North Korea Shows Concern Over Israel-Iran Conflict but Keeps Distance From Iran
If Iran expected North Korea’s public support for its armed conflict against Israel, it may be disappointed by the Foreign Ministry’s latest back-to-back statements. Pyongyang’s rare official statements concerning Iran showed it is taking the developments seriously. However, while they focused on condemning Israel and the United States, they fell short of expressing support for Tehran. Given the timing of Pyongyang’s initial pronouncement on Israel’s June 13 strikes on Iran, issued in the wake of Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu’s June 17 meeting with Kim Jong Un, it is likely the detached tone on Iran was coordinated with Russia’s position on the conflict.
Also worth noting is the Foreign Ministry’s criticism of the US bombings of Iranian nuclear sites was noticeably toned down. This seems consistent with North Korea’s recent tendency to avoid direct criticism of Trump, and also possibly reflects Kim’s understanding of Russia’s position on the conflict.
Reaction to the Israel-Iran Conflict
On June 19, North Korea issued a Foreign Ministry spokesperson’s “press statement [taebyonin tamhwa; 대변인담화]” denouncing Israel’s launch of attacks on Iran.[1] It was followed up with a Foreign Ministry spokesperson’s “answer [taebyonin taedap; 대변인대답]” to KCNA on June 23, criticizing US bombings of Iranian nuclear sites only the day before. At first glance, these may seem what would be expected from North Korea: the Foreign Ministry criticizing Israel and the United States. A closer look, however, indicates three notable messages.
First, the latest Foreign Ministry pronouncements showed Pyongyang is taking the Israel-Iran conflict seriously. North Korea has released only a few Foreign Ministry statements primarily about Iran, going back to 1997; back-to-back statements are highly unusual. In fact, since 2015, it has rarely issued Foreign Ministry statements on Middle East conflicts in general. For example, prior to the latest pronouncements, the North Korean Foreign Ministry did not offer an official comment on any Israel-Iran clash since Hamas’ assault on Israel in October 2023, including in the wake of Israel’s major attacks on Iran in October 2024. The fact that North Korea led off with a Foreign Ministry spokesperson’s “press statement”—considered more authoritative than a Foreign Ministry spokesperson’s “answer” to KCNA, the typical format it uses to comment on Middle East issues—underscores the importance Pyongyang attaches to the issue.[2]
Second, while the Foreign Ministry statements focused on criticizing Israel and the United States, they conspicuously failed to offer an expression of support to or for Iran. Although it is difficult to find apple-to-apple comparisons due the rarity of official North Korean statements on Iran, past articles posted to the Foreign Ministry website show that Pyongyang has on occasion conveyed “full support” to the Iranian people for their efforts to defend national sovereignty and “the gains of Islamic Revolution.”[3] Similarly, back in December 2024, during the Syrian crisis, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry issued a spokesperson’s “answer” to KCNA that “express[ed] full support and solidarity with the Syrian government and people in their just struggle to defend the sovereignty of the country and territorial integrity and settle the crisis.” However, none of this supportive language is found in the recent pronouncements on Iran.
Third, the speed of the Foreign Ministry’s reaction to the US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, issuing a comment only the day after, underscores the sensitivity of the issue. However, the statement was also noticeably toned down, which seems consistent with the trend of North Korea refraining from direct criticism of Trump. For instance, the strongest critique of the United States was that North Korea “strongly denounces the attack on Iran by the U.S., which severely violated the UN Charter … by violently trampling down the territorial integrity and security interests of a sovereign state.” This is significantly more moderate than the Foreign Ministry’s initial statement on Israel’s launch of attacks on Iran, which described Israel’s actions as “a hideous act of aggression,” and Israel as “a cancer-like entity for the peace in the Middle East and a main culprit of destroying global peace and security.”
One could argue that the difference in tone may be due to the wider scope of Israel’s attacks and the civilian casualties that ensued. That argument does not seem to hold, however, given past North Korean Foreign Ministry pronouncements critical of US role in Middle East conflicts that did not even involve direct US military action. In October 2023, for example, the North Korean Foreign Ministry called the United States a “wrecker of global peace and strangler of justice” and accused Israel of bombing a hospital in Gaza. While denouncing Israel’s bombings of Lebanon, the Foreign Ministry in October 2024 also accused the United States of committing an “organized heinous terrorist act.”
Committed to Alignment with Russia
Notably, the initial press statement on June 19 was issued two days after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s close confidant Sergei Shoigu held talks with Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang. This six-day lag between Israel’s launch of strikes and North Korea’s first official comment, which is relatively a slow response time, suggests an effort to align with Moscow’s position on the conflict. North Korea can react more quickly when it wants to and is able. For example, it took two days for the North to issue its initial reaction to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine; four days after the invasion, it followed up with a Foreign Ministry comment.
According to North Korean media’s readout of the meeting, Kim and Shoigu exchanged views on issues of mutual concern, including “the complicated international and regional situation,” and “reached a complete consensus of views.”[4] As the talks were held just after the Israel-Iran conflict erupted, it is likely Kim was briefed on Putin’s position on the Middle East situation, and that the North Korean Foreign Ministry statement’s distant tone toward Iran was coordinated with it.[5] It is also possible that the Foreign Ministry statement’s moderate criticism of the United States reflects Kim’s understanding of Russia’s position on the conflict.
Conclusion
North Korea’s recent statements on the Israel-Iran conflict show Pyongyang is taking the conflict seriously while keeping its distance from Iran. Their timing and tone suggest coordination with Moscow’s position and reaffirm North Korea’s strategy to continue to strengthen ties with Russia.
In fact, North Korean media coverage over the past week highlighted the country’s robust engagement and exchange with Russia, ranging from Kim’s talks with Shoigu to the Foreign Ministry’s reception marking the first anniversary of the North Korea-Russia treaty. This, coupled with the apparent effort to align its official messaging on Iran with Russia’s, reinforces North Korea’s commitment to growing this relationship.
- [1]
The press statement followed a Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) news report published two days earlier on June 17, North Korea’s initial reaction to the Israel-Iran conflict. This news report was carried four days after the opening of the conflict.
- [2]
Even before 2015, when Foreign Ministry statements about the Middle East were more common, the preferred format was the Foreign Ministry spokesperson’s “answer” to KCNA.” Almost all recent Foreign Ministry statements on the Middle East—including on Israel’s aerial strikes on Lebanon in September 2024 and on an escalating conflict in Syria that eventually led to the Assad regime’s downfall in early December 2024—were also only spokesperson’s “answers” to KCNA. See “Spokesperson for Foreign Ministry of DPRK Gives Answers,” KCNA, October 1, 2024, http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/64e900f5bd0353837ca02d7babcce3ad0dbbd62ef26c35af409dfe0131459041a666dda1282180e0ee1b4427b0574ae7.kcmsf; and “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesperson on Anti-Syria Terrorism,” KCNA, December 5, 2024, http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/0c38ae5dc5b40c76f44f5d634f2b4dba.kcmsf.
- [3]
“Immortal Feats Performed for Development of Relations with Iran,” DPRK Foreign Ministry website, February 11, 2022, http://www.mfa.gov.kp/view/article/14327; and Korea-Asia Association, “DPRK-Iran Friendship Continuing over the Century,” DPRK Foreign Ministry website, May 14, 2024, http://www.mfa.gov.kp/view/article/19794.
- [4]
The vernacular version of the North Korean media readout of the June 17 Kim-Shoigu meeting says the two sides “reached a complete consensus of views [완전한 견해일치가 이루어졌다]” on matters of mutual interest, including international and regional issues. The English version, however, omits “complete” and says “reached a consensus of view.” North Korean media’s English-version reports of the Kim-Shoigu meetings on March 21 and June 4, 2025 meetings also omitted “complete” in “the consensus of stand [완전일치한 립장].” The reason for these recurring discrepancies is unclear.
- [5]
Article 2 of the 2024 North Korea-Russia treaty stipulates the two sides shall exchange views on bilateral and international issues of mutual concern and “intensify concerted action and cooperation in the international arenas.”