Pyongyang’s New Frame
Pyongyang continues to alter how it frames the international security landscape, increasingly portraying itself as part of a larger collection of countries standing against the United States (US). Rather than suggest it is facing the US alone, it is painting itself as part of a group of “independent sovereign states” being threatened. Recently it has refined that image further, and suggested the next step will be formation of a “just strategic axis” to redress what it calls an “imbalance” of forces on the Peninsula and in the region created by new US-led defense alignments in the Indo-Pacific.
This framing has policy implications on several levels. Internally, it may be meant to reassure the domestic audience that the North will not be alone in the event of a confrontation with the US. Externally, Pyongyang may anticipate that grouping itself with “independent sovereign states” will be useful in providing cover—however thin—for any action it takes, blunting US efforts to gather a broad anti-DPRK coalition in event of a crisis.
While the new term “just strategic axis” may be largely propaganda-speak, the concept of a broader, more concrete security alignment may be the next step in Pyongyang’s more aggressive stance on the Peninsula. The term first appeared in a press statement issued by the Foreign Ministry’s Institute for Disarmament and Peace on September 13, the same day Sergei Shoigu, Secretary of the Russian Security Council, arrived in Pyongyang. That raises the possibility that enhanced DPRK-Russia military cooperation may have been a topic during the visit. The term appeared again in a long article on September 14 (the day Shoigu departed), by one of the North’s “international analysts” criticizing AUKUS and warning of other moves by the US to fashion a new security architecture in the Indo-Pacific.
Shoigu, who flew directly from St. Petersburg, where Russian President Putin had just warned of a tough response if the US and NATO approved Ukrainian use of their weapons for deep strikes into Russia, could have been prepared to discuss with Kim what Putin meant and how the North fit in. On the ground in Pyongyang for only 13 hours, Shoigu had two meetings with Kim Jong Un. To demonstrate how well the meetings went and the strength of Pyongyang’s ties with Moscow, Kim broke with protocol and personally saw Shoigu off at the airport.
Less than a week after Shoigu’s visit, there was an odd ballet of official Russian aircraft flying between Khabarovsk (Kh), Vladivostok (Vv), and North Korea.1 On September 19, a Special Flight Squadron (SFS) plane and a Russian Air Force IL 62 landed in Vladivostok within minutes of each other. Later the same day, the SFS plane flew to somewhere on the North’s east coast, returned to Vv a few hours later, then left for Novosibirsk. Within a short time the Air Force plane took off for Pyongyang, stayed on the ground only about an hour before flying directly to Kh; the following day (September 21) the Air Force plane flew back to Vv, remained there until 22 September, returned briefly to Kh, then flew directly to Pyongyang where it was on the ground for about two hours before returning to Vv for a brief stop before taking off near dawn on 23 September for an airport outside of Moscow.
(AF IL 62 itinerary 19-23 September): Moscow-Vv-Py-Kh-Vv-Kh-Py-Vv-Moscow
Precisely what those flights were supporting or delivering is unknown, but their unusual itineraries, their proximity to the Shoigu visit, and the appearance of the new North Korean language on a “just strategic axis” suggest that they were connected in whole or in part with developments in Russian-DPRK military ties. All along, in addition to stronger diplomatic backing, Kim has undoubtedly been expecting Russian support in terms of military technology and hardware. With the possibility of another round of escalation in the Ukraine war, Kim may have decided the time is ripe to push Putin to see that it is in Russia’s interest for North Korean action that will distract the US and interfere with ROK supplies of armaments that find their way to support for Ukraine
Pyongyang may hope to see a “strategic axis” that includes both Russia and China one day, however that isn’t the case right now. China-DPRK relations are sore lagging the North’s deepening cooperation with Russia. In fact, Pyongyang rarely mentions China at all, in stark contrast to its fulsome public support for Russia. The temperature may have dropped several degrees as a result of Kim Jong Un’s markedly cool personal treatment of Chinese leader Xi Jinping in a message sent earlier this week. Kim only dropped one adjective (“deep”) normally found in such messages, but Beijing will notice.