The Next Big Thing? Possibilities for North Korea’s Longer Mobile Missile Launcher Chassis

On September 8, North Korea released an undated photo of Kim Jong Un standing next to an apparent road-mobile missile launcher (transporter-erector-launcher, or TEL) chassis that had at least 12 axles, compared to the previous 11-axle TEL of the large, liquid-propellant Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Based on the additional axle(s), it is reasonable to assume the new TEL is longer than the Hwasong-17 TEL, and thus that the new chassis is associated with a longer new ICBM or a space-launch vehicle (SLV).

However, the limited information to date does not allow confirmation that the vehicle in the photo is genuine, as opposed to an engineering or propaganda mock-up, and provides no solid basis to associate it with a specific type of ICBM or SLV. Assuming the new vehicle is associated with an ICBM or SLV, the main possibilities are:

• Longer follow-ons to the solid-propellant Hwasong-18 or liquid Hwasong-17 ICBMs, of which the new photo would be the first indication. The missiles’ longer stages (with or without also having larger diameters) would probably be used to boost heavier payloads, most likely to more easily accommodate multiple warheads.
• A mobile launcher for the North’s latest “Chollima-1” SLV, which would improve space-launch responsiveness and survivability, or use in transporting stages of the larger SLV North Korea is probably developing.
• Use with an existing ICBM system, which cannot be ruled out. For example, using more axles on the Hwasong-17 TEL would further distribute its substantial weight and reduce its ground pressure, opening up the areas to which it could field-deploy while limiting the road curves that such a vehicle could traverse.

It remains to be seen whether the new vehicle makes it out of the factory and what ICBM or SLV system it may end up being associated with. At a minimum, the new chassis indicates North Korea’s continuing commitment to road-mobile missile deployment and further suggests Pyongyang is able to produce its own TELs.

Information to Date

On September 8, the North Korean press reported an undated visit by Kim Jong Un to a “defence industrial enterprise.” Analysis of the accompanying photographs indicates Kim visited the March 16 Factory in Phyongsong, North Korea’s main production facility for road-mobile missile launchers (TELs), which Kim previously visited in January and May of 2024.

One of the photographs showed Kim standing next to an apparent TEL chassis with at least 12 axles. The overall length, width and number of axles could not be discerned, however. The top of the vehicle was not shown, no missile erector arms or other equipment were seen protruding above the vehicle’s side, and it was not carrying a missile, missile canister, or associated cradles. As noted elsewhere, an apparent lifting arm (presumably intended to help erect a missile) and other associated features were seen at the side rear of the vehicle that resemble those on the nine-axle TEL used for the Hwasong-18 solid-propellant ICBM.

What Could It Be?

The vehicle’s layout, green military paint job and presence at North Korea’s main TEL production facility all suggest the chassis is intended to be used as the basis of a new type of ballistic missile TEL. Based on the vehicle’s length as suggested by the number of axles, such a TEL would almost certainly be used with an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or space-launch vehicle (SLV) system. (The Hwasong-18 and the liquid-propellant Hwasong-15 ICBM use nine-axle TELs; the liquid-propellant Hwasong-17, North Korea’s largest ICBM, uses an 11-axle TEL.)

But the limited information to date does not allow confirmation that the vehicle in the photo is genuine, as opposed to an engineering or propaganda mock-up, and provides no solid basis to associate it with a specific type of ICBM or SLV. Assuming the vehicle is associated with an extant or developmental ICBM or SLV system, the four main possibilities are discussed below.

1) and 2) A Longer ICBM

Although the vehicle’s overall length and even total number of axles is unknown, it is reasonable to assume the 12-plus-axle TEL is longer than the 11-axle Hwasong-11 TEL, and, thus that the new chassis would be associated with an ICBM system longer than the Hwasong-11. If such a system is under development, the photo released by the North Koreans is the first indication. Probably the two main contenders for a longer ICBM would be:

A larger solid-propellant ICBM. The similarities between the rear of the new TEL and that of the Hwasong-18 may indicate there is a follow-on to that ICBM using longer booster stages. Longer stages of the current diameter could be used to provide more range, but the current missile has already demonstrated the capability to carry its flight tested payloads (weight unknown) to about 15,000 kilometers (km), easily enough to reach anywhere in the continental United States. Therefore, longer stages, with or without a diameter increase, would more likely be used to increase the amount of payload the missile could deliver to 15,000 km—a range flagged by Kim Jong Un in January 2021. Because the new vehicle’s width and overall length are unknown, there is no current basis to decide whether any new system uses larger-diameter booster stages; however, diameter increases would permit greater payload increases than length increases alone.

Any increased payload would presumably be used to carry multiple warheads—if North Korea is confident that multiple reentry vehicles small enough in diameter to fit on the new solid missile’s final booster stage would survive reentry at operational ranges. More payload also could be used to carry decoys and other ballistic missile penetration aids. Pyongyang claimed to have conducted a flight on June 26 of a solid-propellant test booster releasing three reentry vehicles and a decoy, although the test apparently failed prior to actual payload release.

A longer liquid-propellant ICBM. The similarities between the new TEL and the Hwasong-18 TEL do not rule out use with a longer follow-on to the Hwasong-17 liquid ICBM. Such a missile also presumably would use longer stages (with or without larger diameters) to achieve greater payload capability at current ranges, since the current Hwasong-17 also can reach targets anywhere in the US with its flight tested payloads. Because the current missile already has a very large payload capability due to its large size, the North would seem to have less of a need for a larger Hwasong-17 follow-on compared to a follow-on solid ICBM. But Pyongyang may have decided it needs an ICBM with even more payload capacity than the Hwasong-17 in order to carry multiple warheads large and heavy enough to confidently survive reentry at operational ranges without full-range flight testing—which the North has yet to perform and may wish to continue to avoid for political or other reasons. More payload weight also would permit more or larger decoys.

3) An SLV

The use of the new chassis with an SLV cannot be ruled out. A mobile SLV launcher could be attractive to North Korea by allowing launches away from fixed facilities, thus varying launch and orbital locations, potentially increasing response time, and improving wartime survivability. The US and China, in particular, have been developing road-mobile SLV launchers for these reasons.

North Korea’s latest SLV, the “Chollima-1,” uses a first stage based on the Hwasong-17 ICBM and is estimated to be about 29 meters long, three to four meters longer than the ICBM. That increased length might be compatible with the new, longer chassis. Although the green paint job of the new chassis would seem to suggest a military subordination, the North has thus far claimed the white-painted Chollima is under the civilian National Aerospace Technology Administration (NATA). It may become the case that some Chollimas will be controlled by the military for mobile launch, NATA may just use green TELs for its white missiles, or there may end up being both white/NATA and green/military mobile SLV launchers.

Another possible SLV-related use of the new chassis would be as a stage transporter for the larger SLV North Korea is apparently developing, as suggested by activities at its Sohae Satellite Launching Ground since 2022. Depending on the size of the new SLV, the new chassis could be useful in moving its first stage, in particular, around and between production, final assembly and launch facilities.

4) A current ICBM

Although a longer TEL intuitively suggests a longer missile, it is possible that the new TEL is associated with an existing ICBM system. If so, the best candidate would probably be the large Hwasong-17 liquid missile, where the addition of one or more axles would further distribute its 100,000-150,000 kg weight and reduce the ground pressure exerted when using its existing 11-axle TEL. Use of a longer TEL could thus open up more roadways and off-road locations to help better move and conceal field-deployed Hwasong-17 units, but would also limit the road curves that such a vehicle could traverse.

Outlook

It remains to be seen whether the new vehicle makes it out of the factory, and what ICBM or SLV system it may end up being associated with. But if it is a “new-type” system, there will be plenty of time to assess that system once it begins flight testing. At a minimum, the new chassis indicates North Korea’s continuing commitment to road-mobile missile deployment and further suggests Pyongyang is able to produce its own TELs.