North Korea Tests New Solid ICBM Probably Intended for MIRVs
On October 31, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) conducted the initial flight test of the new Hwasong-19 (HS-19) solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Photos show the missile is longer than the North’s first solid ICBM, the Hwasong-18 (HS-18). This explains the increased boost capability shown in the missile’s longer flight time and higher maximum altitude, and thus is not an indication of technological assistance from Russia, as some analysts have speculated.
Because the HS-18 can already reach targets throughout the US, the HS-19’s additional boost capability will probably be used to loft heavier payloads. A multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV)-associated probable post-boost vehicle (PBV) was shown in stage-separation photos from the launch released by Pyongyang. One or two more successful flight tests will likely be needed before considering the HS-19 booster ready for deployment, but a MIRV payload would require at least several successful tests over at least a few years to be ready.
The most likely reason for developing another solid ICBM with more boost capability than the existing HS-18 is to loft a heavier MIRV payload to a similar range. Deployment of MIRVs on the HS-19 (and probably the larger, liquid-propellant HS-17), in combination with single-RV versions and the HS-18 force, will significantly boost the number of deployed North Korean warheads for a given number of missiles and launchers, increase the number of targets that a surviving missile force can retaliate against after absorbing a first strike, and further complicate the task of allied missile defenses by forcing them to cope with more relatively small objects in the same timeframe. But this potential depends on how the North chooses to allocate its relatively limited nuclear warhead production among many different weapons systems.
Information to Date
On October 30, it was reported that South Korean military intelligence had detected signs North Korea would soon launch an ICBM, including the placement of a missile and its mobile launcher. The Japanese Ministry of Defense reported the launch of an ICBM-class missile on October 31 from the suburbs of Pyongyang to the northeast, landing in the sea after a flight of about 86 minutes covering some 1,000 kilometers (km) at a maximum altitude of over 7,000 km. South Korea’s military confirmed the launch and impact areas, as well as a highly lofted trajectory. Images in the Japanese media of apparent reentering objects suggested the flight was successful. That same day, the North Korean press announced “an ICBM test-fire,” but provided no further technical information.
North Korean media provided further information on November 1, reporting the ICBM was “the latest-type ICBM Hwasongpho-19” (aka Hwasong-19 or HS-19), which flew for 85.93 minutes to a maximum altitude of 7,687.5 km and a distance of 1,001.2 km. Accompanying photos depicted the launch of a three-stage, solid-propellant missile from a canister mounted on an 11-axle road mobile launcher (TEL, or transporter-erector-launcher), and also depicted missile staging, including a photo captioned “third stage separation” of two rocket nozzles remaining on the bottom of the missile’s payload section as the expended third stage falls away. North Korean TV video shows the missile being “cold launched” from its canister on an 11-axle TEL.
Analysis
The missile. The HS-19’s use of an 11-axle TEL indicates that the new missile is longer than North Korea’s first solid-propellant ICBM, the HS-18, which uses a nine-axle TEL. Initial analyses differ on whether the HS-19 is larger in diameter, as well. Either way, the size increase provides for additional solid propellant to increase the HS-19’s total boost capability—which is consistent with the new missile’s increased flight time (about 13 minutes) and altitude (some 1,100 km altitude) compared to the most recent HS-18 launch on December 18, 2023. Although the increased boost capability could be used to extend the HS-19’s range, the HS-18 can already cover anywhere in the United States from anywhere in North Korea. It is much more likely that the new missile’s increased capability will be used to boost a heavier payload.
The payload. In the North Korean photos, the nozzles protruding from the bottom of the payload section, which remained in place after third-stage separation, are consistent with the presence of a PBV, a rocket-powered platform used to maneuver between drop-off locations for MIRVs. The PBV dispenses each reentry vehicle (RV) onto its own discrete trajectory toward a separate target. The payload of a MIRVed missile has to include the weight of the PBV and its propellant, not just that of the multiple RVs, and so a MIRV payload would be a good use for the increased boost capability of the HS-19.
We do not know if the apparent PBV in the HS-19 test was operational or a dummy, if it carried actual RVs or payload simulators, if it maneuvered or was used for range extension, or if it released any RVs—although there is no reporting of unusual reentry objects. Although North Korea first mentioned interest in multiple warheads in January 2021 and conducted what it claimed was a MIRV test in June 2024 (that probably failed before RV release), it has yet to successfully demonstrate MIRV capability. The June test used a booster based on the first stage of the HS-16 solid-propellant intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), which is probably based on the first stage of the HS-18 and, according to North Korea, was intended to release three RVs and a decoy. This may be reflective of the payload intended for the HS-19.
The weight of the payloads flown on the HS-18 and HS-19 is unknown. The increased payload capability of the HS-19 would more easily accommodate the 1960s-style heavier, blunter RVs that North Korea probably deploys on its ICBMs to have sufficient confidence they will survive reentry at operational ranges despite the lack of flight testing to such ranges. (All of the North’s ICBM tests to date have been highly lofted, with much shorter ranges than targets in the US.) If the HS-19 is larger in diameter than the HS-18, it would also better accommodate multiple such RVs.
Implications
No sign of recent Russian assistance. Although some instant commentary attributed the greater performance of the October 31 launch over previous HS-18 launches to the recent receipt of technical assistance from Russia—even to the provision of “a key propellant component that can boost a missile’s engine thrust”—there is no open-source evidence of this occurring. Moreover, the increased performance of the new missile is fully explainable by the increased size of the HS-19, which is itself fully obtainable from the HS-18 technology base that was probably catalyzed some 7-10 years ago. That said, any assistance North Korea has or will obtain from Russia for its ICBM program is a continuing wildcard that could increase the capability, reliability, and/or timeliness of strategic missile developments.
More tests to come. The apparent success of the first HS-19 test continues the impressive reliability demonstrated by North Korean solid-propellant ballistic missiles, even as such missiles have gotten larger in diameter and thus more challenging to produce with good quality control. One or two more successful flight tests would probably be sufficient in the eyes of the North Koreans to qualify the HS-19 booster for deployment. However, if the missile has a MIRV payload, this is a demanding technology, and at least several successful payload tests on the HS-19 over at least a few years are likely before North Korea operationally deploys MIRVs. Assistance from Russia could somewhat accelerate the timeline but would not obviate the likely need for at least a few successful MIRV flight tests.
Likely to augment rather than replace. According to North Korean media, the HS-19 is intended to be used “along with Hwasongpho-18…as the primary core means in defending the DPRK.” It remains to be seen whether HS-19s carry MIRVs and HS-18s carry single RVs, but except perhaps for the deployment of extremely large, high-yield warheads, the HS-18 has enough range/payload capability to deliver single RVs to any place North Korea might reasonably want to target. North Korea is likely to deploy a mix of MIRV and single RV payloads to cover different missions and use scenarios, to hedge against the potential loss of multiple RVs on a single booster to reliability problems or enemy action, and to help manage the challenges of allocating a relatively limited number of nuclear weapons across a large number and variety of potential delivery systems.
Moreover, the HS-19 is likely to share MIRV duty with the large, liquid-propellant HS-17 ICBM. The probable greater payload capability and larger diameter of the latter make it extremely well suited to carry MIRVs—and potentially more RVs and/or decoys per missile than the HS-19. Construction over the past year at North Korea’s key liquid-propellant strategic rocket engine production facility, the Thaesong Machine Factory, is consistent with a continuing role for liquid ICBMs.
It will be survivable. Some have contended that the larger size of the HS-19 renders it too visible and too hard to move, imperiling its survivability. Although the length and weight of the HS-19 and its TEL will keep it from using some roads and off-road areas available to smaller North Korean mobile ICBMs, it will still be able to move out of garrison to remote locations and be camouflaged during a pre-war crisis period or in the run-up to any DPRK-initiated crisis or conflict. Once dispersed over hundreds of square miles of wooded terrain, the increased size of the HS-19 would not appreciably increase its detectability. If caught in garrison, even smaller mobile ICBMs would be highly vulnerable; the larger HS-19 is unlikely to be much worse off. As with the probably heavier (when fueled) HS-17, North Korea also has the option of putting the HS-19 on a rail-mobile launcher if it sees the need.
What about the 12-axle TEL? Immediately after the October 31 launch, it was speculated that the new missile might have been launched from the new 12-axle TEL revealed in North Korean photos released in September 2024 in conjunction with factory visits by Kim Jong Un. Now that it is clear the HS-19 was launched from an 11-axle TEL (albeit one resembling the 12-axle vehicle rather than the type of 11-axle TEL used with the HS-17), the question remains of what system(s) the 12-axle TEL supports. As noted previously in 38 North, the new TEL could be used with a longer variant of the HS-17 or HS-18 (or now the HS-19), a space-launch vehicle, a space-launch version of an existing ICBM (which would have a longer payload section), or to improve the mobility of the existing HS-17.
The Bottom Line
The revelation of an apparent PBV on North Korean photos from the HS-19 test is consistent with the use of a MIRV payload. In a few years, with or without additional Russian help, North Korea is likely to complete MIRV development via the requisite flight testing, resulting in an ICBM force with more flexibility, able to cover more targets, and possessing a more robust second-strike capability.