What Seoul and Kyiv Should Learn from the North Korean POW Dispute
The dispute over two North Korean soldiers transferred from Ukraine to South Korea has exposed a weakness in cooperation between governments confronting the military partnership between Russia and North Korea. Some twenty months after their capture by Ukrainian forces, Kyiv and Seoul completed the transfer of the two soldiers to Seoul’s custody. However, the dispute that ensued over the disclosure of this transfer now threatens to affect the wider relationship. While we wait to see how this diplomatic incident is resolved, there is a larger lesson here. With North Koreans still present in and assisting Russia’s war efforts, the two countries should use what they’ve learned from this experience to establish clearer rules for handling future North Korean prisoners, from protecting their identities and assessing their wishes, to aligning messaging and transfer protocols.
An Escalating Dispute
On September 23, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that the country had “sent two North Korean prisoners of war to the Republic of Korea” at the United Nations General Assembly. However, the following day, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung said on X that Ukraine had breached “a non-disclosure agreement” about the fate of the prisoners. Dmytro Lytvyn, communications adviser to Zelenskyy, denied that such an agreement existed. South Korea summoned Ukraine’s acting ambassador on September 28, and on October 2, Lee warned of further measures unless Kyiv acknowledged the agreement and apologized. In the same post, Lee said that denying the agreement had made him a “liar.” He described the issue as a matter of dignity for South Korea and its people.
South Korea’s foreign ministry has described a “clear understanding” that the transfer would remain confidential. However, the precise terms of any such arrangement, and how they were communicated in each government, remain unclear from the public record. What is clear is that the dispute has moved beyond the two soldiers: voices within South Korea’s ruling party are now questioning whether assistance to Ukraine should continue.
Following Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, South Korea condemned Moscow and joined international sanctions. In July 2026, Lee pledged $100 million in support for Ukraine, including humanitarian assistance and support for recovery and reconstruction. Like Japan, South Korea has focused on humanitarian assistance and non-lethal equipment rather than supplying lethal weapons directly to Ukraine, reflecting Seoul’s cautious approach to involvement in the war.
This caution has a wider diplomatic context. Russia was a significant trading partner for South Korea before the war, particularly in the manufacturing and energy sectors. South Korea-based car brands, Kia and Hyundai, were Russia’s second- and third-best-selling car brands, respectively, in 2021, while Russia supplied about 6 percent of South Korea’s crude oil imports that year. Although Seoul subsequently halted Russian crude purchases, Middle Eastern supply disruptions prompted the government to discuss importing Russian crude and naphtha in March 2026. This illustrates the competing pressures of supporting sanctions against Moscow and securing alternative energy supplies.
South Korea also has a system for receiving and supporting North Korean defectors, and accepting the two soldiers was consistent with its policy of offering protection to North Koreans who wish to settle in the South. Seoul’s reason for keeping the transfer confidential centered on the safety of the men and their families. The transfer was particularly sensitive for the Lee administration seeking to improve relations with Pyongyang while managing the security implications of closer Russian–North Korean military ties.
For Kyiv, the soldiers’ fate was also tied to efforts to bring home Ukrainians held by Russia. Captured in Russia’s Kursk region in January 2025, the two North Koreans reportedly wanted to settle in South Korea. Moscow, however, had twice requested them in exchange negotiations, a Ukrainian official said in May. Their transfer to Seoul therefore raised a difficult question: why send prisoners sought by Moscow to South Korea rather than retain them for a possible exchange that might bring Ukrainian soldiers home? This gave the transfer a political sensitivity that went beyond accommodating the men’s wishes or Seoul’s request.
According to lawmakers briefed by South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS), Ukraine initially requested confidentiality because of “the potential impact on prisoner exchanges with Russia.” Yet the announcement might also have offered a political benefit. The NIS assessed that Zelenskyy may have hoped publicizing the transfer would encourage South Korean support for greater assistance to Ukraine, including weapons, although this is an assessment of his motives, rather than a confirmed explanation.
A Successful Transfer, a Diplomatic Rift
Despite their different priorities, Seoul and Kyiv agreed on the transfer. At their July 8 meeting, Lee and Zelenskyy committed to handling the prisoners’ situation in accordance with international law and humanitarian principles while respecting their wishes. According to South Korean officials, the men arrived in Seoul in mid-September. On October 2, a senior foreign ministry official said that the men’s wishes to settle in South Korea had been verified repeatedly by both governments and an unidentified third party.
The transfer was thus a substantive achievement, but it soon became a source of political contention in Seoul. On September 25, a Democratic Party spokesperson criticized the disclosure as damaging bilateral trust and endangering the soldiers and their families. Kim Byung-joo, lawmaker and special presidential adviser for defense policy, went further, calling for an immediate review of assistance to Ukraine, although he clarified that this was his “personal opinion.” However, opposition criticism took a different direction: People Power Party leader Jang Dong-hyeok accused Lee of showing “uncontrolled anger toward Ukraine” while remaining conciliatory toward Pyongyang. Meanwhile, the government was considering a stronger diplomatic response. Foreign Minister Cho Hyun confirmed on October 6 that recalling South Korea’s ambassador to Ukraine was among the options under review.
Why Cooperation Still Matters
Despite some negative reactions from Seoul, there are also voices calling for broader cooperation not to be impacted by the latest exchange of accusations. For South Korea, the reasons to work with Ukraine extend beyond solidarity with a country under invasion. Ukrainian forces have direct experience of fighting North Korean troops and encountering North Korean weapons. Information from that experience can help Seoul assess the capabilities and limitations of the forces it faces on the peninsula.
Russia’s military cooperation with North Korea gives Seoul a direct stake in developments on the Ukrainian battlefield. Pyongyang’s forces are gaining combat experience, while Russian support and potential technology transfers could contribute to capabilities that South Korea must prepare to face at home. Cooperation with Kyiv can help South Korea better assess what North Korea is learning, and how that knowledge might affect its forces.
Ukraine also has an interest in preserving South Korean support. According to its foreign ministry, South Korea provided more than $550 million in assistance between 2022 and 2025, including contributions through international organizations and equipment for demining, engineering, and medical care. Deliveries of ambulances, generators, and mine-clearing vehicles have supported essential services during the war. The relationship also offers a basis for longer-term recovery: a bilateral agreement allows Ukraine to access up to $2.1 billion in development loans between 2024 and 2029. Even without direct supplies of lethal weapons, South Korean support therefore matters to Ukraine’s ability to sustain civilian life and rebuild after the war.
Looking Ahead
Assuming South Korea-Ukraine cooperation continues, there are lessons to be learned from this experience that suggest a need for a framework for dealing with potentially future North Korean prisoners of war. The aim should be to preserve the procedures that worked in this case and reduce the likelihood of another dispute.
A prisoner’s freely expressed wishes must remain the starting point. Seoul’s account suggests that multiple meaningful checks occurred before this transfer including by a third party; future arrangements should build on that experience. The governments should agree on a process that includes confidential advice, third party involvement, and an opportunity to reconsider before departure.
The legal basis for a transfer and the responsibilities that follow should also be clear to both sides. The International Committee of the Red Cross explains that non-refoulement protections apply to prisoners of war facing relevant risks of persecution, torture, or death upon return. An individual’s wish to reach South Korea must be considered alongside those obligations. The two governments should establish how applicable protections continue through departure, reception, and any subsequent custody, drawing on independent legal and humanitarian expertise where needed.
Protection also depends on how information is handled. In an interview with The Korea Herald earlier this year, UN special rapporteur Elizabeth Salmón warned that public exposure could endanger the soldiers and their families. The men’s identities and reported wishes had already appeared in the media before the transfer was announced. That earlier publicity could not be undone, but it did not make disclosure of their arrival inconsequential because the release of new information can create different risks.
Those risks should be assessed carefully. The Third Geneva Convention protects POWs from public curiosity; the ICRC’s guidance emphasizes the dangers of publishing identifying information, including when prisoners appear willing to participate. In future cases, Seoul and Kyiv should consider these protections early in the process and take greater care when handling photos, videos, and other identifying information that could endanger prisoners or their families in North Korea. There should also be different protocols for how to disclose their preferences versus what is disclosed about their fate, and how it should be messaged to various audiences. These decisions must be aligned both for the protection of the prisoners and to prevent the kind of diplomatic disputes the countries face today.
Containing the Fallout
The immediate task is to keep the current disagreement from consuming the relationship. On October 1, Yonhap reported Seoul said the dispute “would not be linked to other areas of bilateral cooperation, including humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and joint postwar reconstruction efforts.” Pressure within the ruling party to reconsider support should therefore be distinguished from a government decision to do so.
At the same time, diplomatic channels seem to be actively working to resolve this matter. On October 1, Sybiha said he hoped for a swift resolution, emphasizing South Korea’s importance to Ukraine and his wish to sustain their cooperation. On October 6, Cho said that messages from Sybiha had included an apology, although it fell short of Seoul’s expectations. Both governments should use those channels to address the disputed commitments and establish common expectations for future cases.
The two soldiers reached South Korea because Seoul and Kyiv were able to reconcile different priorities. Yet agreement on their destination did not prevent a dispute over disclosure. With North Korean forces still involved in Russia’s war, similar cases may arise again. Clearer procedures for assessing prisoners’ wishes, protecting sensitive information, and coordinating transfers would help both governments protect those captured while preserving cooperation that serves their wider security interests.