Does North Korea Really Have So Few ICBMs?

On May 13, the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), as part of the unveiling of the Administration’s “Golden Dome” anti-missile system, estimated the current and 2035 sizes of potential adversaries’ strategic missile forces. While much commentary focused on DIA’s projection that North Korea would deploy 50 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in 2035, little notice was given to the assessment that the North currently only deploys “10 or fewer” ICBMs.

Such a low estimate of current ICBM deployments is surprising given how long North Korea has been flight-testing ICBMs, its suggestions that three different ICBM systems have already been deployed over that period, the apparent existence of some 17-21 potentially complete road-mobile ICBM launchers, and the apparent ongoing production of at least 27 others.

The basis for DIA’s estimate is unknown, but may have included factors such as classified intelligence, assumptions about the status of launchers and missiles observed, false North Korean claims about deployment status, limited missile or warhead availability, or even different standards of what is deemed operational.

US and regional security would certainly be better off if the North’s ICBM force was currently so small, not to mention US homeland missile defenses. Regardless of the current situation, open-source information points even more strongly to North Korea’s potential to have an ICBM force well in excess of 50 in 2035 if it so chooses—for example, to cope with expanding US missile defenses.

Open-Source Indications of ICBM Force Size

There are a number of open-source factors that make DIA’s relatively small estimate of the size of North Korea’s ICBM force surprising. They include:

ICBM development timeline. North Korea has been flight-testing ICBMs for eight years, and indicating since 2018 that it has deployed ICBMs—allowing plenty of time for building up the ICBM force. By 2024, Pyongyang had suggested that three different ICBM systems had been deployed over those years.

• The liquid-propellant Hwasong-15 (HS-15), first flight-tested in 2017, is almost certainly the missile Kim Jong Un had in mind when declaring in April 2018 that ICBM tests were no longer necessary for the DPRK, “given that the work for mounting nuclear warheads on ballistic rockets was finished…and the development of delivery and strike means was also made scientifically.” Kim announced a few days later that “the whole of its [the US’s] mainland is within the range of our nuclear strike and the nuclear button is on my office desk all the time; the United States needs to be clearly aware that this is not merely a threat but a reality.” DIA apparently assessed in October 2021 that the North had deployed ICBMs,[1] which at that time basically had to be HS-15s,[2] although an October 2024 DIA report listed North Korea as not having deployed ICBMs. The North’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs specifically cited the Hwasong-15 in February and April 2022 in saying that its missiles were “putting the US mainland in the firing range.” A November 2022 press statement noted that in 2017 Kim “let the armed forces of the country be equipped with” the system. An HS-15 launch in February 2023 reportedly was a short-notice unit training drill, indicating that the missile was still operational.
• The large, liquid Hwasong-17 (HS-17), first flight-tested in March 2022, reportedly completed its “final test-fire” before deployment in November 2022. Various aspects of the parading of Hwasong-17s in February 2023 suggested the North considered the system deployed, including indications that an HS-17 unit had been created in November 2022 (as well as another possible ICBM unit). A March 2023 HS-17 launch, which reportedly “confirmed the war readiness” of the “ICBM unit” conducting the launch, further indicated that the North considered the system to be operational.
• The solid-propellant Hwasong-18 (HS-18), first launched in April 2023, apparently was considered operational by the North Koreans after the successful conduct of its third launch in December 2023. This reportedly was the “launching drill of an ICBM unit” that demonstrated the unit’s “combat capability.” The apparent presence of at least four HS-18 road-mobile launchers (transporter-erector-launchers, or TELs) w ith missile canisters at what North Korean media in October 2024 termed during a visit by Kim Jong Un a “strategic missile base” kept on “combat duty,” further indicates the North considers the system operational.

All of this makes it surprising that only as many as 10 ICBMs are currently deployed.

Mobile launcher (TEL) production. North Korea has released photos and videos over the past several years indicating more than 10 ICBM TELs exist, and that indigenous production of such TELs has been underway – suggesting that even more launchers exist and would be available for deployment by now.

• Four HS-15 TELs with apparent missiles have been seen at one time during North Korean military parades in February 2018, October 2020, and April 2022. The North has not released images of the HS-15 since showing a single TEL at the February 2023 launch noted above.
• Twelve HS-17 TELs with apparent missiles have been seen at one time during the February 2023 military parade, underscoring the fact that Pyongyang has more ICBM-sized TEL chassis available to it than the six Chinese-made WS-51200s reported to have been transferred to the North in 2010. Eight presumably additional TELs without missiles were shown under construction in August 2023 at the March 16 Factory in Phyongsong, an ICBM TEL production facility reportedly visited by Kim Jong Un; it is unclear whether these are the same eight TELs seen there in January and May
• Five HS-18 TELs with apparent missile canisters were seen during that same parade (for a total of 16 ICBM-sized TELs at one time), with four seen at the July 2023 parade and during Kim’s October 2024 visit to a “strategic missile base.” Nineteen presumably additional HS-18 TELs without canisters were seen under construction at the Phyongsong facility during another visit by Kim Jong Un, reported by the North Korean press in May 2024—up from 10 seen in January of that year.

Rationale for a Smaller Deployment Assessment

DIA did not disclose what type(s) of ICBM(s) were included in the “10 or fewer” deployed missiles, or the basis for its assessment. The possibility cannot be ruled out that the US has explicit intelligence on the size of North Korea’s ICBM force. In the absence of such data, DIA probably performed an all-source assessment drawing inferences from various indirect indicators. The following could be among the possible reasons that such an assessment might have resulted in a deployed ICBM number of “10 or fewer” despite the open-source ICBM development and TEL production factors noted above:

Some of what we saw were mock-ups. Some of the TELs (and/or the missiles or canisters they were carrying) seen in the various instances noted above could have been parade mock-ups or training items without launch capability. Media reporting of purported US intelligence documents claimed the North probably paraded “nonoperational systems” in February 2023 to exaggerate the size of its missile force. That said, the North has had over two years since then to build more operational TELs and missiles; it has not released photos of ICBM TEL production since May 2024.

Missile production lags TEL production. That same media reporting also claimed US intelligence assessed North Korea would probably be unable to produce enough operational ICBMs during the next year to equip all the launchers seen in February 2023. If this is the case, Pyongyang’s ICBM production is extremely slow, as it has had eight years from first flight-test to series-produce HS-15s, three years for HS-17s, and two years for HS-18s. There is no open-source information on North Korean ICBM production capacities or rates, but Pyongyang appears to be expanding its capability to produce rocket engines suitable for liquid-propellant ICBMs.

Deployment takes longer than the North suggests. North Korea has not directly announced the initial deployment of any of its ICBM types, and its media suggestions that deployment has commenced may be incorrect or misleading. If initial deployment of a given ICBM system took longer than the North suggested or has not yet occurred, then series production of the associated missiles has also lagged.

There may not be enough nuclear ICBM warheads yet. Open-source estimates generally credit North Korea with about 50 deployable nuclear warheads right now, with enough additional fissile material currently on hand to build some 40 more. There is no open-source information on its rate of warhead (as opposed to fissile material) production, and outside assessments of the amount of fissile material per warhead range substantially. Ten to twenty of those warheads are estimated to have been produced by 2017; these presumably were for other types of delivery systems because North Korea had not flight-tested ICBMs until then. Since 2017, Pyongyang has only expanded the numbers and types of non-ICBM systems it claims are associated with nuclear weapons, increasing the competition with ICBMs for the North’s relatively scarce nuclear warheads. The increasing profile since 2021 of “tactical nukes” was a clear motivation for Kim Jong Un’s December 2022 call for “an exponential increase of the country’s nuclear arsenal,” and since then North Korea has expanded its weapons-grade plutonium and uranium production capabilities, and currently appears to be expanding its uranium enrichment capacity even further.

Methodological issues. During the Cold War, the US Intelligence Community (IC) used very strict criteria to determine when it considered Soviet ICBM systems had reached “initial operational capability” (IOC).[3] But the US had deep insight into a USSR that generally followed set and systematic missile development and deployment practices. North Korea historically has pursued a much less extensive and regularized development approach. Although the US IC certainly understands this, it is possible that the IC might take a stricter view than North Korea of what is necessary to regard missile systems as “deployed” or what adds to the deployed ICBM count.

The Bottom Line

US intelligence assessments generally should be regarded as the most authoritative on matters relating to Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear activities, although substantial intelligence gaps must almost certainly exist for the IC about the secretive “hard target” that is North Korea. Nonetheless, the available open-source information—the eight years North Korea has been flight-testing ICBMs, its suggestions over that time that three different ICBM systems have already been deployed, the apparent existence of some 17-21 potentially complete ICBM TELs through February 2023, and the apparent ongoing production of at least 27 others through May 2024—makes it surprising that only “10 or fewer” North Korean ICBMs are estimated currently to be deployed. Several factors could explain DIA’s lower estimate, including the possibility it has pretty clear classified intelligence. Certainly, US and regional security would be better off if the North’s ICBM force was currently so small, not to mention US homeland missile defenses  Regardless of the current situation, open-source information on ICBM development, TEL production, and fissile material production point even more strongly to North Korea’s potential to have an ICBM force well in excess of 50 by 2035 if it so chooses—for example, to cope with expanding US missile defenses.

1. [1]

   For example, page 20 refers to “ICBMs now in the North Korean inventory”; page 22 states that “The Strategic Force includes units operating…ICBMs…”; and page 41 states that “North Korea’s ballistic missile units control a wide selection of SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs, and ICBMs.”

2. [2]

   The Hwasong-14 ICBM was flight-tested once in 2017 and has not been shown or mentioned by North Korea since being paraded on non-TEL towed launchers in February 2018. Analysts generally assess it had never been deployed.

3. [3]

   In the 1980s, the author was a member of the Ballistic Missile Systems Subcommittee (BMSS) of the Weapons and Space Systems Intelligence Committee (WSSIC), the IC organization that, inter alia, declared Soviet (mostly) and other foreign missile systems operational.