North Korea Leaving Maneuvering Room with the US While Preparing for Long-Term Confrontation

North Korea’s (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) public messaging in recent years has been unequivocally and consistently clear that it will not give up its nuclear weapons and instead, will continue to strengthen its capabilities. This was perhaps most vividly demonstrated by Kim Jong Un’s unprecedented visits to nuclear-material production facilities and the Nuclear Weapons Institute (NWI) in September 2024 and in January 2025.[1] The nuclear signaling aligns with Pyongyang’s renunciation of its three-decade policy centered on normalizing bilateral diplomatic ties with the United States by working toward denuclearization.

What is less clear is whether the re-election of Donald Trump as US President may impact Pyongyang’s tactics toward Washington. North Korean media’s unusually brief readout of the annual year-end Party plenary meeting in 2024 offered limited insight into the country’s foreign policy outlook for 2025.[2] Its mention of a “strategy for the toughest anti-U.S. counteraction” seemed to point to more or less the same policy, but not much else.

As expected, official statements and media commentaries following the party plenum have helped to fill some of the void. They suggest that Pyongyang is leaving room for diplomatic maneuvering if it wishes to reengage the Trump administration, while continuing on a path of a “long-term confrontation” with the United States.

Creating Space for Diplomatic Maneuverability …

If the lack of details in North Korea’s latest party plenum report was intended to create some room for diplomatic maneuvering vis-à-vis the new Trump administration, there have been a trail of signs that would seem to support that assessment.

First, the North’s January 22 coverage of Trump’s inauguration—and belated acknowledgement of his election—marked a shift from its initial decision to remain silent on the US presidential election outcome in November. Moreover, this report was carried in media outlets targeting the domestic public as well as external audiences, suggesting North Korea has started priming its people for reengagement with Trump if and when appropriate.

Second, despite the steady stream of official statements and media commentaries criticizing the United States, North Korea’s anti-US rhetoric has softened since early December 2024. Notably, the North’s use of “the US imperialists” has since decreased significantly. This is true for Kim’s public remarks as well, which are regarded as the most authoritative in North Korea. For instance, Kim’s speech at the Defense Ministry on February 8 was the toughest on and the most detailed about the United States since his speech at a national defense exhibition in November 2024. However, unlike in his multiple past speeches at defense-related locations or events, he did not use derogatory terms such as “the US imperialists.” In fact, Kim’s last reported use of the term “the US imperialists” was his defense exhibition speech last November. While there has been an uptick in criticism of the United States since early February, as shown by a series of “KCNA commentary” pieces, the broader trend from December still holds.

Third, North Korean media have refrained from mentioning Trump by name, even when being critical of US statements or actions. When criticism has been issued, it has referred only to “the new US administration,” “the present administration,” or the “US ruler.” [4] The February 12 “KCNA commentary” on the Gaza Strip, for example, blamed the “present US administration” for the plan to take over Gaza, omitting Trump’s name. These pieces were all carried by media outlets targeting the domestic public, probably because they addressed foreign policy issues that are not directly relevant to North Korea. By contrast, the North Korean Foreign Ministry’s criticism of Rubio’s “rogue state” remark was carried only on external websites and was withheld from the domestic audience. This enabled Pyongyang to go on record as rebuffing the remarks to external audiences, while controlling the narrative about the Trump administration at home.

Pyongyang also seems to be creating diplomatic space by attempting to influence Washington’s thinking as it awaits the Trump administration’s new North Korea policy. Its Defense Ministry said the United States was “openly ignoring the security concern of the DPRK” in reference to a US nuclear-powered submarine entering a South Korean port, an unusually direct accusation of the United States “ignoring” its security concerns. When we consider the flip side of this message—do not ignore North Korea’s security concerns—this is in effect Pyongyang’s call on the new administration to factor its “security concerns” into its policy on North Korea.

… But Let Us Not Be Mistaken

Despite these signals, there is not yet evidence that North Korea intends to change its nuclear policy or its policy on the United States. As noted at the outset of this article, North Korea remains consistently clear that it will continue to bolster its defense capabilities. Kim Jong Un’s latest public remarks, including a “strategy for the toughest anti-U.S. counteraction” at the December 2024 party plenum, a “nuclear response posture without limits” at the NWI in January, and the North’s “unshakable policy of more highly developing the nuclear forces” at the Defense Ministry in February, only reaffirm that the country’s preparations for a long-term confrontation with Washington continue.[5]

Perhaps more important is that North Korea’s thinking on the very essence of the United States and its longer-term relationship with Washington may be evolving. Despite its brevity, there was one passage in the 2024 year-end Party plenum report that was particularly interesting: “… the U.S. is the most reactionary state that regards anti-communism as its invariable state policy…” The unusual connection between the United States and “anti-communism”—“imperialist” would be the typical association—is significant because since 2021, North Korea has consistently presented communism as North Korea’s ultimate destination.[6] This passage alone, without further context, would seem to imply that the two countries are fundamentally incompatible in their goals and values, going beyond North Korea’s decades-long US “hostile policy” complaint. This is not necessarily an ideological issue. It could be something more practical, such as North Korea and the United States belonging to two opposing blocs.

Looking Ahead

While North is clearly in no hurry to engage the Trump administration, it has started to create some wriggle room for diplomatic maneuvering. However, we should not expect Pyongyang to change its strategy toward the United States. The key factors that led to the fundamental shift in North Korea’s US policy—Kim’s lesson learned from the Hanoi summit’s collapse that North Korea-US relations are in for a “long-term confrontation,” and intensifying great-power competition—remain intact. In fact, burgeoning Pyongyang-Moscow relations and North Korea’s changed perception of its own self on the global stage make it even less likely that its strategy toward the United States will take a positive turn in the foreseeable future. Kim’s strong show of support for the Russian war against Ukraine in his recent speech at the Defense Ministry underlines the complexities of the situation.

Keep in mind, this is also the final year for North Korea to complete the comprehensive “five-year plan” presented at the Eighth Party Congress in January 2021. That means Pyongyang will prioritize achieving unfinished tasks presented in this plan, including weapons development and testing, over new initiatives—diplomatic or otherwise. Yet, if Kim sees signs that the Trump administration will factor his key security concerns into its new North Korea policy—Kim recently reiterated that the presence of US strategic assets in the region, US-led joint military drills, and US-South Korea-Japan trilateral security cooperation were a grave security challenge—we may see US-North Korea engagement more quickly than anticipated.

1. [1]

   “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Nuclear Weapons Institute and Production Base for Weapon-grade Nuclear Materials,” Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), October 13, 2024, http://kcna.co.jp/item/2024/202409/news13/20240913-03ee.html; and “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Nuclear-material Production Base and Nuclear Weapons Institute,” KCNA, January 29. 2025, http://kcna.co.jp/item/2025/202501/news29/20250129-01ee.html.

2. [2]

   The readout of the annual December party plenary meeting in 2024 offered only brief snippets of Kim’s positions on key domestic and foreign policy issues, rendering any attempt at meaningful analysis impossible. The policy segment constituted 1,275 words, making it the shortest in all of the North’s year-end Party plenum reports since the country started holding such meetings in 2019. Of these, only 191 words, or 15 percent, addressed foreign and defense policy tasks for 2025, making it one of the least informative year-end party plenum reports for these issues. While quantity is not the best (or even a good) way to gauge North Korea’s policy intent, it is an indicator of how much information is available for analysts to work with.

3. [3]

   See, for example, “KCNA Commentary on U.S. Arms Support to Puppet ROK,” KCNA, February 2, 2025, http://kcna.co.jp/item/2025/202502/news02/20250202-08ee.html; “KCNA Commentary on ROK’s Reckless Military Maneuvers,” KCNA, February 9, 2025, http://kcna.co.jp/item/2025/202502/news09/20250209-14ee.html; “KCNA Commentary Denounces U.S. as Ferocious Robber,” KCNA, February 12, 2025, http://kcna.co.jp/item/2025/202502/news12/20250212-15ee.html; and “KCNA Commentary Sneers at Puppet ROK and Its Master,” KCNA, February 14, 2025, http://www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/ffe4fbb6a859f80077a1632bd898697b.kcmsf.

4. [4]

   Examples include “Press
   Release of Institute for Disarmament and Peace of DPRK Foreign Ministry,” KCNA, February 3, 2025, http://www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/a20e121f20968f0a03f8f07736614282.kcmsf;
   “이란이슬람교혁명지도자 미국과의 협상을 배격,” KCNA, February 10, 2025, http://www.kcna.kp/kp/article/q/3ed720545f2019644bee875708427f7f.kcmsf; “KCNA Commentary Denounces U.S. as Ferocious Robber,” KCNA, February 12, 2025, http://www.kcna.kp/kp/article/q/3ed720545f2019644bee875708427f7f.kcmsf; “로씨야외무성 서방의 량면주의적인 처사를 비난,” KCNA, February 12, 2025, http://www.kcna.kp/kp/article/q/072a322504bf5426ce78c381cff99342.kcmsf; and 허영민, “누구를 비호하고 무엇을 부추기는가,” Rodong Sinmun, February 15, 2025, http://rodong.rep.kp/ko/index.php?MTJAMjAyNS0wMi0xNS1OMDI5QDE1QDJAQDBAMjk==.

5. [5]

   “Report on Enlarged Meeting of Eleventh Plenary Meeting of Eighth Central Committee of WPK,” KCNA, December 29, 2024, http://kcna.co.jp/item/2024/202412/news29/20241229-01ee.html; “김정은총비서 핵물질생산기지와 핵무기연구소 현지지도,” KCNA, January 29, 2025, http://kcna.co.jp/calendar/2025/01/01-29/2025-0129-002.html; and “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Pays Congratulatory Visit to Ministry of National Defence on Day of KPA Founding,” KCNA, February 9, 2025, http://kcna.co.jp/item/2025/202502/news09/20250209-01ee.html.

    

6. [6]

   동태관, “하나는 전체를 위하여, 전체는 하나를 위하여!” Rodong Sinmun, March 18, 2021.