North Korea’s Regional Development: The Long Journey Toward “20×10 Policy”

North Korea has been plagued by poverty since the 1990s, when the entire economic system came to a standstill. Although the economy has gradually recovered since the 2000s, the latest figures released by the North Korean government show that the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita stood at $1,400 in 2019 (Figure 1). North Korea has consistently cited the improvement of the people’s livelihood as the ultimate economic policy goal, but it often took a backseat in actual resource allocation. The heavy industry sector was frequently given priority over light industry. The funds that remained for the civilian economy were channeled first and foremost to the capital, Pyongyang, before the provinces. Even within the provinces, central cities were given priority over those in peripheries. However, Kim Jong Un could not indefinitely postpone the development of the provinces, home to over 80 percent of the population.

It is against this backdrop that Kim Jong Un launched the “Regional Development 20×10 Policy” (referred to as the “20×10 Policy” hereafter), which aims to build local industrial “modernized factories” in 20 cities and counties per year over the next 10 years. An unprecedented initiative aimed at promoting regional economic development, particularly regional industries, this project is notable for being North Korea’s first regional development effort with its own name.

In this author’s opinion, the goal of the 20×10 Policy is not merely to build a few good factories in the provinces. It did not simply pop up overnight, either. Instead, the North Korean leadership appears to be trying to ultimately establish a sustainable “regional innovation system” where industrial facilities for production, educational institutions for training personnel and research institutions for technological support, which North Korea has endeavored to build since 2008, all come together to make one whole.

While it may seem that the 20×10 Policy was abruptly launched in January 2024, it is an extension of a policy announced at the Eighth Party Congress in January 2021, which laid out a regional economic development strategy centered on cities and counties. Kimhwa County served as the test case and demonstrated a plan for comprehensive transformation of entire cities and counties rather than merely modernizing a few factories. The 20×10 Policy builds on that model, under both Kim Jong Un’s direction and with state, party and military backing to support it.

Launch of the “Regional Development 20×10 Policy”

The term “Regional Development 20×10 Policy” first emerged in Kim Jong Un’s policy speech on January 15, 2024, at the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), the North Korean parliament. In his speech, Kim explained that the policy did not merely aim at the modernization of certain factories but a comprehensive transformation of local economies at city and county levels.

North Korea’s administrative districts are divided into three tiers: 13 provinces (도), approximately 200 cities and counties (시, 군) and around 4,000 ri (리), or villages. Building industrial factories in 20 cities and counties annually over 10 years, therefore, entails a nationwide transformation, not just a focus on Pyongyang or a few key regions.

At Kim’s proposal, practical measures for the 20×10 Policy were discussed and decided in detail during an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee that followed the SPA session. A thorough examination of Kim’s policy speech and the Political Bureau meeting readout shows two distinctive features of this policy.

First, Kim Jong Un pledged his personal responsibility for and commitment to the 20×10 Policy. He said:

And I think of setting up a section for guiding regional industry construction in the Organizational Leadership Department [Organization and Guidance Department; OGD] of the Party Central Committee and reviewing its work on my own responsibility and pressing ahead with it.[1]

It is unprecedented for the supreme leader, who technically oversees and supervises all state affairs, to single out and assume responsibility for a specific project. This underscores his determination for the project’s success. It also indicates that Kim views the project’s complexity and scope as too great for anyone else to manage.

Second, in a rare move, North Korea pledged party resources and mobilized the military from the outset of this economic project instead of leaving it to the cabinet, which oversees the national economy. This again reflects the project’s unprecedented scale and complexity.

Kim Jong Un guaranteed that “the Party would continue to provide funds, labor force and materials annually and compulsorily to each county.” Furthermore, as noted above, the WPK established a new “section for guiding regional industry construction in the Organizational Leadership Department” to oversee the project. North Korea plans to systematically implement this large-scale project by establishing what Kim referred to as a “national [국가적] guidance work system,” leveraging the party’s authority of personnel management.

On the military front, Kim issued the order “On mobilizing units of the People’s Army for the struggle to implement the resolution of the 19th Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Eighth Central Committee of the WPK on bringing about a regional industrial revolution.” North Korea rarely pledges military resources at the start of a project. Since the annual target suddenly increased from four to 20 cities or counties under this project, North Korea, from the outset, mobilized the army, which can most rapidly mobilize resources and personnel (see the next paragraph on the original target of four cities or counties.). To that end, North Korea organized special units, “the 124th regiments,” specific to this project and deployed them to construction sites.

The 20×10 Policy may come across as a spontaneous project because it suddenly appeared in Kim’s SPA speech in January 2024. There was no mention of this policy in state media’s readout of a party plenary meeting held just two weeks prior, where the North reviewed the work of 2023 and announced plans for 2024. However, North Korea has been laying the groundwork for this project since at least the Eighth Party Congress in 2021, as the next section will explore. Due to insufficient personnel, resources and funds, the original plan was to limit the project’s scope to one city, three counties and approximately 200 factories, an approach that appears to have been in place even to the end of the party plenary meeting in December 2023.

Kimhwa County: A Testbed for the 20×10 Policy

North Korea made a strategic decision at the Eighth WPK Congress in January 2021 to develop regional economies centered on cities and counties. Accordingly, North Korea launched a pilot project for regional industrial development in Kimhwa County, Kangwon Province, in March 2021. According to North Korean media, Kim Jong Un chose Kimhwa County as the initial pilot project county due to its severe underdevelopment.[2] Situated near the demilitarized zone, more than 80 percent of Kimhwa County is covered by mountains, and it lacks significant industrial infrastructure.[3] Additionally, Kimhwa County suffered severe damage from heavy rains in August 2020. Therefore, the North Korean leadership seems to have believed that if the 20×10 Policy were modeled after a county as poorly situated as Kimhwa, it would be easier to implement the policy in other cities and counties with better conditions.

Instead of conducting partial repairs in the wake of severe flooding in 2020, North Korea completely rebuilt damaged houses and factories in Kimhwa County. By the end of 2020, North Korea had built a new village of approximately 100 homes. The regional industrial factories construction project, launched in Kimhwa County in March 2021, was completed by June 2022. During this process, North Korea brought together scattered factories into a new industrial complex. The newly built factories in the industrial complex included facilities for food, clothing, daily necessities and paper production.[4] The decision to build paper factories likely stemmed from Kim’s emphasis on the rapid development of education at party plenary meetings in April 2018 and April 2019. Kim, in the past, has pointed to paper shortages as a key problem in the education sector and called for increased paper production.

Conceptually, North Korea promotes the need to achieve a “self-supporting” economic system,  meaning self-sufficiency in fuel (energy), raw materials, manpower and technology. However, in reality, the extent and manner of self-sufficiency can vary. The Kimhwa County case illustrates that self-sufficiency in raw materials and workers was essential at a regional level, but the central government provided critical technological support. In this author’s view, this model of central technological support and regional self-sufficiency in workers and resources may represent a distinct feature of the ongoing regional development policy.

North Korea, since 2023, has made efforts to disseminate the Kimhwa County model nationwide. In May 2023, the cabinet established a “non-permanent central committee for promoting the reconstruction and modernization of local industrial factories” to standardize and generalize the Kimhwa County model and begin applying it to other regions and factories. The committee selected the city of Kaesong and three counties (Jaeryong, Yonthan and Usi), as well as approximately 200 factories, for reconstruction and modernization.[5] Based on the committee’s name and the significantly larger number of target factories compared to the four cities and counties selected for the project, we may infer that North Korea was focused at the time on modernizing individual factories rather than comprehensively rebuilding regional economies.

That approach seems to have lasted through the end of the party plenary meeting in December 2023. North Korean media provided only a gist, rather than the full text, of Kim’s conclusion at the plenum, which makes it impossible to ascertain what exactly he said about regional development. Going by the publicly available summary, however, Kim neither mentioned the term “regional development” nor did he discuss city or county development.

With the launch of the 20×10 Policy, the “non-permanent central committee for promoting the reconstruction and modernization of local industrial factories” was transformed into the “non-permanent central committee for promoting regional development 20×10 policy.”

Long-standing Interest in Regional Development

A review of North Korean media shows that the country’s interest in regional development did not start in 2021 but goes back much further. The number of articles containing the terms “regional industry (지방공업)” or “regional economy (지방경제)” in North Korea’s two main newspapers, Rodong Sinmun, the party daily, and Minju Joson, the cabinet daily, increased significantly not only in in the wake of the Eighth Party Congress in 2021 but also in 2011.[6]

.[7]

The jump in 2010 may be accounted for by North Korea’s emphasis on light industry. The title of the 2010 New Year’s joint editorial, which unveiled North Korea’s policy priorities for 2010, was “Let Us Bring About a Decisive Turn in the Improvement of the People’s Living Standards by Vigorously Promoting Light Industry and Agriculture in This Year Marking the 65th Founding Anniversary of the Party.” There is a strong connection between regional industries and economies and light industry. This appears to explain state media’s significant attention to the terms “regional industry” and “regional economy” in 2010 and the first peak observed the following year.[8]  Kim’s shift back to the economy in 2018 allowed for the reemergence of regional economic development policies, accounting for a second peak that year. The number of newspaper articles on regional industries and regional economies peaked for the third time in 2021 after the Eighth Party Congress called for regional development.

The drop from 2012 to 2017 likely was due to the large volume of articles in 2012 that mourned the death of Kim Jong Il and the launch in March 2013 of the second byungjin policy, or the simultaneous development of the economy and nuclear forces, which lasted until the policy shifted back to the economy in 2018. Although byungjin, in theory, called for parallel development, in reality, it prioritized nuclear weapons development. A review of Rodong Sinmun and Minju Joson shows that there is an inverse correlation between the number of articles mentioning “regional industry” or “regional economy” and “munitions industry (군수공업)” or “defense industry (국방공업).” This interpretation is also supported by a rise from 2012 to 2017 in the number of articles containing “defense science (국방과학),” which is often associated with nuclear weapons (Figure 3). This trend peaked in 2017 when North Korea’s byungjin policy culminated in test firings of the Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). There was another uptick in the volume of articles mentioning “regional industry” or “regional economy” in 2018 when North Korea declared a shift from byungjin to a policy of “concentrating all efforts on the socialist economic construction.”

This would seem to indicate that military expenditure is a direct obstacle to economic development, particularly regional economic development. In other words, North Korea could only fully commit itself to regional development when military spending was deprioritized. The policy of regional economic development, which North Korea has emphasized since approximately 2010, was pushed aside for some time as military tensions increased, resulting in Pyongyang’s prioritization of national defense. In that light, we may say the 20x10 Policy began as early as 2010 but only started gaining traction in 2021.

Based on the inverse correlation discussed above, North Korea’s increased focus on weapons development since the party congress in 2021 has been a stumbling block to the implementation of its regional development policy. This may explain what may have been a disagreement between Kim Jong Un and the rest of the leadership over the 20x10 Policy. It is possible that Kim announced this major policy for the new year not at the year-end party plenary meeting in 2023 but two weeks afterward because he and the top leadership were not aligned on the feasibility of the 20x10 Policy. Most North Korean officials may have assessed they would not be able to suddenly expedite regional development due to ongoing defense spending, while Kim may have believed regional development should not be slowed down.

Conclusion

Like all countries’ economic policies, the ultimate goal of North Korea’s economic policy is improving the people’s livelihood. However, North Korea has rarely prioritized policies directly related to light industry or regional economies. Its civilian economy has often taken a back seat to heavy industry, defense sectors, and the capital, Pyongyang. In this context, the “Regional Development 20x10 Policy,” launched in January 2024, is a rare instance where North Korea is giving the civilian economy foremost support at the party, government and military levels, setting this policy apart from similar previous initiatives.

While it may seem that the 20x10 Policy was abruptly launched during Kim Jong Un’s policy speech in January 2024, it is an extension of a policy that had been tested in Kimhwa County since 2021. North Korea already announced at the Eighth Party Congress in January 2021 a regional economic development strategy centered on cities and counties. The Kimhwa County case demonstrated a comprehensive transformation of entire cities and counties rather than merely modernizing a few factories. Kim Jong Un accelerated a plan to roll out this model nationwide by launching the 20x10 Policy, pledging personal responsibility for its success.

It is easy to presume that a sudden acceleration of the 20x10 Policy would be challenged at multiple levels. However, as the plan is still in its early stages, it would be better to develop analytical frameworks from various perspectives rather than rushing to judgment. North Korea’s regional economic development strategy, which has been in motion for at least three and up to fifteen years ago, should be understood from a longer historical perspective.

If we consider North Korea’s efforts since 2008 to establish research and educational institutions along with industrial facilities centered on cities and counties, we may view the 20x10 Policy through the lens of a “regional innovation system.” In that vein, the next article will turn back the clock to 2008 and explore North Korea’s research organizations that make up the core pillars of the country’s regional innovation system, including the Electronic Business Research Institute (전자업무연구소).

This research was financially supported by the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies (IPUS) at Seoul National University under the project “Laying the Groundwork for Unification and Peace.”

1. [1]

   Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Policy Speech at 10th Session of 14th SPA,” Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), January 16, 2024, http://kcna.co.jp/item/2024/202401/news16/20240116-02ee.html.

2. [2]

   “지방공업의 새로운 도약, 본보기적실체 – 개건현대화된 김화군 지방공업공장 준공식 진행 [A New Leap for and Exemplary Reality of Local Industries: Completion Ceremony of Reconstructed and Modernized Local Industrial Factories in Kimhwa County Held],” Rodong Sinmun, June 23, 2022.

3. [3]

   “김화군 [Kimhwa County],” Encyclopedia of Korean Culture, Academy of Korean Studies, https://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/Article/E0011101; and”강원도 김화군 개요 [Overview of Kimhwa County, Kangwon Province],” North Korean Human Geography, Institute for Peace Affairs, http://www.cybernk.net/infoText/InfoAdminstList.aspx?mc=AD0101&ac=A0706.

4. [4]

   “지방공업의 새로운 도약, 본보기적실체 – 개건현대화된 김화군 지방공업공장 준공식 진행 [A New Leap for and Exemplary Reality of Local Industries: Completion Ceremony of Reconstructed and Modernized Local Industrial Factories in Kimhwa County Held],” Rodong Sinmun, June 23, 2022.

5. [5]

   Park Song Rim, “지방공업공장들의 개건현대화를 위한 적극적인 실행대책 강구 – 내각에서 [Cabinet Takes Positive Measures for Reconstruction and Modernization of Local Industrial Factories],” Minju Jonson, May 20, 2023.

6. [6]

   Data in Figures 2 and 3 were derived by examining the number of articles containing the terms “regional industry (지방공업)” or “regional economy (지방경제)” in Rodong Sinmun and Minju Joson using the Korean Press Information Database (KPM; dprkmedia.com). The KPM, operated by the Tokyo-based Chosun Media, offers full-text articles from North Korean dailies and academic journals with official authorization from North Korea.

7. [7]

   On average, Rodong Sinmun publishes 40 to 60 articles on six pages daily, while Minju Joson publishes 25 to 40 articles on four pages, six days a week. An increase in the volume of relevant articles indicates a rise in the priority of that policy. Since the total volume of articles varies from year to year, examining shifts in the ratio of relevant articles rather than their absolute number would more accurately reflect policy priorities.

8. [8]

   For more on the rise between 2008 and 2015 of light industry and food industry, which are closely related to regional industries, see Hojye Kang, “Company-Level Technological Innovation in DPR Korea: Focusing on Kumkhop General Foodstuff Factory for Sportspeople,” The Korean Journal for the History of Science 44, no. 2 (August 2022): 321–338, https://doi.org/10.36092/KJHS.2022.44.2.321.