North Korea Reiterates Party’s Precedence Over the Military, Conducts Sweeping Changes in KPA Leadership
This article is from the first edition (April-June 2025) of 38 North’s new quarterly product, North Korea Briefing, that monitors key internal developments in North Korea. For the full series, click here.
During the second quarter of 2025, the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Central Military Commission (CMC) carried out two important activities: an investigation into a failed ship launch, and convening of a CMC expanded meeting. The former offers greater insight into the CMC’s administrative processes and shows its exercise of authority over the country’s defense industry. The expanded meeting was significant for two reasons: Kim Jong Un (KJU) reaffirmed the Party’s precedence over the Korean People’s Army (KPA), and he conducted sweeping changes in the KPA leadership ahead of the Ninth Party Congress scheduled for 2026.
CMC Investigation Sheds Light on its Administrative Processes
The CMC led an investigation into the May 21 capsizing of a KPA naval destroyer during a commissioning ceremony at Chongjin Port.[1] In the process, CMC investigators referred three defense industry, shipbuilding, and port officials—the port’s chief engineer, the hull construction workshop’s head, and the deputy manager for administrative affairs—to “the law-enforcement organ.”
Context and Implications
The CMC’s leadership role in the failed ship launch investigation is altogether unsurprising. It has administrative and policy oversight over the DPRK’s defense industry, in addition to basic decision-making on defense affairs. The “law-enforcement organ” that detained the three individuals may refer to the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), North Korea’s police, or the Central Prosecutor’s Office (CPO). It is unclear if a formal statutory connection exists between the CMC and CPO or if the case referrals were a one-off enforcement measure.
These disclosures provide us with greater insight into the CMC’s administrative processes. The MPS and/or CPO referrals show the CMC’s interaction with a North Korean institution outside of the KPA. The CMC’s investigation also shows that the CMC exercises its authority over the defense industry. Overall, the latest investigation provides us with a deeper understanding of how the Kim regime engages in problem-solving and the bureaucratic mechanisms it employs.
Kim Reaffirms Party’s Precedence Over the Military, Conducts Sweeping Personnel Changes in KPA
The CMC gathered in an expanded session on May 28.[2] There were no publicized mentions of the failed ship launch or additional large rear-area troop deployments to Russia. In fact, state media’s brief report of the meeting indicated that civil-military relations between the WPK and the KPA, or the roles of the WPK committees and the KPA’s political commissars, were the main topics discussed. It said: “The meeting discussed the important issues of exercising tight control and guidance so that all military and political activities of the DPRK armed forces are thoroughly conducted as required by the Party’s military line….” KJU himself emphasized the importance of “realizing the guidance of the Party Central Committee over the army” in that same meeting.
Although the tone of KJU’s remarks was neutral and aspirational rather than scolding, the CMC demoted the military rank of KPA General Political Bureau (GPB) Director Jong Kyong Thaek.[3] Additionally, the CMC made at least 10 personnel changes in the military, but state media did not reveal the new officeholders’ names. These included six corps commanders, the KPA Artillery Bureau commander, and the Military Security Command (MSC) director. The CMC also “dispatched some” political commissars, with at least 10 (possibly more) general-grade officers changing positions after the CMC meeting. State media’s report of the CMC meeting did not reveal the names of outgoing officers’ names or those of the new office holders, but the only known personnel change was General Jo Kyong Chol’s exit from the MSC director position.
Context and Implications
The Party-military relationship has previously been an agenda item at things like CMC and Political Bureau meetings. The latest session’s emphasis of the Party’s control of the military not only is consistent with Kim Jong Un’s longstanding policy of WPK precedence over the KPA, but also echoes a theme highlighted at the 2024 year-end Party plenary meeting: bolstering ideology in the KPA.[4]
Jong’s demotion from four-star General to three-star Colonel General is the lowest rank of an incumbent GPB director since the 1970s. The GPB manages the Party’s relationship with the military primarily through a network of political commissars and officers deployed to KPA units. During a pair of inspections at North Korean military colleges in February, Jong’s presence was not explicitly reported in state media. He was upstaged by Pak Jong Chon, director of the WPK Department of Political Leadership of the Military, and Minister of National Defense (MND) No Kwang Chol.[5] Due his family background, previous career experience as a key political enforcer and his stable patronage ties, Jong Kyong Thaek is not someone who would be out of office per se, but he probably has to prove himself to keep his current post.
The CMC’s multiple personnel changes mark a significant churn in KPA leadership. Jo’s departure from the MSC marks the most notable change of them all. He is a core member of Kim’s bodyguard and has built up the MSC’s organization and jurisdiction. Appointed in 2009, Jo had been in office for 16 years. This makes him the second-longest serving KPA official in DPRK history, after O Jin U’s 19 years as defense minister.
Since the Party Secretariat meeting at the end of January, when Kim harshly criticized violations of Party discipline by local party officials, Kim Jong Un seems to be using this final year before the Ninth Party Congress in 2026 to undertake personnel changes.[6] This will almost certainly ease personnel selections prior to the Party Congress, where North Korea typically conducts sweeping personnel shuffles. We might get further insight into some of these new commanders at forthcoming events. The next opportunity most likely will come in October, when North Korea is expected to stage a military parade marking the Party’s 80th founding anniversary.
- [1]
“Investigation into Destroyer Launch Accident Intensified,” KCNA, May 23, 2025, http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/a6981124e6d4bac2a1824e9ec3468c3c.kcmsf; and “Accident Investigation Group Informs WPK Central Military Commission of its Work,” KCNA, May25, 2025, http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/64e900f5bd0353837ca02d7babcce3ad5fbec640da0fe3231761bf5f9776d335a71110c246820e75b27f0800d3bfeaf6.kcmsf.
- [2]
“Eighth Enlarged Meeting of WPK Central Military Commission Held,” KCNA, May 30, 2025, http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/24ebb6eaf8c8a6c6e96c54e72ba79e04.kcmsf.
- [3]
This was not reported by North Korean media but confirmed by photos showing Jong’s uniform showing a three-star insignia the day after the CMC meeting. See Kim Soo-yeon, “(2nd LD) N. Korea’s Kim demotes director of military’s general political bureau,” Yonhap, May 30, 2025, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20250530000752315.
- [4]
“Report on Enlarged Meeting of Eleventh Plenary Meeting of Eighth Central Committee of WPK,” KCNA, December 29, 2024, http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/13e43e68ae1cbc62540eddbad5f92205.kcmsf.
- [5]
“Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Visits Kim Il Sung University of Politics,” KCNA, February 25, 2025, http://www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/eaf19564e69980427ddc571f33565f65.kcmsf; “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Kang Kon Military Academy,” KCNA, February 26, 2025, http://www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/60652a2eb618df9fb5b85e811df030b2.kcmsf; and “Comrade Kim Jong Un Visits Kim Il Sung University of Political Science,” Korean Central Television, February 26, 2025.
- [6]
“Report on 30th Enlarged Meeting of Secretariat of Eighth Central Committee of WPK,” KCNA, January 29, 2025, http://www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/b7d040edf71f8cac912719455bbb18d9.kcmsf.