The KN-23 Goes to War: Has It Improved North Korea’s Missiles?
North Korean-made KN-23 solid-propellant, road-mobile short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) have been used in the Russia-Ukraine war since at least December 2023, both by Russian forces and likely for a time by one of North Korea’s own missile units. Limited public information, almost all from Ukrainian government sources, reports that the KN-23 initially demonstrated reliability and accuracy problems. Both issues seem to have been resolved since then, according to more recent reporting, with multiple allegations that Russian assistance helped improve the missile’s accuracy.
Of these two claimed problems, the accuracy issues seem to be more credible given their sourcing. It is also plausible that Russia provided technical assistance to address this. The most likely scenario is that the KN-23’s ability to access satellite updates like GPS was initially being blocked by Ukrainian electronic warfare which Russia was later able to help the North Koreans overcome, rather than more extensive accuracy enhancements.
Related reporting that Russia has applied aspects of KN-23 technology to its own similar Iskander missiles is plausible to the extent it concerns improving aspects of missile production, but less plausible concerning potential fixes to the Iskander’s ability to penetrate missile defenses or the terminal homing portion of its guidance system.
The most significant improvements to the KN-23 missile, and especially to North Korean road-mobile missile operations, have probably come from the North Koreans participating in Russian use of the KN-23, observing overall Russian road-mobile missile operations in the face of Ukrainian missile defenses and counterstrikes, and operating North Korea’s own KN-23 launch unit in Russia facing those same challenges. Although unproven, this has likely led to enhanced KN-23 performance and production, as well as greater ability of the North’s road-mobile missile force to operate in wartime. This means that North Korea’s theater-range missiles should be more effective in any future conflict on the Peninsula than before the war in Ukraine, both in terms of damage capability and survivability, although the degree of improvement is uncertain.
Considering the Source
There is limited public information on the KN-23’s performance in the Ukraine war and modifications to improve that performance. Almost all of it is said to come from Ukrainian government sources, usually from military intelligence but sometimes in the state prosecutor’s office.[1] The Ukrainian government clearly has access to radar tracking data and debris from KN-23 strikes, as well as any information it receives from the US and other partners. It presumably has some degree of intelligence access to Russian KN-23-related operations, and perhaps even to those of North Koreans in Russia. On the other hand, Kyiv also has plausible motivations to shape its public pronouncements to promote its wartime policy objectives, such as obtaining or maintaining support from South Korea, the US, and other countries concerned about the North Korean threat.[2] The limited available information available and its limited sourcing need to be kept in mind when assessing KN-23 use against Ukraine and Russia-North Korea missile cooperation, as well as their implications.
In-Flight Reliability
A Ukrainian regional prosecutor reported in March 2024 that about 50 KN-23/24 missiles had been launched against Ukraine by that time, but “there were many reports of the missile exploding mid-flight.” Ukraine’s Prosecutor General Office reported in May 2024 that “about half of the North Korean missiles” launched from Russia between December 2023 and late February 2024 “lost their programmed trajectories and exploded in the air.” This failure rate is at great variance with that seen in KN-23 launches in North Korea: all 19 of the KN-23s launched from May 2019 to November 2024, a mix of developmental and troop training launches, apparently made it to impact. The Prosector’s office, a non-technical organization, apparently determined the failed launches were KN-23s “by looking at their flight trajectories, speed and launch sites” (the Ukrainian military should have such data) and assessed they “exploded in air” due to a lack of recoverable impact debris.
Given the launch history in North Korea, which included operational troop training launches, it is unlikely many in-flight failures of KN-23s launched from Russia resulted from systemic or production-quality problems. As these were Russia’s first operational launches of this foreign-provided missile system, lack of operator training and experience might have played a role. It is also unclear the extent to which the Prosecutor General’s Office was aware of any interceptions of these KN-23s by Ukrainian-operated Patriot missiles, which started arriving in April 2023. Some incoming KN-23s may have also veered off course because their guidance systems were successfully jammed by Ukrainian electronic warfare assets.
Whatever the case, there has not been additional reporting of KN-23 in-flight reliability problems against Ukraine since May 2024, nor any reporting of reliability-related modifications made to the KN-23. Thus, to the extent there was a significant reliability issue, it apparently has been addressed.
Missile Accuracy
Most of the initial coverage of KN-23 performance problems in Ukraine reported poor accuracy. The Prosecutor General stated in February 2024 that only two of 24 KN-23/24s recently fired against Ukraine had been “relatively accurate” given their proximity to military targets; the missiles were identified as North Korean based on impact debris and their “characteristic flight paths.” Defense Intelligence of Ukraine reported in December 2024 that attacking KN-23s were “based on ‘outdated technologies’ that affect their accuracy.”
However, from February 2025, reports started suggesting improvements in KN-23 accuracy. According to “two senior Ukrainian sources,” accuracy “suddenly” improved from 1,000-3,000 meters to 50-100 meters.[3] (The head of Ukrainian military intelligence separately said the previous accuracy was 500-1,500 meters.) Improved accuracy was seen “in all the more than 20 North Korean ballistic missiles that hit Ukraine over the past several weeks,” this “after months of inaccurate launches.” This assessment “was based on where the missiles—identified as North Korean through examinations at blast sites—fell in relation to the presumed target in the vicinity.”
It would obviously be difficult for the Ukrainians to know the exact intended aimpoint of incoming KN-23s, especially given the missile’s maneuvering capability. Moreover, Russia clearly has been targeting urban population areas as well as specific military assets. Even when striking point targets, there are tactical circumstances in which offset targeting (aiming the missile at a location other than directly at the target) can be desirable. Engagements by missile defense interceptors that did not destroy the missile can cause some missiles to fall away from their originally intended targets, as can missile maneuvers to evade interception. And electronic warfare against incoming missiles can also cause them to miss their targets. Nonetheless, a 450-2,950-meter difference between earlier and later assessed accuracies is large enough that an accuracy issue appears credible.
Reporting on the KN-23’s accuracy generally does not address the source of the problem beyond “outdated technologies.” The most direct explanation is that, during the 2023-24 launches against Ukraine, the missiles only used inertial guidance. This would be consistent with an accuracy of at least 500-1,500 meters, as well as even worse accuracy as the KN-23 maneuvers or approaches its maximum demonstrated range of 800 km. Using only inertial guidance also would be consistent with the attribution of the accuracy issue to “outdated technologies.”
The most likely reason why the KN-23 would only rely on pure inertial guidance is that Ukrainian electronic warfare denied the missiles’ access to satellite guidance updates (like GPS), just as reportedly happens to some Russian Iskander and Kinzhal ballistic missiles similar to the KN-23. (The actual KN-23 guidance method has not been revealed in open-source reporting, but use of satellite-aided navigation often is regarded as a possibility.) Restoring access to satellite navigation updates could give the KN-23 an accuracy on the order of 35-90 meter, according to a January 2023 French think tank study (well before KN-23s were sent to Ukraine in Fall 2023) based on analysis of craters from KN-23/24 launches against a small island used by the North Koreans as an impact point. This is consistent with the 50-100-meter accuracy reported by Ukrainian sources for the “improved” KN-23s. Therefore, if the above suggestions of what caused the reported KN-23 accuracy problems and the fix are correct, it is more accurate to say that KN-23 accuracy in Ukraine has been “restored” rather than “improved,” although the KN-23 guidance systems’ resistance to electronic warfare would have been improved.
Russian Fixes to North Korea?
Although Ukrainian sources do not identify the exact fixes made to increase (or restore) the accuracy of incoming KN-23s, they do allege that the enhancements were a result of Russian advice or assistance being incorporated into the North Korean missiles.[4]
- In February 2025, the head of Ukrainian military intelligence reported that “Russian missile experts made technical modifications, resolving the issue”—the exact same words used in a May 2025 report attributed to “an MSMT [Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team] participating state.” (Ukraine is not an MSMT member, but it could have provided information to a member state such as South Korea, whose media conducted the February 2025 interview.)
- In June 2025, the head of Ukrainian military intelligence said that the accuracy improvement “is the result of the common work of Russian and North Korean specialists.”
- A May 2026 report claimed without sourcing that “at least one type of recently tested [North Korean] missile was previously transferred to Russia and improved in multiple ways before the knowledge of how to produce the upgraded missiles was reportedly sent back to North Korea.”
- A July 2026 report apparently sourced to “anonymous sources inside Ukrainian military intelligence” stated that “Russian engineers got to test and refine” the KN-23 “against real Ukrainian targets night after night, and the resulting upgrades flowed straight back into North Korea’s own missile program.”
- Another July 2026 report claimed without sourcing that “Russian missile specialists embedded with the program analyzed the telemetry from each combat launch—real-world flight data that North Korea could never generate through domestic testing—and identified the guidance system deficiencies responsible for the errors.” Based on this, the report claimed “Russia has turned the Ukraine war into a live-fire development program for North Korea’s ballistic missile force, and the upgraded designs are flowing back to Pyongyang.”
It is plausible that Russian missile experts analyzed and diagnosed the apparent accuracy issues with the KN-23, came up with a fix, and passed it on to North Korea, which then used that fix to update missiles in its own inventory and future production. (It is also possible that the North Koreans diagnosed the problem and the Russians came up with a fix.) If, as suggested above, the real accuracy issue had to do with jamming the KN-23’s satellite navigation update system, Russia would be well-positioned to devise a fix. It is highly experienced with ballistic missile guidance, satellite update technology (including operating its own GLONASS equivalent to GPS), and electronic warfare (such as GPS jamming and spoofing, including in the Ukraine war). Russia also would need to be able to address the Ukrainian jamming threat against its own KN-23-like Iskander and Kinzhal missiles, and those solutions would be available to provide to the North Koreans.
This kind of Russian assistance is more plausible than the unsourced claims of “a live-fire development program for North Korea’s ballistic missile force.” For example, it is unlikely that Russia “analyzed the telemetry from each combat launch.” Combat missiles generally do not incorporate telemetry systems, which monitor various aspects of missile behavior and transmit them to missile developers, because telemetry equipment takes weight and space away from weapons payload and other military functions, its transmissions serve as a tracking beacon of the missile’s position for enemy defenses, and in-flight diagnostic data on already-deployed systems in operational use (as opposed to in development) generally provide no offsetting benefit.
North Korean Fixes to Russia?
There also have been press reports that Russia has begun using aspects of North Korean missile technology in its own KN-23-like Iskander ballistic missile. These are based on the following press characterization of a June 2026 briefing by a Ukrainian military technology researcher:
“Russia has modified the Iskander-M ballistic missile to penetrate missile defense systems and adapt production to sanctions, in particular by incorporating components and technical solutions from the North Korean KN-23.
This was reported by Colonel Oleksandr Zaruba, chief research fellow at the State Scientific Research Institute of Armament and Military Equipment Testing and Certification, during the event “The Russian Federation’s Use of Air Attack Weapons Against Civilian Infrastructure: Technical and Humanitarian Aspects,” which was attended by a correspondent from Militarnyi.
In particular, the missile has been equipped with an updated 9B899 module, which fires decoys, dipole reflectors, and heat traps during the terminal phase of flight.
The onboard systems are adapted to operate in active scanning mode and detect blind spots in the visibility of air defense radar systems. The software is regularly updated.
New versions of the missile produced after 2023–2024 use a faster processor to process images received by the optical homing head, which increases the probability of target recognition, detection, and destruction.
To ramp up production, elements and technical solutions used in North Korea’s KN-23 have been integrated into the Iskander-M missile.”
The most plausible of these claims is that the Russians learned lessons from North Korean KN-23 production that they drew upon to facilitate their own production of the Iskander. It makes sense that, as part of Russia’s purchase of KN-23s for its own use against Ukraine, Russian experts were given access to KN-23 production information and even factories. It also is reasonable that the Russians discovered some differences in their own and the North Koreans’ production practices that Moscow decided were worth incorporating in Iskander production.
To the extent that the other claims in the July 2026 briefing were intended to be linked to North Korea, as opposed to being claims about Russia’s indigenously-sourced improvements to the Iskander listed along with the claimed KN-23 production lessons, those claims are less credible.[5]
- The Iskander’s reportedly upgraded “9B899 module” is the SRBM’s missile defense penetration aid (penaid) system that was first identified in open-sources in March 2022 (well before Russia’s acquisition of the KN-23). It is implausible that North Korea provided significant technology to upgrade the Iskander’s penaid system, for several reasons: Russia has had experience with penaids since the 1960s, while penaids have not been confirmed on North Korean missiles; Russia has been operating its own missile defense systems since at least the 1960s as well, while North Korea does not possess any; Russia has much better instrumented missile test ranges to assess penaid performance than does North Korea; and Russia has deployed the Iskander since 2006 and used it against Ukraine since the outset of the invasion in February 2022, thus having much more combat experience with the missile and its penaids, as well as with Ukrainian missile defenses, than does North Korea.
- For similar reasons, it is also implausible that North Korea provided significant technology to upgrade the Iskander’s radar detection capabilities and its optical homing terminal guidance system.
North Korean Fixes to North Korea?
Beyond whatever technical inputs North Korea received from Russia, it is highly likely that Pyongyang has incorporated into its missile production and road-mobile missile operations its own lessons learned directly from the employment of KN-23s against Ukraine, and from observing Russian road-mobile missile operations in the Ukraine war more generally. There is no direct open-source reporting that this has occurred or on the nature of any changes made, but this is a logical inference to make given the large number of KN-23s expended in the Ukraine war (about 250 KN-23/24s reportedly had been transferred to Russia by September 2025), the need for KN-23s in the Ukraine war to contend with missile defense engagements and counterstrikes that North Korea itself has not been subjected to, the likely presence of North Korean experts to assist with Russian KN-23 operations, and the deployment of North Korean combat troops to assist Russian ground operations.
More important as a potential source of improvements to the KN-23 missile and North Korean road-mobile missile operations, Pyongyang reportedly deployed its own KN-23 launch unit to Russia from November 2023 to December 2025. Outside analysis from May 2026, little noticed elsewhere, observed references to this unit in the background of Korean Central News Agency and Korean Central Television coverage of the new museum opened in Pyongyang to celebrate the deployment of North Korean combat troops to Russia. Analysis of the museum exhibit suggests that a “Hwasongpho and Anti-Tank Guided Missile Unit” (the North uses Hwasongpho [aka Hwasong] designators for the bulk of its land-based ballistic missile systems) conducted ballistic missile launches as part of the war.[6] A North Korean missile launch unit currently in the process of being deployed to Russia, according to an August 2026 announcement by Ukrainian military intelligence, therefore is in effect a redeployment.
Implications
Beyond the likely improvement in the KN-23 guidance system’s resistance to electronic warfare (or possibly some other guidance system improvement), open-source reporting does not shed light on the specific benefits North Korea’s road-mobile missile force has gained from that the KN-23’s use in the Ukraine war. But logically, it is highly likely that North Korea has used its access to information about Russia’s use of the KN-23 and Iskander missiles against Ukraine—and especially from the North’s own apparent employment of a missile launch unit in the war—to improve KN-23 performance and production, and the ability of its road-mobile missile force to operate in wartime. North Korea’s missile force therefore should be more effective in any future conflict on the Peninsula than before the Ukraine war, both in terms of damage capability and survivability, although the degree of improvement is uncertain.
- [1]
Two exceptions are May 2025 information on North Korean missile accuracy improvements sourced to “an MSMT [Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team] participating state” (Ukraine is not an MSMT member, although it could have provided information to a member state) and unnamed “non-Ukrainian official sources” that reportedly corroborated Ukrainian reports of accuracy improvements.
- [2]
A good example of this is Ukrainian President Zelensky using his August 8 statement that 30-50,000 more North Korean troops are to be stationed in Russia to plead for support from South Korea.
- [3]
Another report, based on “multiple Ukrainian sources,” states that accuracy had improved by July 2026 to 1-5 m. Such high accuracy would require the use of terminal guidance systems, such as optical or radar homing. This is within the realm of the technically possible for North Korea—even more so if it received Russian assistance—but there has been no other reporting of such high KN-23 accuracy and no direct indications of a terminal seeker on the KN-23. But the issue bears watching, as terminal guidance is a logical improvement that would significantly increase the KN-23’s utility in conventional conflict.
- [4]
- [5]
The interpretation taken by another July 2026 report, used as a source for the same claim in the July 2026 “live-fire development program” report noted above.
- [6]
The KN-series designators are applied to North Korean missile systems by the US military.