Guesstimating NK Troop Presence in Eastern Europe

According to the US Government, North Korea has about 12,000 personnel deployed to Russia.  Using the few, scant accurate details about the Korean People’s Army (KPA) deployment we might attain a general sense of the personnel comprising North Korean Forces in Eastern Europe [NKFEE] and their potential missions and roles. 

There are a couple of analytic trigger warnings and caveats.  First, the 12,000 estimate is sort of an analytic ceiling–the more precise number probably hovers closer to 10,000.  Second, the state of play in Ukraine and Russia is marked by information operations and D&D (not the kind that uses the D-10) on both sides of the conflict. As such, we cannot completely rely on the provenance or accuracy of current available information.

Commanders

Recent reporting has claimed that North Korea has six (6) generals currently in Russia, although that is not corroborated.  Their presence is highly concealed.

The last known KPA general-grade officers present were Vice Chief of the KPA General Staff for SOF and Light Infantry Col. Gen. Kim Yong Bok (Kim Yo’ng-pok) and KPA Reconnaissance General Bureau [RGB] Director and Vice Chief of the KPA General Staff Col. Gen. Ri Chang Ho (Ri Chang-ho).  When Col. Gen. Kim and Col. Gen. Ri arrived, it seemed their stay would be temporary and would involve liaison and administrative work with their Russian colleagues and standing up North Korean forces before turning it over to a lower-ranked general.  There have been several events in the home country, particularly the year-end Central Committee plenum and the November meeting of KPA battalion commanders, at which either of these two gentleman would have been present.  Given these absences, it is safe to assume that they have remained abroad.

Missiles and Munitions

North Korea’s probably deployed personnel to Russia starting in 2023.  The North’s initial support, back in 2022, for Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine involved selling stockpiled ordnance and component parts.  Since then, according to the ROK Government and social media posts, the DPRK has also shipped 170 mm self-propelled artillery systems and 240 mm multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS).  With those weapons shipments comes technical and maintenance personnel to service the equipment.  In fact, North Korea’s first personnel deployment to Russia was artillery technical experts and maintenance personnel during 2023.   

According to Ukrainian sourcing, “dozens” of weapons technicians to support ballistic missile systems in addition to observations of “engineering personnel” working with North Korean weapons, both in Donetsk.  A photo of a senior DPRK missile technician with a Russian soldier was disseminated by the ROK National Intelligence Service (NIS).  NIS matched the man in the photo to an individual accompanying Kim Jong Un (KJU) at a missile factory engagement.  This means that North Korea most likely deployed enough personnel to fill a KPA artillery engineering company (100-300).   

With reports about additional weapons artillery pieces and MLRS being shipped to Russia, North Korea’s large October 2024 deployment, estimated between 10,000-11,000, may have included a full artillery brigade (which would top off at about 1500 troops).   An artillery brigade deployed to Russia would draw personnel from KPA members seconded (or dual hatted) to the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Munitions Industry Department (which includes the Second Economy Commission), such as the missile technician identified in the Telegram post by NIS, or from  elite rear area units with artillery (including MLRS) such as the Pyongyang Defense Command [PDC], the Guard Command or one of the rear area KPA Ground Corps with artillery such as the VII Army Corps.

On the ground 

Much observation, discussion and media reporting about North Korea’s deployment has focused on the KPA ground forces’ deployment, the largest cohort.  It probably numbers between 7,000-9,000 troops.  Much of the chatter has focused on combatants deployed to the front around Kursk.  But the DPRK’s ground forces, based on the conjecture and analyses of Ukrainian and ROK officials and other analysts, consists of: light infantry, special operations forces [SOF], guards units and construction personnel.

The DPRK has sent between two (2) and three (3) brigades of light infantry and SOF.  This is the equivalent of two KPA light infantry/SOF brigades (which number between 3,000-5,000 troops).  Light infantry have been observed on the battlefield and taken casualties.  However, the KPA forces deployed to Russia probably have other functions than drawing our their adversaries or shooting down drones.  Some KPA SOF personnel may be intended for special missions including sabotaging critical infrastructure or scouting Ukrainian targets.  Other light infantry might be assigned for guard post duties or construction projects near Russian headquarters and/or command elements.

It is highly probable that most of the North’s deployed ground forces are junior officers of the XI Army Corps, also known as the Storm Corps or KPA Large Combined Unit #630.  The XI Corps consists of regular light infantry, marines, paratroopers and commandos.  ROK analysts think that XI Army Corps personnel deployed to Russia are snipers and light infantry personnel.  However, there is a possibility some commando elements may be part of the deployment, as they were present in at least two locales in Central Asia and the Middle East during the 2010’s.  The XI Corps last known significant activity, albeit domestic, was a 2020 deployment on the DPRK-PRC border.  While the XI Corps might be more active in the DPRK’s previous discrete foreign deployments, they probably do not constitute the entirety of KPA ground forces deployed to Russia.

The KPA has other light infantry brigades that could contribute personnel.  One possibility is the III Army Corps which protects the outer security line in the vicinity of Pyongyang.  The PDC’s 841st Light Infantry Brigade may have sent some troops.  In addition to being well trained and highly vetted (meaning they are not a defection risk), III Corps and PDC units are versatile and self-contained.  They can fulfill a number of guard and rear services missions with a high degree of efficiency.

The KPA General Staff Department [GSD] has two specialized units directly subordinate to it–an SOF Battalion and the 60th Sniper Brigade.  Although the GSD units are more essential to the KPA high command’s daily to-and-fro, they may have contributed command staff to support Kim Yong Bok and Ri Chang Ho.  After all, both serve in the GSD apparatus.  If KPA forces in Russia are working on construction or infrastructure projects, the GSD may also have contributed personnel from the GSD Road Corps, particularly the 123rd and 125th Road Brigades which combine light infantry with construction personnel.

The X Corps, although less elite than the above-mentioned KPA units, could have sourced personnel from the 43rd Light Infantry Brigade.  Before being appointed commander of the Storm (XI) Corps, Lt. Gen. Ri Bong Chun commanded the X Corps.