North Korea’s New Party Rules and the Limits of Delegated Authority
This article is from the sixth edition (July–September 2026) of 38 North’s quarterly product, North Korea Briefing, that monitors key internal developments in North Korea. For the full edition, click here.
In the third quarter of 2026, two major developments offered a window into North Korea’s political system. The first was the disclosure of previously unavailable details of the revised Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) charter adopted at the Ninth Party Congress. The second was the dismissal, prosecution, and public censure of Pak Hui Chol, a member of North Korea’s military elite. At first glance, these developments may appear unrelated. Read together, however, they shed light on the formalization and limits of delegated authority under Kim Jong Un.[1]
The Revised Party Bylaws
The Ninth Party Congress in February revised the Party charter, but state media did not disclose the changes in detail. In early September, a South Korean government-funded think tank released the full text of the revised charter, revealing changes in three main areas.
First, the revised charter defines Kim Jong Un’s political authority in greater detail, specifying the general secretary’s powers to appoint and dismiss Politburo members and dissolve Party departments. It also includes a new provision allowing the general secretary to directly admit to the Party individuals who have made outstanding contributions. Second, on inter-Korean relations, the revised charter removed references to South Korea and unification, including those concerning the Party’s longstanding goals of promoting revolutionary change and building ties with sympathetic organizations in South Korea. Third, the charter adjusted the roles and authority of Party organizations and the responsibilities of various decision-making bodies. Among other changes, it requires the Central Military Commission (CMC) to report its activities to a Party plenary meeting at least once every six months.
These changes broadly correspond to the constitutional revisions adopted by the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) in March and released in full by the South Korean Unification Ministry in May. Both sets of revisions further formalized the power Kim Jong Un already exercised within the Party and state and reflected North Korea’s changed inter-Korean policy. The revised constitution defines its territory as the northern part of the Korean Peninsula and removes references to unification.
Context and Implications
The Party charter revisions raise an important question: Were these provisions intended to provide an institutional basis for greater authority, or did they simply formalize powers Kim Jong Un already exercised without explicit authorization in the charter?
In North Korea, formal institutions do not necessarily constrain the leader. They can also formalize existing practices and power. The Kim Jong Il era offers one example. No Party Congress was held during his rule, which relied heavily on personal directives, even as constitutional changes formalized the National Defense Commission’s central role in the state. Under Kim Jong Un, Jang Song Thaek’s dismissal from office and expulsion from the Party in 2013 were decided at an enlarged Political Bureau meeting, in violation of the Party charter’s requirement to take such steps at a Party Central Committee plenary meeting. The use of a Party institution to sanction Jang did not, in itself, demonstrate an institutional constraint on Kim’s authority.
Kim Jong Un has placed greater emphasis than his father on formalizing the rules governing the political system and institutionalizing the Party. Since he came to power, for example, Party Congresses have resumed on a regular schedule, and Party organizations continue to play a key role in governance.
One possible reason for trying to codify these powers is to clarify the structure of authority by specifying how power may be exercised and reaffirming the leader’s ultimate authority. The latest revisions should therefore not necessarily be understood as increasing Kim’s power. Rather, they appear to put powers he already possessed and exercised more explicitly into writing.
Prosecution and Public Censure of Pak Hui Chol
Former Korean People’s Army (KPA) General Political Bureau Vice Director Pak Hui Chol was dismissed from the Party’s central leadership, prosecuted, and sentenced for “irregularities and corruption,” according to North Korean state media. His case was publicized at an unusual joint Party-government-military meeting in July, where he was accused of abusing his personnel authority to facilitate the sale of official positions and accept bribes.[2] North Korea emphasized not only Pak’s alleged corruption, but also his use of personnel authority to place loyalists in key military positions and cultivate personal followers. Without independent information, it is difficult to assess these allegations.
State media presented Pak’s case as proceeding through Party and judicial institutions. The CMC initiated an investigation in late June, after which the Second Plenary Meeting of the Ninth Party Central Committee dismissed him from the Party’s central leadership and transferred him to law enforcement. The Supreme Court subsequently issued a verdict and imposed punishment on Pak and others implicated in the case. The July 10 joint meeting publicized the alleged offenses and judicial outcome, and Kim explained their political significance to the assembled officials. The sentences were not disclosed.
Context and Implications
Public disclosure is an important distinction in how North Korea treats those who fall from political favor. Some have lost their positions without public allegations of wrongdoing, while others have been publicly denounced.
For example, in July 2012, then CMC Vice Chairman Ri Yong Ho was abruptly removed from all posts, officially for health reasons, without public denunciation or disclosure of political wrongdoing. By contrast, the December 2013 execution of Jang Song Thaek involved extensive public denunciation of his alleged factionalism. Both had been viewed as key players likely to exert significant influence during the early years of Kim Jong Un’s rule. The contrast suggests that removal from power did not necessarily entail public condemnation; in Jang’s case, publicly detailing his alleged wrongdoing added a further element of punishment and warning.
Pak was officially accused of corruption and abuse of personnel authority rather than factionalism. Nevertheless, the public handling of his case resembled aspects of Jang’s treatment, though on a far more limited scale: state media publicized the investigation, alleged offenses, and judicial outcome. The comparison concerns the public presentation of the cases, rather than suggesting that Pak’s alleged misconduct constituted factionalism.
In Pak’s case, the political dimension was evident in the official account itself. The July 10 joint meeting alleged that he used appointment authority to place people loyal to him in important posts and that these practices obstructed the Party’s monolithic command system across the army. The leadership thus presented his conduct as a threat to central control as well as a case of corruption. Publicizing the allegations before Party, government, and military officials gave the case broader political significance.
As in Jang’s case, public denunciation defined unacceptable conduct and served as a warning to other officials. In Pak’s case, that warning concerned the use of delegated military appointment authority to cultivate personal influence. By publicizing Pak’s alleged misuse of personnel authority, Kim underscored that such authority is delegated by the Party Central Committee and cannot be treated as an individual official’s private resource.
In sum, the Party charter revisions and Pak’s case illuminate two complementary aspects of governance under Kim Jong Un. The charter formalizes the structure of political authority, while the public presentation of Pak’s prosecution and punishment reinforces the boundaries within which delegated authority may be exercised. Neither development necessarily indicates greater institutional constraint on Kim himself.
- [1]
“Legibility” may offer a useful conceptual lens for examining North Korea’s political and leadership developments. One hypothesis is that legibility operates asymmetrically: upward, by making the exercise of authority and the formation of personal networks more identifiable to the leadership; and downward, by making the leadership’s ultimate authority and the limits of delegated power clearer to elites. Unlike visibility, which simply describes whether information is made public, legibility concerns whether behavior can be interpreted through institutional categories and linked to accountability and punishment.
- [2]
The Ninth Party Congress had also emphasized combating corruption, adding illicit accumulation of wealth to Article 4, Paragraph 6 of the revised Party charter.