A ‘Pragmatic’ Foreign Policy Agenda: What’s Next for South Korea’s New President?
On Tuesday, 44.3 million eligible South Koreans took to the polls to vote in the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) 21st Presidential Elections. After six months of political chaos, the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) candidate Lee Jae-myung—with a historic 49.4% of the vote—emerged as the next president of South Korea. Lee’s decisive victory over the second runner-up People’s Power Party (PPP) nominee, Kim Moon-soo, ushers in a political transition as a new progressive administration takes the helm in South Korea.
A pivotal moment for South Korean politics, the 2025 snap-elections followed 180 days of political turmoil after previous President Yoon Suk Yeol disastrously imposed martial law on December 3, 2024. Although swiftly reversed, the martial law declaration shocked the nation and shook the essential foundations of South Korea’s democracy. Yoon’s actions resulted in his impeachment by the National Assembly in December and, later, official removal from office following the Constitutional Court’s unanimous 8-0 decision on April 4, 2025. Months later, Lee’s win signals a referendum against the conservative PPP, heralding the return of South Korea’s liberal party to office.
As Lee takes office, he will need to balance domestic and foreign policy in South Korea’s increasingly entrenched partisan environment—but also implement ‘pragmatic’ foreign policy amid rising regional instability. Some in Washington quietly fear that stark changes to Seoul’s foreign policy agenda may be on the horizon. Challenges and opportunities await the new president as he seeks to address South Korea’s fierce and fractured political landscape, enact policies to boost the slowing economy, and reestablish the nation’s foreign relations towards allies, partners, and, potentially, adversaries alike.
Rebuilding Political Landscape: From the Inside Out
Under the shadow of Yoon’s martial law declaration, the recent South Korean presidential election came down to domestic issues. As South Korea’s next president, Lee will have a challenging journey ahead for his five-year term. First and foremost, rebuilding political cohesion and trust in South Korea’s democratic institutions will take highest priority. During his victory speech, Lee pledged to “end the political crisis” and strive to unite the much-divided nation—a platform that resonated strongly within South Korea after months of internal chaos. To rebuild public confidence in the government—amid entrenched political partisan division—a more robust economic policy seems the first step in the Lee administration’s domestic agenda.
On the campaign trail, Lee prioritized economic policy as a platform for national revival. A focus on the domestic economy may serve to signal to the nation that Lee is committed to strengthening South Korea from the inside out, focusing on improving citizens’ livelihoods. According to Lee’s campaign, economic policy will be a central component to reassure and rebuild national support for the incoming government. Shortly after taking office on Wednesday, Lee announced his first executive order to launch the promised “Emergency Economic Taskforce,” holding a cabinet meeting to plan for an extensive emergency economic package. While plans are currently underway, the new president is leaning in heavily into his campaign promises to provide a much-needed boost to South Korea’s lagging economy.
Second, Lee has assigned his administration the ambitious agenda of simultaneously reviving South Korea’s failing economy and achieving peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula. However, it remains to be seen if Lee can implement a ‘middle ground’ political stance, as pitched during his pre-election campaign. Since the 2022 presidential election, which Lee narrowly lost by less than 1% of the vote, Lee positioned himself as a staunch anti-Yoon voice. A tactic that ultimately played well within South Korea’s increasing polarized political landscape—likely helping Lee ride the wave of South Korean citizens’ frustration to victory during the election.
During the campaign, Lee’s foreign policy articulations centered around the core importance of the US-ROK alliance and stressed the need to continue strengthening the historically fraught, yet recently thawing, South Korea- Japan relations. After taking office, however, many will be watching closely—both within and outside of South Korea—to see whether and how Lee will build bipartisan consensus and strengthen South Korea’s foreign policy. Looking ahead, the new administration will likely need to strike the right balance between domestic and foreign policy initiatives to help the country move past the prolonged political crisis.
Facing Geopolitical Instability: A Call for ‘Pragmatic’ Foreign Policy
Beyond domestic issues, South Korea will face a challenging task of bolstering US-ROK relations amid an unpredictable second Trump administration and an increasingly hostile and unstable security environment in the Indo-Pacific region. To address these security challenges, Lee has signaled the need for a post-Yoon foreign policy reset—shifting instead to a platform of ‘pragmatic diplomacy.’
First mentioned as a part of Lee’s 2022 presidential campaign, Lee redefined his vision for pragmatism, which aims to strengthen the US-ROK relations and rejuvenate US-ROK-Japan cooperation initiated by his predecessor, while also reasserting a more cooperative stance towards China and Russia. This more centrist approach—balancing between traditional DPK and PPP divides—may allow Lee to speak to the DPK’s progressive playbook without sacrificing South Korea’s recently gained foreign policy relations with key Indo-Pacific partners. Moving forward, the international community will be watching closely to see where Lee holds firm to his declared middle-ground foreign policy.
However, not all of this will be on South Korea’s shoulders. Much in US-ROK relations will also depend on how the Trump administration chooses to address the ongoing question of tariffs and US troop presence on the Korean Peninsula. To the Trump administration, South Korea’s trade surplus, which reached $55.6 billion in 2024, may be seen as the largest issue on the table. With the July 8 deadline for trade negotiations quickly approaching, the early days of Lee’s presidency will likely focus political capital on seeking a reduction of the US-announced 25% tariff on Korean imports, the outcome setting the tone for Trump-Lee relations. Additionally, with Trump’s previous statements accusing South Korea of “free-riding” on US security and reports of the Pentagon exploring options for limited US troop removal from the Korean Peninsula, the Lee administration will be watching closely to see what Trump’s ‘transactional’ foreign policy means for the Indo-Pacific security mechanisms.
Given the evolving US-South Korean relations, the largest challenge ahead for the incoming Lee administration is North Korea’s advancing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile programs. To date, North Korea possesses approximately 20-50 nuclear weapons and amassed the requisite weapons-grade fissile material for an additional 50 to 165 warheads. Projections in the early 2020s emphasized the risk of North Korea’s nuclear buildup, citing the potential for up to 200 nuclear weapons by 2027—a deadline well within Lee’s five-year term period. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program demonstrates and urgent and serious threat to South Korea.
Despite the rising threat, Lee has stated that he remains open for diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang, calling for “peaceful coexistence” on the Korean Peninsula. Traditionally, within South Korean politics, progressive administrations tend to turn ‘inwards’ focusing on domestic politics and placing North-South Korean relations at the heart of foreign policy objectives. Leaning into the progressive party’s line of thinking, Lee says he aims to reopen communication lines with the North and “establish an inter-Korean military joint committee.” There is even hope for a revival of the 2018 Inter-Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement, which previously served to limit confrontation and tensions along the Demilitarized Zone between the two nations.
Amid these security concerns, Lee may find himself positioned—by both internal and external forces—to pursue a more centrist foreign policy strategy vis-à-vis North Korea. The incoming Lee administration will inherit an Indo-Pacific security environment much changed from his liberal predecessor, Moon Jae-in. Unlike Moon’s term, which witnessed a temporary period of inter-Korean rapprochement, Lee enters his term faced with an emboldened North Korea, bolstered by renewed and expanding security relations with Russia and backed by China. As Pyongyang continues to advance its coercive and warfighting power through the expansion of its nuclear weapons stockpile, a pathway of political engagement seems unlikely to solve Seoul’s immediate security crisis.
Moreover, foreign policy analysts in both the United States and South Korea increasingly find it hard to envision a denuclearized North Korea despite continued emphasis on this goal. The 2022 North Korean Nuclear Law brought home to many the “irreversible” status of the North’s nuclear weapons program. The 2023 Washington Declaration, which established the US-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), sought to reassure South Korea of US commitment. As the current political climate Washington lays doubt in US extended deterrence, however, many in South Korea are looking to options to balance the nuclear security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula, with some voices calling for redeployment of US tactical nuclear weapons. Consistently, more than 70 percent of polled South Korean citizens have even called for Seoul to pursue its own nuclear armament to address the ongoing North Korean threat.
While the Trump administration is still engaged in its North Korea policy review, early statements by Trump seemingly alluded to the nation as a full-fledge nuclear power, adding to the complexity of managing relations between the two Koreas. Should President Trump attempt a renewed engagement with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, Lee may have a window of opportunity as the DPK has traditionally sought to restart inter-Korean relations. However, there is also the risk that US-North Korea bilateral talks could sideline South Korea completely. Overall, South Korea’s new administration will have to be cautious and not overly optimistic in its approach towards Pyongyang, lest it be doomed to the same fate as the Moon administration’s failed attempts to broker peace on the Peninsula.
Challenges (and Opportunities) Ahead
Although, it remains to be seen what route Lee’s foreign policy will take, one point remains clear: there is a difficult road ahead. Obstacles and challenges abound both at home and abroad. However, there are opportunities should the Lee administration seek to truly build middle-ground politics and establish a platform of ‘pragmatic’ foreign policy. Simply put, repeating Moon’s liberal strategy will no longer work in South Korea’s geopolitical strategic interests.
Instead, Lee will need to devise new foreign policy pathways—potentially, even bridging the long-standing conservative-progressive partisan divide—for his administration to address the ever-pressing security challenges on and around the Korean Peninsula. As Lee takes office, much will rest on the pending outcomes of Washington-Seoul negotiations over recent tariff hikes and the continuation of US troop presence. Additionally, as the US-China strategic competition continues, South Korea will need to balance relations with China—its largest trading partner—while also recognizing that that US-ROK security alliance hold primacy.
Overall, there is much at stake for Lee’s administration. From rebalancing domestic partisan divides to tackling today’s threatening security environment, the early commitments and eventual outcomes of Lee’s term will have wide-sweeping implications for South Korea’s role in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.