Developments of North Korea’s Land-based Air Defense Systems

In any high-intensity war with North Korea, South Korea and the United States will heavily rely on air strikes to attack key North Korean locations and assets. Though the dense network of air defense systems in North Korea provides overlapping and redundant coverage of the country at medium and high altitudes, the effectiveness of these systems has drastically diminished in the face of evolving air threats, leaving the country vulnerable to air strikes to the extent targets can be located.[1] However, North Korea has been making efforts to try to reduce this vulnerability, and some technical breakthroughs for upgrading its air defense capabilities might be near at hand.[2] A modernized air defense network could not only better protect strategic locations, but also provide cover for the operations of North Korean troops, especially the nuclear forces.

Mid- and Long-range Air Defense Systems

In a high-intensity war scenario, South Korea, the United States and possibly Japan could launch a wide range of precision land-attack munitions against North Korea from air, land and sea. These munitions mainly include:

• Tactical ballistic missiles and possibly hypersonic missiles in a few years
• Subsonic land-attack cruise missiles
• Loitering munitions and suicide drones
• Guided bombs and other precision munitions

Considering cost-effectiveness, and due to a limited radar line of sight at low altitudes, especially in mountainous terrains, mid- and long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) are better suited to engage manned aircraft, medium and large drones, and, when possible, cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles.

In North Korea, obsolete Soviet-era SAMs remain the backbone of ground-based, mid- and long-range air defense systems. These equipment could only pose very limited threats to US and South Korean air assets. As can be seen in Figures 1 and 2, the Soviet S-75 (SA-2) has been the most numerous SAM in North Korea. According to open-source research, North Korea was also able to produce its own S-75 missiles with Chinese assistance.

[3]

Legacy Systems Upgrade

Both the S-75 (SA-2) and S-125 (SA-3) are guided by radio command. Under this guidance mode, the missile is steered via radio command from a ground-based engagement radar, which tracks both the missile and its target.[4] Judging from limited footage released by state media, North Korea has added an infrared seeker to at least some of its S-75 missiles.[5] This modification would bring about three improvements:

• A terminal infrared seeker could improve accuracy, especially at longer range, as the accuracy of radio command guidance decreases when the missile flies further from its ground-based engagement radar.
• A switch of guidance mode during flight could, in theory, increase difficulties for ECM (electronic countermeasures).
• As soon as the infrared seeker locks onto target, the ground-based radar could choose to disengage, which may slightly improve operational flexibility and survivability of the radar.

In addition, North Korea has also tried to mount S-75 launchers on tracked and wheeled road-mobile platforms, despite the fact that the S-75 is a relatively cumbersome, liquid-propellant missile (with a solid booster). The accumulation of these upgrades led to a unique North Korean S-75 system equipped with infrared seekers and carried by mobile launchers. This modification was first unveiled at the Exhibition House of Military Hardware of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) in 2012 (Figure 3).

With improved mobility, accuracy and ECCM (counter-electronic countermeasures) capabilities, the upgraded S-75 systems might pose a modest threat to US and South Korean aircraft—although this vintage system is well understood by the alliance, which presumably has deployed various countermeasures against it. If and to what extent these modifications have been adopted by the KPA remains unconfirmed in the open-source domain, though some have claimed that there is a “widespread introduction” of infrared seekers among existing S-75 missiles deployed at fixed sites.[6] Meanwhile, North Korea’s efforts to upgrade the S-125 system appears to have been limited to only improvement in mobility, which possibly is a function of fewer available S-125 units.

Systems Under Development

번개 5 (Pongae-5/Lightning-5/KN-06)

North Korea revealed a new solid-propellant SAM referred to as the Lightning-5 (US designation KN-06) during a military parade in October 2010. Key components of the Lightning-5 appear to be similar to that of the Russian S-300 (SA-10) long-range SAM (Figure 4), and are mounted on wheeled vehicles.

South Korean authorities do not regularly report on North Korean SAM activities. But, according to media reports, the North might have test fired the Lightning-5 in May 2009[7] and June 2011. In a January 2015 KCTV documentary, an engagement radar of the Lightning-5 was seen participating in a joint live fire drill (Figure 5).

North Korean state media publicly reported on the test launch of the Lightning-5 in April 2016[8] and May 2017. According to South Korean authorities, a Lightning-5 missile in the April 2016 test reached a range of around 100 km. Considering that pure radio command guidance would limit the range of a SAM to around 70 km,[9] the Lightning-5 likely adopted a more sophisticated guidance mode.[10]

Overall, the Lightning-5 probably represents substantial improvements in mobility, range and multi-target engagement capabilities in comparison to the S-75, S-125 and S-200 legacy SAMs currently in service with the KPA.[11] During the May 2017 test, Kim Jong Un stated that the Lightning-5 “should be mass-produced to deploy in all over the country like forests.” However, despite Kim’s order, there is no substantial evidence in the open-source domain suggesting that the Lightning-5 has been deployed in any significant numbers or that it has ever entered active service.

There could be a number of explanations for the Lightning-5’s apparent lack of progress after 2017, such as technological flaws, quality issues, inability to initiate mass production or constraints in resources and budget. The appearance of another new-type SAM in 2020, however, indicated that North Korea might have decided to halt the development of Lightning-5 in favor of an even more ambitious project.

별찌-1-2 (Pyoljji-1-2/Meteor-1-2)

During a parade in October 2020, another type of long-range solid-propellant road-mobile SAM was put on display. North Korea subsequently claimed that this new SAM was tested in September 2021, November 2022, February 2024 and April 2024. During the April 2024 test, the SAM was referred to by state media as Meteor-1-2.

To meet different range requirements, the Meteor-1-2 can be put on either a short booster or a longer one.[12] After booster burnout, the Meteor-1-2 is then powered by a sustainer motor.[13] Notably, the missile appears to have two sets of aerodynamic control surfaces (eight control surfaces in total, referred to by the KCNA as twin-rudder control technology) and four fixed wings to provide stability and additional lift. This rather unconventional design is reminiscent of Israel’s Stunner missile (Figure 6) and, to a lesser extent, Japan’s Type 03 Chū-SAM.[14]

Considering its overall layout, the Meteor-1-2 could, in theory, have a longer range and higher maneuverability than the Lightning-5 because:

• A two-stage rocket could enable the missile to fly further than a single-stage rocket of similar size;
• After booster burnout, the missile becomes considerably smaller and lighter than the Lightning-5; and
• It is steered by eight movable fins instead of four.

This comparison seems to support the maneuverability and range aspects of state media’s claim that the Meteor-1-2 features “rapid responsiveness and guidance accuracy of missile control system as well as the substantial increase in the distance of downing air targets.”

According to images released by state media, the engagement radar of the Meteor-1-2 also appears to be different from that of the Lightning-5. Most notably, the absence of the feedhorn behind the phased array antenna (Figure 7) indicates that further modifications have been made to the Meteor-1-2’s radar.[15]

It is possible that both the Lighting-5 and Meteor-1 systems are supposed to receive target information from the same new-type target acquisition radar and new-type early warning radar North Korea unveiled in 2021, which would possibly serve as crucial components in North Korea’s future air surveillance network. However, there is no updated information regarding these radars at this point.[16]

Short-range Air Defense Systems

Short-range air defense systems are primarily intended to conduct close-in intercepts of low-altitude cruise missiles, loitering munitions, suicide drones, glide bombs and other precision munitions launched from aircraft, as well as manned aircraft within their reach. The ongoing war in Ukraine once again clearly demonstrated the necessity for short-range defense systems to help counter these air threats.

North Korea has produced and deployed relatively modern man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) that are intended to engage both aircraft and small, low-altitude targets such as cruise missiles[17] and a large number of towed and self-propelled anti-aircraft guns.[18] In addition, the country also operates a number of Soviet 9K35 (SA-13) mobile short-range SAMs. According to currently available open-source information, however, most of these systems lack effective means for target acquisition and fire control by modern standards (Figure 8).[19]

Upgrade Potentials

The most comprehensive short-range air defense suite in North Korea to date could be found onboard a new class of naval corvettes that was revealed by state media in August 2023. The corvette, referred to as the Amnok class by the outside world, features a short-range, low-altitude search radar, electro-optical sensors, Gatling guns and a MANPADS launcher (Figure 9). Compared with surface combatants of developed navies, the Amnok class only has very basic close-in self-defense capabilities. However, the sensors on board, especially the low-altitude search radar and electro-optical sensors,[20] could, in theory,[21] also be incorporated into land-based systems to increase the effectiveness of the North’s short-range air defense assets.[22]

Systems Under Development

North Korea showcased its most ambitious short-range SAM project during a military parade in October 2020. In concept, this new SAM shares a close resemblance to the Russian Tor (SA-15) and Chinese HQ-17 systems. Same as the Tor and the HQ-17, the new-type SAM appears to have adopted the simple radio-command guidance mode, but should be able to engage more than one target simultaneously thanks to the introduction of an electronically scanned array engagement radar.

It is unclear how many missiles the North Korean version is designed to carry per vehicle. For reference, the Tor M2 variant carries up to 16 vertical launch tubes (Figure 10), while older types and the Chinese HQ-17 carry up to eight tubes. The maximum range of a Tor missile is about 12 km, tripling that of typical MANPADS.

If deployed in large numbers, this new-type SAM should, in theory, significantly strengthen air defense at short-range and at low-to-medium altitude,[23] although the Tor system in Ukraine appears to have shown a mixed performance.[24] To date, North Korea has not reported any test fire and the future of this SAM project remains opaque. In addition, in 2021, North Korea also displayed air-to-air missiles with modern aerodynamic layouts in an arms exhibition. These air-to-air missiles, if successfully developed, could be converted into short-range SAMs without major modifications.

Conclusion

Efforts made in the past 20 years have yielded few results in enhancing North Korea’s outdated air defense capabilities, leaving the North’s conventional and nuclear capabilities vulnerable to strikes from the air. On the other hand, North Korea appears to be close to achieving more capable anti-air assets. However, it remains unclear how long it would take the North to upgrade its legacy air defense network across the country, and the extent to which such upgrades would keep pace with evolving aerial threats.

1. [1]

   Given the obsolescence of the North’s air defense forces, the primary means of protection for North Korean leadership and nuclear weapons almost certainly is mobility, concealment, and the use of underground facilities.

2. [2]

   C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), ECM (electronic countermeasures, such as GPS jamming), logistics and training of personnel are also crucial aspects of a well-developed air defense network. SAM system capabilities are also heavily dependent on the capabilities of the associated radars and interceptor missiles. These aspects, however, are not included in this article due to the lack of adequate open-source information.

3. [3]

   The specific criterion of the ability to target aircraft before releasing bombs is singled out because unpowered guided bombs are the most affordable air-launched precision land-attack munitions. As these bombs are unpowered, they must be released from an altitude high enough to achieve a certain range, making the bomb carriers vulnerable to long-range anti-aircraft missiles. Shooting down the carriers of these aerial bombs would considerably disrupt air raid operations.

4. [4]

   Depending on guidance mode, engagement radars can perform a series of functions such as target detection, target identification, target tracking, missile tracking and missile guidance.

5. [5]

   To the author’s knowledge, this was first reported in the open-source domain by Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans, The Armed Forces of North Korea: On the Path of Songun (England: Helion & Company, 2020), 82.

6. [6]

   Ibid.

7. [7]

   Hours after North Korea conducted its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009, two surface-to-air missiles were reportedly fired from Musudan-ri. On the following day, another one or two surface-to-air missiles were fired again from the east coast. Considering that 1) the reported flight distance of these missiles reached 130 km, surpassing the range of S-75 and S-125; and 2) North Korea’s S-200 long-range surface-to-air missiles are deployed in hardened bunkers far away from Musudan-ri, it might be possible that North Korea launched several Lightning-5 missiles. See: Rhee So-eui, Jon Herskovitz and Jack Kim, “North Korea follows nuclear test with missile launch,” Reuters, May 25, 2009, https://web.archive.org/web/20090531002940/http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/SEO175027.htm; Jean H. Lee, “Defying world powers, N. Korea conducts nuke test,” Associated Press, May 25, 2009, https://web.archive.org/web/20090528200244/http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090525/ap_on_re_as/as_koreas_nuclear; Sam Kim, “N. Korea Monday fired two missiles, not three: ministry,” Yonhap, May 27, 2009, https://web.archive.org/web/20110928044950/http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2009/05/27/0401000000AEN20090527005000315.HTML; and Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Is Said to Test-Fire 3 More Missiles,” New York Times, May 26, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/world/asia/27korea.html.

8. [8]

   South Korean authorities stated that two out of the three missiles launched failed shortly after launch. “북한 발사한 지대공 미사일, 3발 중 2발 ‘실패’ 징후 [Two out of three North Korean missiles fired showed sign of failure],” VOA, April 5, 2016, available at: https://www.voakorea.com/a/3269876.html.

9. [9]

   For example, China’s radio-commanded guided KS-1C SAM has a maximum range of over 70 km.

10. [10]

    Likely possibilities include track-via-missile (typical example: US Patriot PAC-2, 48N6 and 48N6E2 of the Russian S-300), semi-active radar-homing (typical example: Taiwan’s Tien Kung-1), and active-radar-homing (typical example: China’s HQ-9). In 2021, North Korea displayed air-to-air missiles with modern aerodynamic layouts in an arms exhibition, indicating that the North might be developing semi-active or active radar-homing technologies.

11. [11]

    A PESA engagement radar is, in theory, able to engage multiple targets within its field of view. For example, China’s KS-1A/HQ-12 system is able to guide six missiles against three targets, while an old “Fan Song” engagement radar of the S-75 system could only guide up to three missiles against one target.

12. [12]

    It is possible that the two variants with different boosters are referred to as Meteor-1-1 and Meteor-1-2, respectively.

13. [13]

    North Korea’s KCNA stated that the Academy of Defense Science had applied “double-impulse flight engine” technology to enhance the combat performance of the missile. A dual pulse rocket motor contains propellant that is divided into multiple sections by an internal barrier, which will perforate as the second igniter fires to allow the propellant to exhaust through the same nozzle as the first propellant. Such a configuration allows for different thrust profiles for the two sections, which could be advantageous for anti-aircraft missiles. However, it is not immediately clear whether KCNA intended to refer to this type of motor or it simply meant to say that the missile had two stages.

14. [14]

    Chū-SAM is also steered by two sets of control surfaces (eight in total), presumably to achieve high maneuverability. Interestingly, some early studies on the engagement envelope of the Type 03 Chū-SAM were leaked to North Korea in 1995. However, it is unlikely that North Korea could have built the Meteor-1-2 based on the leaked documents alone.

15. [15]

    One possibility is that the radar adopts an AESA (active electronically scanned antenna) array, eliminating the need for the feedhorn. However, other possibilities also exist, and it is premature to arrive at a conclusion.

16. [16]

    For old information about these radars, see Tianran Xu, “Brief on the Defence Development Exhibition of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” Open Nuclear Network, October 18, 2021, https://opennuclear.org/open-nuclear-network/publication/brief-defence-development-exhibition-democratic-peoples-republic.

17. [17]

    Early MANPADS relied on contact fuse to attack large aircraft such as helicopters. In KCTV footage, North Korean MANPADS are used to intercept small target rockets. As direct hits seem to be unlikely, it is reasonable to assume that these MANPADS are equipped with proximity fuses to increase the kill probability against small targets. Notably, some of these missiles have ended up in Myanmar and factions opposing the Assad regime.

18. [18]

    Mainly including 14.5-mm towed anti-aircraft guns, 30-mm self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, 37-mm towed self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, and 57-mm towed and self-propelled anti-aircraft guns.

19. [19]

    While it is possible to take down some of the low-flying targets with manually aimed MANPADS and anti-aircraft guns, modern fire control systems enable higher interception rates.

20. [20]

    It is assessed that the fire control radar is based on the Soviet MR-104 “Drum Tilt” radar, which has outdated performance in a modern threat environment. The North also experimented with pairing anti-aircraft guns with a land-based variant of this radar. In 2012, KCTV footage showed an unknown type of fire control radar installed on a missile boat to direct a 76-mm main gun. Its status remains unknown. Another MR-104 radar was also installed on the same boat to direct a 30-mm Gatling gun.

21. [21]

    Decent low-altitude search radars should be able to detect small, low-flying targets amid strong clutter at sea and on land. Modern electro-optical sensors are supposed to be able to track targets with small infrared signatures. To what extent North Korean sensors are able to meet these requirements is unclear.

22. [22]

    For example, Vietnam has replaced outdated Soviet fire control radars and optical aiming sights with modern electro-optical sensors to upgrade its aging short-range defense systems, including ZSU-23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft gun, and towed anti-aircraft artillery. In addition, Vietnam also developed a truck-mounted MANPADS launcher cued by similar electro-optical sensors, which commonly features a daytime camera, a thermal imaging camera and a laser rangefinder.

23. [23]

    A shipborne version could also better protect the North’s naval vessels.

24. [24]

    For example, videos on social media have shown Tor missiles missing small drones and being destroyed by a wide range of weapons. On the other hand, Tor is claimed by Russia to be an effective air defense weapon.