Quick Take: The South and Syria

38 North editorial note: On December 11 Korean time, North Korea’s external propaganda websites and domestic media carried their initial reaction to South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s enactment of martial law and follow-on events. This coverage, which came approximately one week after Yoon’s martial law declaration, was notably slow in that North Korean media, since May 2023, have regularly reported on anti-Yoon protests in South Korea. This longer-than-expected lag time suggests Pyongyang was undecided on what to say or it was simply waiting to see how events unfolded in South Korea. As of December 11, North Korean media remain silent on the fall of the Assad regime in Syria.  

North Korean state media has yet to issue any response to South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s December 3 declaration of martial law in the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea). The declaration was short-lived and immediately triggered an ongoing political leadership crisis in Seoul. Combined with the sudden collapse of the Assad regime in Syria—one of the North’s closest allies—these developments present the country with dual geopolitical challenges that may compel Kim Jong Un to recalibrate his regime’s messaging and prioritize defense cooperation with Russia.

The only substantive foreign policy activity from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) was a December 4 finalization of the country’s comprehensive treaty with Russia, which took place in Moscow, a December 5 Foreign Ministry spokesman’s statement decrying a power challenge to the Assad regime in Syria, and a December 7 statement from the National Aerospace Technology Administration (NATA) opposing US Space Forces deployment to Japan. The treaty signing and NATA statement constitute old business for the DPRK—the treaty was a fait accompli, and the US Space Force deployment was announced in 2022.

Of course, “the reckless military moves of [the] terrorists” in Syria decried by the Foreign Ministry proved successful on December 8. The Assad regime, a favorite partner of North Korea with whom Kim Jong Un has routinely exchanged messages, folded. Its leader, Bashar al-Assad, was given asylum in Russia.

The December 3 martial law declaration in the South and the collapse of the Syrian regime after 11 days of fighting (amid a 13-year civil war) found Kim and top DPRK policymakers contending with two strategic shocks. With a modest personnel footprint in Syria, North Korean contingency planning may have envisioned and planned for the collapse of the Assad regime but probably failed to foresee how quickly the regime crumbled. Yoon’s martial law declaration was entirely unanticipated.

President Yoon cited “anti-state” and “North Korean communist forces” within his domestic political opposition in his declaration, which included mobilizing military forces in and around Seoul. With that initial declaration, it is highly probable that Pyongyang went into an unpublicized crisis posture out of caution. While the US retains operation control (OPCON) over military forces in South Korea, the martial law declaration raised the possibility, from the Pyongyang perspective, of South Korea launching clandestine attacks against the North or limited military engagement near the Northern Limit Line (NLL).

Pyongyang probably surveyed the ROK’s domestic political landscape in the days after the declaration. Because senior ROK government officials from President Yoon’s own political party were caught almost completely unaware, the DPRK’s Seoul watchers found a high degree of uncertainty and instability. Kim could have authorized military activity or weapons testing to aggravate the overall situation in the region or ordered communique or media activity—like the publishing of Rodong Sinmun essays or editorials—to express satisfaction at Yoon’s predicament, but Pyongyang has exercised restraint. Perhaps at the point when Pyongyang was prepared to formulate some type of response to events in Seoul, Hayat Tahir al-Sham (HTS) and its satellite forces moved into Damascus, Assad’s last stronghold in Syria.

With the collapse of a close DPRK ally and one of the last family-based authoritarian regimes, along with a budding political transition in South Korea, Kim Jong Un and his advisers find themselves in an extraordinary decision-making environment, at the very least in terms of strategic communication and what ideas and perspectives Pyongyang intends to convey. North Korea might use the Assad regime collapse and leadership uncertainty in South Korea to persuade Russia to expedite any potential technology exchanges or defense industry cooperation that might aid in innovating or expanding the DPRK’s weapons systems, including ballistic missiles. Finally, cadres planning for the year-end Central Committee plenum might have to adjust the plenum’s agenda to include more rhetoric and policy initiatives focused on national security.