North Korea’s Post-Parliament Tension Signaling
Predicting North Korea’s next moves can be risky, even for the most seasoned and careful experts who base their analysis on a robust baseline of relevant data. Cases in point are the latest Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) session held on October 7 and 8, and the steps North Korea has since taken.
The general assessment was that Pyongyang would remove unification-related language and define North Korea’s territory in a constitutional revision at the SPA session—probably with Kim giving a policy speech, as he has done at all fall SPA sessions since 2021.[1] Many North Korea watchers, including myself, had also predicted that inter-Korean tensions would inevitably increase as a result of North Korea’s announcement—and probably enforcement—of its new borders.
Contrary to these widespread expectations, North Korean media’s readout of the latest SPA meeting did not mention any of these topics, focusing instead on economic issues. And in lieu of addressing the SPA, Kim made a rare visit to the University of National Defense, where he gave a speech with a heavy nuclear focus. As a result, speculation abounded in the days that followed about whether North Korea revised the constitution related to unification and North Korean territory.
Even more surprising and significant than the outcome of the SPA session itself is what followed. North Korea demolished sections of the inter-Korean roads and railways and issued a flurry of angry statements on alleged South Korean drone incursions into Pyongyang airspace, escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
In the first week after the SPA session, it appeared that North Korea was not ready for a major confrontation with Seoul. However, its demolition of the inter-Korean roads and railways and belated implication of a constitutional revision defining “the ROK as a hostile state” may signal a turn of events.[2] In that vein, Kim Jong Un’s nuclear rhetoric in recent days, reinforced by his sister Kim Yo Jong’s statement, may be cause for concern.
Upping the Ante
Prior to its announcement of the road and railway demolition, Pyongyang’s handling of the border question suggested it was not ready to confront South Korea over the definition of its border or address it with its own people. This included the fact that no details were provided about the constitutional revisions passed at the October SPA session (other than the revisions adjusting people’s working and voting ages), and that North Korea’s announcement of its plan to sever all inter-Korean roads and railways was disseminated to external audiences only.
By contrast, North Korea was much more vocal about the alleged South Korean drone incursions, even sharing relevant statements with the domestic populace despite the apparent sensitivities surrounding the military’s failure to protect the Pyongyang airspace. Yet, similar to the North’s treatment of the border issue, the initial set of statements suggested the country did not wish to escalate tensions with Seoul beyond what was necessary. The warnings were all conditional and left room for de-escalation. Placing eight artillery brigades on “standby to open fire” in case of recurrence paled compared to the “wartime state” of frontline units in August 2015. Even North Korean media’s coverage of the people’s reaction for the first two days was underwhelming in volume and tone when compared to the intensive anti-South Korea campaign in June 2020.
However, an unusual meeting of top defense and security officials convened by Kim Jong Un on October 14 marked a turning point. North Korea destroyed sections of the inter-Korean roads and railways the day after the meeting, presumably in response to Kim’s instructions on “immediate military activities.”[3] It was after this meeting that North Korea announced the demolition of the railways and roads to its own people as well as to external audiences. It was also after this meeting that Pyongyang implied the constitution had been revised to redefine South Korea, in line with Kim’s new two Koreas policy.[4] These were both notable shifts from North Korea’s previous positions.
Although state media readout of the October 14 meeting did not provide much detail, there were certain references, such as Kim giving tasks on the “operation of the war deterrent and the exercise of the right to self-defense,” that raise concern about the potential for further escalation of tensions. In fact, since Kim’s meeting was reported, North Korean media coverage of the drones has taken on a militant tone, with state media reporting that 1.4 million people have volunteered to join the Korean People’s Army (KPA). Additionally, since the publication of the demolition report, there has been an uptick in media coverage of the people’s reactions to the drones, some even slipping in criticism of the United States. This behavior is normal during inter-Korean tensions—for example, state media as recently as March 2023 carried similar reports on joining the army—but it is worth watching how North Korea covers public sentiment in the coming days.
Furthermore, during a visit to the frontline Second Corps on October 17, Kim reviewed their “military action plans” that apparently included Seoul. He described South Korea as “a foreign country and an apparent hostile country” and reiterated his conditional warning of attack against the South, reinforcing his two Koreas policy.[5] These actions and comments by themselves may not be new or remarkable, but they become significant when viewed in tandem with the ongoing tensions.
Kim’s Nuclear Rhetoric
In one of her statements on the drones, Kim Yo Jong referred to North Korea as “a nuclear weapons state” and claimed the United States should be held accountable for the alleged South Korean drone incursions. Under normal circumstances, this uncharacteristically short statement may have been written off as simply odd, but it echoes Kim Jong Un’s nuclear rhetoric in recent days. This, coupled with the summoning of the United States in the North’s propaganda on the drone incursions, merits a closer review of Kim’s nuclear rhetoric.
Pyongyang carried out a carefully choreographed campaign between early August and mid-September to underscore the country’s nuclear capabilities and justify the importance of prioritizing defense development over the civilian economy despite difficult circumstances and limited resources. Notably, Kim delivered an unusual National Day speech, which focused heavily on continued expansion of the country’s nuclear capabilities. The speech was quickly followed by his first publicized visit to a uranium enrichment facility.
Kim picked up on the nuclear theme again in the days running up to, and on the first day of, the latest SPA session. However, his nuclear rhetoric took a tougher turn.
Speaking to special operations units—his second visit to a special operations forces training facility in three weeks—Kim Jong Un made personal attacks on the South Korean president for showing off “their military muscle at the doorstep of a state possessing nuclear weapons” during the previous day’s military parade. He then warned that “the DPRK will use without hesitation all the striking forces in its possession, including nuclear weapons,” against South Korea if it uses military force to violate North Korea’s sovereignty. This was an unusually direct threat of nuclear use, despite Kim’s emphasis on the word “if,” its weight redoubled due to the attribution to Kim himself. North Korea typically uses a more indirect formulation, “the second mission” of nuclear weapons, to indicate preemptive nuclear use. For example, Kim, in a speech at an SPA session in January, said, “the second mission of our nuclear force.”
Kim issued virtually the same conditional warning about nuclear use in his speech at the University of National Defense on October 7—presumably after he had been briefed on the first drone incursion on October 3. Notably, Kim repeated a theme he has stressed since early August—that North Korea faces serious security challenges because “the ROK-U.S. military alliance has completely changed into a nuclear alliance.” This, when viewed in conjunction with Kim’s pledge in the same speech that North Korea would “never tolerate the balance of strength being disturbed on the Korean peninsula,” seems to imply the North may act decisively if it judges that the “balance” is about to be or has been disrupted. North Korea’s official statements and commentaries since mid-August have linked US security arrangements with its allies and partners to the disruption of the balance of power in the region.
During his October 17 visit to the Second Corps, Kim Jong Un reiterated the possibility of retaliation against South Korea if its sovereignty is violated (but omitting the use of “nuclear weapons”) and again stressed the implications of the US-South Korea alliance’s “changed nature” for North Korea’s security.
Conclusion
The ongoing situation makes the North’s motives and next possible moves particularly challenging to assess because of its highly unusual circumstances: violation of the capital’s airspace and North Korea’s disclosure of it. This places not only North Korea watchers but also North Korea itself in unchartered territory.
Another potential twist in this story is Russia’s unequivocal support for Pyongyang amid rising tensions. The Russian Foreign Ministry accused South Korea of a “reckless and provocative campaign” and echoed Pyongyang’s line that the alleged South Korean drone incursions were a violation of North Korea’s sovereignty. The Russian deputy foreign minister went further and said Russia will provide military assistance to North Korea if it comes under attack as per the new North Korea-Russia treaty. This deepening policy coordination between the two countries could affect Kim’s calculus as he thinks about his next steps.
Kim proclaimed to his own people in January 2024 that “if the ROK violates even 0.001 mm of our territorial land, air and waters, it will be considered a war provocation.” This likely has not been forgotten by the North Korean army or the people, and Kim will need to handle the situation in a way that does not make him look weak. We should also recall that two border issues have come up thus far: land (the road and railway demolition and continued work to “fortify” the border areas) and air (drone incursions). It may only be a matter of time before tensions over the Northern Limit Line, the de facto inter-Korean maritime boundary line that Kim has called “illegal,” rear their head again.
- [1]
Kim, in December 2023, characterized inter-Korean relations as those between “two belligerent states” and renounced the country’s decades-long unification policy. The following month, he defined South Korea as the “primary enemy state and invariable principal enemy” and called for removing unification-related language from and defining North Korea’s territory in the constitution at the “next SPA session,” which was the SPA meeting on October 7-8. He also instructed the removal of the “Monument to the Three Charters for National Reunification” in Pyongyang and complete severance of the inter-Korean railways.
- [2]
- [3]
- [4]
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