance helped Russia “get back on its feet” and “turn the tide” of the war. But the other side of this relationship also deserves scrutiny.

The North Korean regime has extracted major benefits from its warming ties with Russia despite significant flaws in its arms shipments. Based on insights from Ukrainian and Russian channels of Telegram, a social networking service, there are obvious flaws in the supplied armaments that could affect military, economic and geopolitical dynamics moving forward.

Overall, however, ongoing Pyongyang-Moscow engagement is much more significant than a simple arms deal. It has given the Kim Jong Un a crucial lifeline amid the country’s relative isolation and supercharged their collective aggressive, revisionist agendas.

The War in Ukraine and How is North Korea Winning

North Korea’s wins from Russia’s war can be broken down into three major categories: military, economic, and geopolitical.

Military Factors

First, North Korea is supplying poor-quality artillery shells, which are in high demand but cannot currently be fully replaced by Russia’s vast yet outdated and corrupt defense industry. It is indeed a calculated move on North Korea’s side. While sending cheaply produced/outdated munitions, North Korea may be receiving far more advanced military assistance in return. According to the White House, this could include: fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles, ballistic missile production equipment or materials, and other advanced technologies. Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) intelligence believes Russia helped North Korea launch a reconnaissance satellite last November and the failed launch from this May. Furthermore, Kim Jong Un, while visiting Russia in 2023, was given a tour of Russian nuclear-capable strategic bombers, hypersonic missiles and warships. Worryingly, Russian military and technological assistance can also help North Korea improve capabilities related to missile targeting, reentry, and maneuverability that are needed to evade and overwhelm the US-ROK ballistic missile defense, thereby undermining deterrence.

North Korea also now has a rare opportunity to test its ballistic missiles in battlefield conditions, providing valuable and actionable data. According to South Korean intelligence, North Korea dispatched military advisors to Russia in 2023 to help with the “use of the munitions,” but these same advisors can also collect information for North Korea’s benefit.

Ukrainian officials believe North Korea has fired 50 North Korean missiles at Ukraine this year. They have investigated 21 of these and generally state, “About half of the North Korean missiles lost their programmed trajectories and exploded in the air; in such cases, the debris was not recovered.” A United Nations Panel of Experts report concurred, pointing to Russia’s use of Hwasong-11B missiles in its January 2024 attack on the city of Kharkiv. In a different assessment by Ukrainian officials, only two out of 24 missiles reached military targets.

This poor performance is nonetheless a valuable learning opportunity for Pyongyang’s missile makers. Missile development is iterative, so this field testing will provide North Korea an opportunity to improve the reliability and lethality of its arsenal.

Economic Factors

Owing to large Russian demand, North Korea’s military-industrial complex received a boost in orders. According to South Korea’s defense ministry, North Korean factories producing artillery shells for Russia are “operating at full capacity,” while factories producing for the Korean Peoples’ Army are operating at merely 30 percent because of a shortage of materials and power outages.

North Korea’s economy is famously opaque, so we are left to speculate on the macro consequences of this activity. Some analysts believe that an increase in weapons production could have positive spillover effects for the ailing North Korean economy, limping from years of isolation, pandemic disruptions, and poor policy choices. But others view the military-industrial complex in North Korea as relatively sectioned off and believe the vast majority of the benefit will be absorbed by the Kim regime and its top-tier military patronage networks.

It remains unknown whether Russia is paying cash for the weapons or following the Cold War bartering model. It has been speculated that the value of the arms exports could exceed $1 billion, a massive step up from North Korea’s paltry $160 million in total exports in 2022. According to the South Korean Minister of Defense, “food accounts for the largest proportion [of shipments from Russia by volume], which is believed to have stabilized food prices in North Korea.”

Geopolitical Factors

Despite these massive military and economic benefits, North Korea’s most significant gain is something more intangible: geopolitical breathing room. In the wake of a failed 2019 US-DPRK summit in Hanoi, compounded by a severe pandemic border closure in early 2020, North Korea was as isolated as ever. Pyongyang’s multi-decade-long gambit to gain recognition as a nuclear power and normalize relations with the United States on those terms has hit a wall. Pyongyang’s leaders have always been wary of over-relying on China, their lone security ally (until the Treaty signed with Russia on June 19) and source of 97 percent of their external trade. But new options have emerged after Russia’s war against Ukraine and increasing strategic competition between the US and China have scrambled the global chess board and solidified opposing blocs.

North Korea is no longer so isolated; it has found company in a cast of revisionist powers with anti-West agendas, including Russia, China and Iran. Over and above ideological comradery and an anti-West posture, Russia’s support for North Korea stems from its dependence on North Korea’s military-industrial complex. Russia vetoed the March 2024 mandate extension for a UN Security Council body set up to oversee the implementation of sanctions on North Korea, thereby obscuring Russia’s own transgressions and opening up scores of new proliferation opportunities for the Kim regime.

As the centerpiece of this new relationship, Kim Jong Un was able to get Russian President Vladimir Putin to sign a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership that includes a pledge to “immediately provide military assistance” in case either country is attacked. North Korea already has a similar agreement in place with China, but Beijing has hinted that there are limits to this. The solidification of Pyongyang’s alliance with Moscow. Therefore. not only helps it to evade sanctions, beef up its military and earn currency, but also empowers the Kim regime by freeing it from over-reliance on Beijing. Kim is no doubt taking a page from his grandfather’s playbook here: during the Cold War, Kim Il Sung took advantage of the Sino-Soviet split to score mutual defense treaties with both countries.

As a consequence of the trickle-down effects from the arms sales to Russia, Kim Jong Un is militarily, economically and politically better positioned today than he was before the Russian invasion. This is an impressive feat, considering that the quality of the armaments leaves something to be desired.

Evidence From the Ground

When discussing arms trade between North Korea and Russia, the most commonly addressed theme is that of numbers. In February, the US State Department said North Korea had shipped 10,000 containers, while South Korea said 6,700 containers. The proportion of different armaments (which is unknown) affects the bottom-line estimate. For instance, South Korea reported that 6,700 containers could fit either “3 million rounds of 152 mm artillery shells or more than 500,000 rounds of 122 mm multiple rocket launchers.”

However, what is less discussed is the quality of the artillery shells. Artillery is especially important to sustain Russia’s style of fighting in Ukraine, as it inflicts up to 80 percent of the casualties in the conflict. Russia relies on artillery bombardments in Ukraine, just like it did in the Chechen Wars and the war in Syria, to compensate for shortcomings like poor performance in combined arms and joint maneuvers. Although the infusion of fresh arty is a welcome relief for Russia, the poor-performing North Korean arms can’t help but have an impact on Russia’s ability to gain and hold territory.

Novel primary sources derived from the Ukrainian military-related Telegram (a messaging and social media service) channels shed more light on this issue. Ukrainian Telegram channel administrators have accessed and collected pictures and discussions from Russian Telegram channels in order to provide contextual clues and visual evidence of North Korean shipments. While the authors are unable to independently verify the authenticity of the photos, the low quality of the ammunition evident in the photographs is consistent with other evidence about the performance of North Korea’s arms.

When North Korea struck South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 with multiple rocket launchers, “fewer than half of them hit the island; of those, about 25% failed to detonate,” according to the South Korean military. In December 2023, the Ukrainian army reported on Facebook that North Korean artillery shells were often defective. The post said, “Due to the unsatisfactory state of such ammunition, there are only cases of their breaking directly into the barrels of the occupiers’ cannons and mortars, resulting in the loss of weapons and personnel of the invaders.” Observing the dispersed pattern of Russian blast craters, a South Korean defense analyst assessed that North Korean artillery “cannot be fired accurately.” Finally, a Ukrainian defense intelligence official said in late February that half of the artillery, which is from the 1970-80s, “does not function, and the rest require either restoration or inspection before use.”

The evidence from Telegram tells a similar story.

An early indicator of North Korean ammunition arriving in Russia dates back to October 29, 2023, roughly a month after Kim’s summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin. First to come were the highly coveted 152mm artillery shells. Figures 1a-1d present the North Korean High-explosive Fragmentation (HE-frag) 152-mm artillery shells for D-20/D-30 howitzers shared by Russian soldiers on their Telegram channel and reposted on a Ukrainian military-themed Telegram channel. North Korean 152-mm shells for Russia bear an official name 1-52D, as seen on the shells themselves, as well as their packaging.

Figure 1a. North Korean High-explosive Fragmentation (HE-frag) 152-mm artillery shells for D-20/D-30 howitzers shared by Russian soldiers on Telegram and reposted on a Ukrainian Telegram channel. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6680)
Figure 1b North Korean High-explosive Fragmentation (HE-frag) 152-mm artillery shells for D-20/D-30 howitzers shared by Russian soldiers on Telegram and reposted on a Ukrainian Telegram channel. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6680)
Figure 1c. North Korean High-explosive Fragmentation (HE-frag) 152-mm artillery shells for D-20/D-30 howitzers shared by Russian soldiers on Telegram and reposted on a Ukrainian Telegram channel. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6680)
Figure 1d. North Korean High-explosive Fragmentation (HE-frag) 152-mm artillery shells for D-20/D-30 howitzers shared by Russian soldiers on Telegram and reposted on a Ukrainian Telegram channel. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6680)

The second indication of the arrival of North Korean ammunition was on November 2, 2023, which was even more important. Leaked Russian documents present firing instructions for a wide variety of North Korean arms, which supports the hypothesis of their wide-scale incorporation into the Russian army. The list includes:

  • 120-mm mortar shell, titled Product 120-1
  • 122-mm rocket for the BM-21 “Grad” rocket artillery system, titled Product 122-1-RS
  • 122-mm HE-frag shell, titled Product 122-1
  • 152-mm HE-frag shell, titled Product 152-1

According to the analysis conducted by the Ukrainian channels, firing instructions are almost identical to those of the standard USSR/Russian army munitions, with percentage adjustment on the range for mortar shells (Figures 2a-2d). Furthermore, the source concludes that 122-mm and 152-mm HE-frag artillery shells supplied by North Korea, based on the firing instructions and tables, are identical copies of the Soviet-made OF-462 and OF-540 shells. In addition to this, the source states that according to preliminary information (derived from the comment section in the Russian Telegram channels), the projectiles are thin-walled (compared to the Soviet/Russian ones), which makes them of poorer quality. However, the information was not confirmed in any way by the documents.

Figure 2a. Leaked Russian firing instructions from 2023 for a variety of North Korean arms. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6718)
Figure 2b. Leaked Russian firing instructions from 2023 for a variety of North Korean arms. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6718)
Figure 2c. Leaked Russian firing instructions from 2023 for a variety of North Korean arms. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6718)
Figure 2d. Leaked Russian firing instructions from 2023 for a variety of North Korean arms. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6718)

As early as two months into the shipments, the first concerns about the quality of the shells began to arise. On November 12, 2023, Ukrainian channels shared pictures taken from Russian Telegram, that depict North Korean 120-mm mortar shells (Product 120-1). The shells are very similar to the Soviet-made OF-843/843B 120-mm mortar shell family (Figures 3a and 3b). However, due to lower quality and different charges, the shells have a different range, which is indicated in the aforementioned firing instructions.

Figure 3a. North Korean 120-mm mortar shells, similar to Soviet-made OF-843/843B 120-mm mortar shells. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6821)
Figure 3b. North Korean 120-mm mortar shells, similar to Soviet-made OF-843/843B 120-mm mortar shells. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/6821)

Evidently, due to Russia’s inability to cover its artillery consumption, imports from other countries are present alongside imports from North Korea. On April 3, 2024, Ukrainian channels presented pictures, published by a Russian Telegram channel, that show a side-by-side comparison of the North Korean (Product 120-1) and Iranian 120-mm mortar shells. The North Korean ammunition has a distinctive blue paint coating. Iranian shells, on the other hand, are green and are believed to be better than North Korean due to better weight distribution and more convenient gunpowder rings. In addition to this, a firing table for Iranian mortar shells in English is provided by the source (Figures 4a, 4b and 5).

Figure 4a. Side-by-side comparisons of the North Korean (Product 120-1) and Iranian 120-mm mortar shells. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/8159)
Figure 4b. Side-by-side comparisons of the North Korean (Product 120-1) and Iranian 120-mm mortar shells. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/8159)
Figure 5. A firing tale in English for Iranian mortar shells. (Source: https://t.me/mag_vodogray/8159)

Mortar shells were not the only low-quality products supplied by North Korea. On April 11, 2024, a Ukrainian channel presented evidence of the extremely poor quality of other North Korean supplies. Specifically, the DPRK-supplied 122-mm HE-frag shells (Product 122-1, copy of the Soviet OF-462 shell). According to the analysis, projectiles for the barrel artillery, provided by North Korea, are extremely old. Evidence of this is the absence of paint on the driving band and bourrelet, as well as very few markings. This distinguishes these North Korean projectiles from newer ones (produced in the 2000s-2010s), which have the entire structure of the projectile painted and at least some markings present. Evidently, the analysis in the source suggests that the artillery and mortar shells are being bought from the old stockpiles of the DPRK from various periods. The source poses a question: how many shells from stockpiles will Kim Jong Un be willing to sell to Russia, and what is the state of the production of new ammunition in the DPRK?

Another Ukrainian channel published more evidence on the same day. Pictures found on the Russian channel (Figures 6a-6c) focus on the North Korean 120-mm mortar shells (Product 120-1, copy of the Soviet OF-843/843B). As the source claims, Russian troops complain about the extremely poor quality of the shells. Indicators of poor quality are: 3 layers of distinctive blue paint, the body that has defects due to poor casting quality, and the tails of the mortar shells that are covered in a “centimeter layer of solidol [lubricant/oil-based grease].”

Figure 6a. Pictures of poor quality 120-mm North Korean mortar shells, taken on April 11, 2024. (Source: https://t.me/Pizdsapper/543).
Figure 6b. Pictures of poor quality 120-mm North Korean mortar shells, taken on April 11, 2024. (Source: https://t.me/Pizdsapper/543).
Figure 6c. Pictures of poor quality 120-mm North Korean mortar shells, taken on April 11, 2024. (Source: https://t.me/Pizdsapper/543).

While there are reports that North Korean factories are producing only new munitions for Russia, evidence from Russian Telegram channel administrators shows that only a portion of the munitions shipped by North Korea appear to be new. From all the evidence we were able to gather, we could only find a handful of pictures from Russian sources that showcase shells in good condition that are believed to be newly produced specifically for Russia. For instance, there is an example from January 12, 2024, which showcases a side-by-side comparison of three 122mm shells: Iranian, North Korean, and Russian (Figure 7). In the comment section, there is another picture of a North Korean shell with a production date/title: LOT 21/2023. The shell is believed to have been produced in 2023, hence the different gray paint coating instead of the older blue version. However, as seen in Figure 8, the quality of the shell is still quite poor, with lubricant markings on the bottom of the shell.

Even larger Ukrainian military outlets have been paying attention to the low quality of North Korean shells. According to the sources, North Korean-supplied 152-mm HE-frag shells failed to impress the Russian Army while undergoing quality control (Figures 10a-10d). The shells apparently have differing amounts of gunpowder, resulting in varying combustion dynamics and alternate ranges for the projectiles, as well as open sealing covers, which could lead to the presence of moisture in the shells.

Finally, the dates indicated in some of the picture sources are open to scrutiny. Some of the pictures presented were traced to the channels where they were originally posted and, consequently, the first time they surfaced online: Figures 8, 9a and 9b and Figures 1a-1dFigures 8, 9a and 9b are the most recent, taken on April 11, 2024, and depict the poor quality of 120-mm North Korean mortar shells. Another piece of evidence that is quite up-to-date is a post on X made by a Russian person (presumably a soldier) who customizes shells for a price. The date of the post is May 2, and the shell depicted is a North Korean 122-mm HE; however, there is snow on the ground, which means that the picture was likely taken earlier, perhaps in the winter or late spring of this year. Despite the difficulty of pinpointing the exact dates of the images, it is unlikely that there is a large time lag between the day the original pictures surfaced and the day they were reposted. Ukrainian Telegram channels are incentivized to repost pictures from Russian propaganda channels as quickly as possible. This highlights the problematic nature of the North Korean shells used by Russia and raises international awareness about North Korean illicit arms shipments.

Based on these sources, at least two conclusions may be drawn. First, North Korea has supplied Russia with either old ammunition from North Korea’s stockpiles (shipments without markings and with scuffs), or new shells, but of extremely low quality. So far, there are no indications of high-quality, newly manufactured munitions made specifically for Russia. Even most new shells are oversimplified copies of Soviet/Russian designs. Although we cannot hold out the possibility that North Korea is specifically sending defective armaments, it is entirely plausible that the armaments shipped to Russia are an indicator of the quality of North Korea’s ammunition stockpiles and production capacity. If true, this has major implications for North Korea’s conventional warfighting capacity. Second, no matter how desperate Russia may be for artillery, its military and political leaders are likely frustrated with the low quality of the armaments. Moscow probably has or will implore Pyongyang to provide newer, higher-quality munitions.

Conclusion

A backdrop for all of this is that Russia is increasing its capacity to produce its own munitions. While in 2023 and even early 2024, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) sources indicated that Russia could not cover its daily 10,000-12,000 shells consumption that sometimes reaches 40,000-80,000 shells, since March-April 2024, more intelligence agencies began to ring alarms that Russia is now on track to outpace its three million shells per year target and cover its own deficit by the end of 2024.

Because both Russia and North Korea deny the arms transfers and because of the general opacity of Russia’s military strategy, it remains unclear exactly how the munitions are being used. It is possible that North Korea’s artillery shipments are crucial for filling urgent Russian deficits, and it is also possible that they are merely adding additional capacity to help overwhelm Ukrainian positions with constant barrages. In either case, Russia would no longer rely on North Korea’s help quite so much if it revved up its industrial capacity. This would likely dramatically reduce or even end the quid pro quo exchange that sees Russia provide North Korea with hard currency, oil, food, weapons, and technology.

For now, Kim and Putin remain united in a marriage of convenience because of their anti-West dispositions and need to set up systems of exchange and support outside the US-dominated global financial system and rules-based order. Therefore, even if the relationship cools, a breakup is unlikely. Until then, as long as Russia’s industrial capacity is unable to match its military’s demand for deadly munitions, the primary beneficiary will remain Kim Jong Un.

Figure 7. Side-by-side comparisons of three 122-mm shells from Iran, North Korea and Russia. A production date LOT 21/2023 was noted in the Telegram channel’s comment section. (Source: https://t.me/russianocontext/1741)
Figure 8. Another picture from Telegram, showcasing the poor quality of the shell. (Source: https://t.me/russianocontext/1741?comment=28519)

Figure 9a. Two D-30 towed 120-mm howitzers with damaged barrels. (Source: https://t.me/russianocontext/1487)
Figure 9b. Two D-30 towed 120-mm howitzers with damaged barrels. (Source: https://t.me/russianocontext/1487)

Figure 10a. 152-mm HE-frag shells in their disassembled state while undergoing quality control by Russian troops. A translation of the caption from the Telegram channel lists issues with the quality, with the author assuming that factors such as missing spacer wires and differences in the quality of gunpowder can affect the projectile flight range. (Source: https://t.me/TyskNIP/8461) 
Figure 10b. 152-mm HE-frag shells in their disassembled state while undergoing quality control by Russian troops. A translation of the caption from the Telegram channel lists issues with the quality, with the author assuming that factors such as missing spacer wires and differences in the quality of gunpowder can affect the projectile flight range. (Source: https://t.me/TyskNIP/8461) 
Figure 10c. 152-mm HE-frag shells in their disassembled state while undergoing quality control by Russian troops. A translation of the caption from the Telegram channel lists issues with the quality, with the author assuming that factors such as missing spacer wires and differences in the quality of gunpowder can affect the projectile flight range. (Source: https://t.me/TyskNIP/8461) 
Figure 10d. 152-mm HE-frag shells in their disassembled state while undergoing quality control by Russian troops. A translation of the caption from the Telegram channel lists issues with the quality, with the author assuming that factors such as missing spacer wires and differences in the quality of gunpowder can affect the projectile flight range. (Source: https://t.me/TyskNIP/8461) 
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