Quick Take: North Korea’s Coverage of Russian War Against Ukraine
In a speech at a Korean People’s Army conference on November 15, Kim Jong Un said the United States was “sustaining their [its] military assistance to Ukraine” and claimed “the United States and other Western countries are using Ukraine as a shock force in the war against Russia.” This speech was carried for both domestic and external audiences. Kim’s unusual, but not unprecedented, direct reference to the Russia-Ukraine war offers a good opportunity to review how North Korean propaganda outlets have handled this topic since the war began.
North Korea has taken two widely different approaches to the coverage of the war, depending on the audience.[1] Outlets targeting external audiences were quick and decisive in reporting on the war and siding with Russia. By contrast, domestically oriented media were first observed to mention the Ukraine situation in March 2023, more than a year after the war began.[2] North Korea became more forward-leaning in its domestic coverage of the war as its relationship with Russia continued to deepen.
North Korea’s cautious and more calibrated approach to the war in Ukraine vis-à-vis the domestic public indicates sensitivities surrounding the topic. In that vein, it should be no surprise the country’s domestic media, unlike its external websites, remain silent on the extent of North Korea’s role in the war.
External Versus Domestic Coverage
External outlets reacted within days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Two days after the invasion, the Foreign Ministry website carried a bylined article blaming the United States and supporting Russia’s position on Ukraine. An official Foreign Ministry statement reiterated this same line two days later. North Korean external platforms, led by the Foreign Ministry website, have since carried articles and statements consistent with Russia’s position on Ukraine, including North Korean Foreign Ministry officials’ press statements directly voicing support for Russia. Pyongyang’s quick and decisive support for Russia’s war against Ukraine is in line with one of the earliest signs of its foreign policy reorientation in August 2021, when the Foreign Ministry website started to regularly carry reports and articles introducing or supporting Russian positions on international and foreign policy issues.
Domestic media’s first observed reference to the war in Ukraine was in a party daily article on March 30, 2023 citing the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s claim that the United States was encouraging the “Ukrainian crisis” for economic benefits. Domestic media have since published news reports, articles, and commentaries that aligned with Russia’s position on Ukraine and were critical of the United States and the West.
Domestic media coverage of the war in Ukraine has increased since March 2024, shortly after the Foreign Ministry indicated, based on the foreign minister’s trip to Russia in January 2024, that Putin would be visiting Pyongyang and a new treaty would be signed. It was also after this announcement that domestic media started to provide more details about the war and carry Foreign Ministry statements on the war in Ukraine, which had hitherto been reserved for external websites. Choe Son Hui’s Russia visit in January 2024 seems to have given North Korea greater confidence in its relationship with Moscow, prompting it to give clearer signals domestically on its position on the war.
That notwithstanding, domestic media refrained from directly voicing support for the war. In two instances, they indirectly acknowledged North Korea’s support for Russia’s “special military operation” by citing Putin (July 2023) or Russia (January 2024). Putin’s visit to Pyongyang in June 2024, however, was a turning point. In a departure from past practice, a party daily editorial explicitly voiced “full support and encouragement for the special military operation against Ukraine” on the day of Putin’s scheduled arrival in Pyongyang. In his talks with the visiting Russian vice defense minister the following month, Kim Jong Un himself expressed “strong support for and firm solidarity with” Russia on “the special military operations in Ukraine,” echoing the same promise he made during the summit with Putin.
- [1]
There are two broad categories of North Korean propaganda outlets: domestic and external. Domestic outlets refer to official media targeting the people inside North Korea, such as the central radio and television stations and newspapers. They do not include the “Third Broadcast,” a nationwide cable radio network that cannot be accessed from the outside, or lectures and other propaganda materials disseminated inside North Korea that are not carried by the country’s official broadcast or print media. External outlets refer to various North Korean-operated websites, including the Foreign Ministry website and social media platforms. Because ordinary North Koreans do not have access to Internet websites and social media, these outlets target audiences abroad, including South Korea. North Korea targets different audiences to maintain policy flexibility or shield certain audiences from sensitive information while voicing or even reinforcing its message to intended recipients. For more information, see Rachel Minyoung Lee, “Understanding North Korea’s Public Messaging: An Introduction,” in Understanding North Korea (paper series, National Committee on North Korea and the Wilson Center’s Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy, 2022), 9-10, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/FINAL-NCNK-WWC-RMLee-UnderstandingNorthKoreasMessaging.pdf.
- [2]
The author surveyed North Korea’s top two newspapers, the party daily Rodong Sinmun and the cabinet daily Minju Joson, using the Korean Press Information Database at dprkmedia.com. Although a search on the database will show that Rodong Sinmun’s first mention of the war in Ukraine was on February 28, 2022 (“우크라이나사태 《미국의 강권과 전횡에 근원》/조선외무성 홈페지에 게재된 연구사의 글”), the PDF file of the Rodong Sinmun hardcopy for February 28, 2022 shows that the report was not published.