Quick Take: “The Old SOF Shoe”

Citing an anonymous source, Kyodo News reported that North Korea’s special operations forces (SOF) commander, three-star Colonel General Kim Yong Bok, arrived in Russia on October 24 to assume “command” of Korean People’s Army (KPA) SOF personnel deployed to Russia. His presence in Russia was corroborated and publicized by a Republic of Korea (ROK) delegation briefing NATO officials in Brussels on October 28, in which he was identified as “commander-in-chief” of KPA forces in Russia.
Estimates on the KPA presence in Ukraine have been contradictory, ranging from approximately 3,500 to 10,000, which is one to two KPA SOF brigades. Neither the Russian nor the North Korean government has denied North Korea’s deployment. Prior to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s tacit admission of the KPA deployment, Pyongyang (and Ukraine) watchers were relying on a combination of official sanctioned releases and anonymous media leaks. There was incomplete provenance of sources or placement of caveats on the information, such as DPRK personnel finding their way into eavesdropped conversations. There were no analytical hedges, such as positing alternative scenarios like the KPA SOF serving as rear area guards. This creates an effect in which kernels of accurate information, such as North Korea’s largest troop deployment outside the Korean Peninsula since the Vietnam War, are overshadowed by speculation.
This brings us to Colonel General Kim Yong Bok’s purported in-country presence in Russia. In March of this year, he was identified as Vice Chief of the KPA General Staff, placing him in the KPA’s high command. By dint of this position, he is Kim Jong Un’s top advisor on light infantry and the SOF. He attended seven of Kim’s public engagements and inspections in 2024, three of which involved SOF exercises, one a live fire artillery drill and two flood reconstruction efforts in North Pyongan Province.
The number of disclosed SOF exercises was probably a tell-tale sign that North Korea would deploy some personnel to Russia. One can write off his presence at the artillery drill in the context of his high military command position. However, by publicizing his presence at flood reconstruction work, to which he has no seeming connection (with the hedge that the KPA SOF has construction units which could contribute to such work), Pyongyang was telecasting that their SOF commander has direct, unfettered access to Kim.
Characterizing Colonel General Kim Yong Bok as “commander” of KPA forces in Russia is deliberately ambiguous. It would lead many observers to assume that he will take up a field command role. From this perspective, Kim Jong Un is sending one of his best people to personally oversee the deployment. On the other hand, why would Kim subject a reliable, close aide with whom he presumably shares a good rapport into the line of fire? Moreover, three-star colonel generals do not command brigade-sized units. If Colonel General Kim has traveled to Russia, a more sensible interpretation would be that he is supervising the KPA SOF’s transition into the Ukraine theater and consolidating command and control over all KPA assets, including munitions technicians, in the Ukraine theater. He is also probably coordinating with Russian counterparts and creating a reporting framework between deployed personnel and Pyongyang.