North Korea-Russia People-to-People Exchanges as a Tool for Sustained Dialogue
At the meeting with Kim Jong Un on June 17, Sergei Shoigu, the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, noted that the partnership between Russia and North Korea “is being carried out not just on paper, but through practical action.” This was Shoigu’s second visit to Pyongyang in a month, indicating that the countries are planning to elevate their cooperation beyond the current level and expand it within the framework of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
During his visit to Pyongyang in June 2024, when the Treaty was signed, Russian President Vladimir Putin mentioned positive developments in bilateral trade, the Khasan-Rajin logistics project, education, agriculture, tourism, and sports. Traditionally, joint projects are developed by the bilateral Russia–North Korea intergovernmental commission on trade-economic and scientific-technical cooperation. The commission, having held a meeting in 2019, did not convene during the COVID-19 pandemic, but finally resumed its work in 2023 and 2024. Most of the bilateral initiatives were aimed at expanding people-to-people contacts: an art troupe from the Primorsky branch of the Mariinsky Theatre performed in Pyongyang in 2024, followed by visits from North Korean athletes to Russia. Over 10 Russian tourist groups visited North Korea that year, with expectations of increasing tourist numbers, making tourism one of the priority areas for civilian cooperation.
While many analysts’ attention has been drawn to Russia-North Korea military cooperation, Moscow and Pyongyang’s bilateral ties in non-military sectors have been largely overlooked or dismissed, although have been driven by both governments under the guidance of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty. These are the ties that are likely to form the basis for lasting cooperation long after the war’s end.
People-to-People Diplomacy
Regional Russian officials, particularly politicians from Primorsky Krai, have played a vital role in coordinating contacts and determining specific actions for implementing plans set during the summit between Kim and Putin at Vostochny Cosmodrome in September 2023, as well as at a North Korea-Russia intergovernmental commission meeting the following month. A delegation led by the governor of Primorsky Krai, Oleg Kozhemyako, visited Pyongyang in December that year to discuss resuming direct flights between Vladivostok and Pyongyang, as well as steps to establish rail and road transportation. The governor met with officials from Rason, the closest city to the Russian Far East, where Russia and North Korea operate their largest joint venture, RasonConTrans. Kozhemyako made another visit to Pyongyang in March 2024, bringing a delegation of representatives from cultural, sports, and educational sectors.
North Korea soon reciprocated this gesture with a delegation led by its minister of education visiting Primorsky Krai to discuss increasing the student quota from North Korea and exchanges of language teachers. From 2023 to 2025, representatives of North Korean universities have been working to build closer ties with prominent Russian universities, including Moscow State University, Bauman Moscow State Technical University, Far Eastern Federal University, Novosibirsk State University, and Kazan Federal University. The North Korean Deputy Minister of Education and heads of ten top North Korean universities participated in the first Russia-North Korea University Presidents’ Forum held at Far Eastern Federal University in May 2025. Previously, the university organized similar forums with other East Asian countries—China, South Korea, and Japan. While academic exchanges with North Korea in 2024 were still marginal, and the number of North Korean students enrolled in Russian universities was only 180, both countries demonstrated interest in expanding cooperation in this field.
North Korea and Russia have been promoting youth contacts, with state-led youth patriotic movements and organizations taking the lead. The first official contacts were established in 2023, when the Young Guard of United Russia (YGUR), a youth movement established by Russia’s ruling party, hosted a delegation of the Russia–North Korea student friendship club from the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Exchanges moved to the higher level in spring 2024, as the Socialist Patriotic Youth League met with the YGUR to participate in joint events in Vladivostok and Khabarovsk, commemorating the fifth anniversary of the summit between Putin and Kim Jong Un in 2019. The following year, the two youth organizations signed an agreement on friendship and cooperation during a meeting in Pyongyang, establishing a legal foundation for future collaboration. This occurred shortly after the ruling party in Russia, United Russia, signed a protocol to expand and enhance cooperation with the Workers’ Party of Korea. Given the close connections between United Russia and the YGUR, leaders of this youth movement may become party members and hold positions in regional and federal administrative bodies. By fostering good relations with YGUR representatives, North Korea is securing its access to party leaders for the future.
Another Russian state-led youth organization, Movement of the First, arranged the first trip to the North Korean summer camp Songdowon for schoolchildren from various Russian regions. A Vladivostok-based travel company, which offered tours to North Korea, provided vacation packages for children to that camp in the summer of 2025.
Russian tourists were the first to visit North Korea after it reopened its borders following the COVID-19 shutdown. The first group of travelers went to Pyongyang, Wonsan, and Masikryong in February 2024, marking the beginning of a tourism revival. However, due to weak transportation links, restrictions on independent travel to North Korea, and the presence of more familiar and popular destinations, only about 1,500 Russian tourists visited that year. Still, North Korea has been preparing its facilities for new tourists, while both countries work on improving transport connectivity. A new tourist train made its inaugural journey, commemorating Victory Day, between Vladivostok and Rason in May 2025, establishing a new travel route.
Previously, North Korea suspended foreign tours in Rason following negative feedback, but did not cancel tours from Russia. Additionally, it was reported that the countries announced the opening of flights between Vladivostok and Wonsan and considered launching a sea ferry service that would transport Russian tourists directly to the seaside resort. However, given the high travel costs, particularly for travelers from Russia’s western regions, tours to North Korea became uncompetitive. Russia’s Federal Agency for Air Transport proposed Aeroflot and Aurora airlines open flights to Pyongyang to make the tours more attractive. At the 11th North Korea-Russian intergovernmental commission meeting, officials agreed to increase charter flights, and later members of the State Duma proposed charter flights from Moscow or St. Petersburg to Vladivostok. However, as of yet, North Korea’s Air Koryo remains the only carrier operating flights between Vladivostok and Pyongyang, and no new flights have been introduced.
While North Korea has the potential to attract more travelers from the Far East, its accessibility for the majority of Russia’s population, which is concentrated in the European part of the country, remains low. Expanding flights to Vladivostok solely to serve North Korea makes little sense for Russia, but this problem is likely to be addressed another way. Recently, Russia has been developing domestic tourism, including initiatives to increase tourist flows to the Far East, which can have a positive effect on tours to North Korea as well: if travel costs to the Far East decrease, then visiting North Korea will become less expensive. This could be a small boon for North Korea’s tourism industry.
Cross-Border Transport Infrastructure as a Driver of Economic Ties
One major development aimed at improving transport infrastructure between the countries was the start of road bridge construction in spring 2024, set to be completed in 2026. The bridge will feature a checkpoint with ten traffic lanes and accommodate 300 vehicles daily. North Korea first proposed building a road bridge in 2018 to enhance trade with the Russian Far East. This could complement the railroad between Khasan and Rajin Port, which was reconstructed from 2008 to 2013 by the Russian company Russian Railways and the North Korean Ministry of Railways. Given the significant increase in rail traffic, the bridge could enhance logistical connectivity and optimize the transportation of smaller volumes of goods, making shipments more cost-effective. This could make the Russian market more accessible to North Korean producers.
A product fair was already held in Vladivostok in 2024, showcasing North Korean foods, cosmetics, clothing, musical instruments, and art items. While local consumers were intrigued by the exhibition, some noted that prices were relatively high. Given that North Korean companies will face competition from cheaper, more familiar Chinese products, these high prices could stop many consumers from purchasing North Korean goods.
Conclusion: What Are the Gains?
The non-military projects being developed between Russia and North Korea create the potential for sustained cooperation that had been limited before the war. Recent people-to-people diplomacy could enhance North Korea’s image among Russians, who have historically perceived it as an impoverished country with a deprived population, oppressed by its government. This perception has been prevalent since the 1990s due to North Korea’s economic hardships and has largely remained unchanged due to limited access to timely and reliable information.
Strengthening ties with regional politicians from the Russian Far East will allow North Korea to build a network of connections needed to pursue its interests in the region. A similar strategy was employed by North Korean leaders in the late 1990s, seeking to establish contacts with Russian officials at various government levels and political parties. Developing ties with Russian ministers and regional authorities helped North Korea to solve some issues, such as securing food aid during the famine, and engage in economically profitable activities, like dispatching laborers. However, Russian politics at that time was more competitive and fluid, meaning that North Korea sometimes backed figures who lacked real political power. This time, navigating among politicians and regional leaders may be easier for North Korea, as the power is consolidated in the hands of one ruling party and cooperation has been codified into law.
North Korea’s interest in fostering public exchanges with Russia may indicate a shift in Pyongyang’s broader strategy to enhance its global reputation. This would imply that Kim Jong Un is attempting to revitalize his grandfather’s policy, which focused on expanding grassroots exchanges with other countries. These connections weakened, and North Korea’s overall image worsened during the rule of Kim Jong Il, leaving a troubled legacy for his son. Russia serves as a good starting point to strengthen North Korea’s global standing, particularly given the friendly ties that have persisted despite Russia’s previously negative stance on Pyongyang’s nuclear program and its diplomatic ties with South Korea, a North Korean rival. Russia is also the best option considering North Korea’s cautious attitude toward China, which until recently, remained the only official ally of North Korea.
Closer ties with Moscow could bolster Kim Jong Un’s domestic image as a strong leader, sought after for help and goodwill by the leader of a major country. Hosting Russian delegations and tourists is safer and more advantageous than sending its people abroad. The presence of foreign representatives in country creates a potentially positive public relations impact, giving locals the impression that North Korea holds greater authority in this relationship. The frequency and intensity of these contacts will largely depend on North Korea’s ability to propose ideas for a common agenda, especially as the need for military assistance from North Korea declines. Considering the political benefits that people-to-people contacts with Russia can provide, Pyongyang is likely to seek to maintain them.
For Russia, this kind of cooperation is relatively low-cost and comes with few obligations. Unlike military cooperation, people-to-people projects attract less international criticism and attention, making them relatively safe. Still, even non-military projects can violate current sanctions, for example, international sanctions prohibit scientific collaboration with North Korea if it can contribute to its nuclear and missile programs. Though recently Russia has been neglecting international norms, if its relations with the West improve, it may become more cautious in terms of sanctions compliance.
Current and post-war collaboration with North Korea falls within a broader context of Russia’s efforts to expand ties with the Global South. Russian Foreign Ministry claimed that Russia would not give up deepening ties with Asian, African, and Latin American countries even if its relations with the West improve. In this context, Russia will try to maintain contacts with North Korea to keep its presence in Asia, even though the areas and scope of cooperation have limited potential.