Quick Take: Pyongyang’s Subdued Coverage of South Korea’s Post-Martial Law Situation

How does North Korea feel about South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s enactment of martial law and the fallout, including the National Assembly’s vote to impeach Yoon?

The North’s reaction to the ongoing South Korean political turmoil has been subdued. Notably, it remains silent on reports that the former South Korean defense minister sent drones into Pyongyang in October in an attempt to start a limited conflict with North Korea and lay the groundwork for martial law enactment. North Korea seems to be in an escalation prevention mode for now, probably because of its focus on maximizing economic production by the end of the year, and its continued supply of military resources to Russia. The party plenary meeting at the end of this month and the next Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) session, slated for late January, may lend more insight into Kim Jong Un’s next steps on foreign policy and policy toward Seoul.

Subdued Media Coverage

North Korea’s reaction to Yoon’s martial law enactment and follow-on developments has been slower, sparse, and low level.[1]

Pyongyang’s initial reaction to Yoon’s declaration of martial law eight days after the fact was slower than one would have expected. North Korean media, since May 2023, have regularly reported on anti-Yoon protests in South Korea—even after Kim Jong Un in late 2023 and early 2024 renounced a decades-old policy of peaceful unification and defined South Korea as a “foreign country.”[2] The two-day lag between the National Assembly’s passage of the impeachment bill and North Korea’s reaction also was slightly longer than the one-day interval in December 2016, when the National Assembly voted to impeach then-President Park Geun-hye.

As of December 18, North Korea has carried only three news reports—low in the hierarchy of North Korean propaganda vehicles—since its initial reaction to Yoon’s martial law enactment. Such sparse coverage also is inconsistent with North Korean media’s regular reporting since May 2023 on anti-Yoon protests in the South.[3]

Worth noting is that North Korea has not reacted to the former South Korean defense minister’s reported attempt to draw North Korea into a limited conflict by sending drones into Pyongyang and justify martial law.[4] The North’s silence on this issue is uncharacteristic. It tends to issue official statements or media commentaries on South Korea over issues that concern North Korea. It was in this vein that it issued a flurry of official statements in October alleging South Korean drones had violated Pyongyang airspace.

Preventing Escalation

The reasons for North Korea’s low-key handling of the political situation in South Korea are unclear. It may be waiting to see how events unfold, is undecided on what to say, or looking for the right moment to release a stronger response. The definition of South Korea as a separate country under Kim’s new two Koreas policy could be a factor. Yet, it would not fully explain this behavior, as North Korea has diligently reported on Yoon’s political challenges up until his martial law enactment.

Keying in on its silence on South Korean media reports about the drone incursions, it appears that North Korea wants to prevent escalation. It has been supplying weapons and troops to Russia. Moreover, the overriding theme in North Korean propaganda these days is the economy. The country needs to maximize economic output before Kim reviews the year’s achievements in his report to the annual year-end party plenary meeting later this month. All in all, North Korea is seeking stability at the moment.

Escalation prevention would be consistent with North Korea’s measured response to the drones’ violation of Pyongyang airspace in October. It issued some official statements, Kim convened a meeting of top defense and security officials, and there were some angry reactions from the public. North Korea, however, quickly shifted its focus to the economy instead of escalating tensions, which it easily could have justified. This occurred around the time North Korea reportedly dispatched troops to Russia, which probably explains its restraint.

Although North Korea seems uninterested in escalating tensions for now—and during Park’s impeachment between December 2016 and March 2017, it did not engage in any notable military activities that heightened tensions—its calculus could change if the political turmoil in South Korea becomes protracted. Unlike in 2016, North Korea has no desire to improve relations with the United States at the expense of its nuclear programs; it has defined South Korea as a “hostile state” separate from North Korea, and it has a new treaty with Russia.

The upcoming party plenary meeting and the SPA session in late January may provide more clues about Kim’s next moves. North Korea announced that it will revise “some provisions” of the constitution at the next SPA session. It made amendments to this legal document in October, but details remain largely unknown. It is possible that the upcoming SPA session may make constitutional revisions with implications for inter-Korean relations.

1. [1]

   These reports were carried by North Korean media outlets targeting both domestic (e.g., newspapers) and international audiences (Internet websites). Notably, the December 11 and 12 reports were only available in Korean on the two KCNA websites (kcna.kp and kcna.co.jp), despite these websites serving international audiences. The KCNA websites usually offer major reports, including those related to Yoon, in foreign languages as well as in Korean. It is unclear what this deviation means.

2. [2]

   In October 1979, when South Korea last enacted “emergency martial law,” it took North Korean media two days to carry the country’s first reaction. See “박정희역도가 총탄에 맞아죽었다—남조선 전역에 ‘비상계엄령’이 선포되였다 [Traitor Park Chung-hee Died From a Gunshot—“Emergency Martial Law” Declared Across South Korea],” Rodong Sinmun, October 28, 1979, p 2. Too much time has elapsed between then and now for an accurate comparison—the political situations in and the dynamic between the two Koreas are different, as is the North Korean media environment—but the eight-day lag reinforces how slow North Korea’s reaction was this time, particularly when considering that communications were much slower in 1979 than now.

3. [3]

   A comparison of North Korea’s current media behavior to 2016, simply based on the commonality of South Korean presidents’ impeachment, would show a vast difference in volume and tone. In 2016, North Korean party daily, Rodong Sinmun, carried multiple news reports or biting commentaries almost every day in the lead-up to and following the National Assembly’s impeachment of Park. However, before making this comparison (and putting aside the obvious fact that the circumstances of Park’s and Yoon’s impeachment are different), we need to account for two major changes that have taken place in North Korea in recent years. First, North Korea’s authoritative newspapers, since October 2019, have ceased publishing media commentaries exclusively about South Korea. Second—and this is connected to the disappearance of South Korea-specific media commentaries—Kim Jong Un announced a new two Koreas policy at the end of 2023 and early 2024.

4. [4]

   While reporting on Yoon’s impeachment, North Korea said Yoon had cited the “‘threat’ from someone” as a reason for his martial law enactment, its closest reaction thus far to Yoon’s use of North Korea for his actions.