North Korea Continues to Modulate Anti-US Rhetoric and Strengthen Ties With Russia; Indicates Lack of Interest in Improving Ties With South Korea
This article is from the first edition (April-June 2025) of 38 North’s new quarterly product, North Korea Briefing, that monitors key internal developments in North Korea. For the full series, click here.
In the second quarter, North Korea continued to moderate its anti-US rhetoric, suggesting it is leaving some maneuvering space for diplomacy with the Trump administration for when the time is right. However, creating diplomatic space is not the same as being receptive to US demands. North Korea’s pledge at the end of 2024 to launch “the toughest anti-U.S. counteraction,” Kim’s commitment to expanding nuclear capabilities, and the North’s ongoing mistrust of Washington will continue to pose significant challenges. North Korea continued to expand and deepen ties with Russia and will likely prioritize this bilateral relationship at least for the foreseeable future. North Korea’s subdued and limited coverage of South Korean internal affairs, coupled with its ongoing criticism of Seoul in regional security contexts, indicates Pyongyang remains uninterested in improving relations with the new South Korean government despite the latter’s conciliatory measures.
United States
North Korea continued to modulate its anti-US rhetoric in the second quarter, a trend that began as early as December 2024. Despite its steady stream of news reports and articles critical of the United States, North Korea’s official statements, generally considered more authoritative, by and large maintained a punch line that has become a consistent and prevalent theme in North Korean propaganda: that the country would continue to step up its nuclear capabilities to face US “threats.”[1] Kim Jong Un refrained from using derogatory terms such as “the US imperialists,” even while accusing the United States of endangering North Korea’s national security and pledging to respond to provocations in kind.[2] Furthermore, although North Korean state media criticized the “Trump administration,” they avoided criticizing Trump himself by name, instead opting to use the term “the ruler [집권자; chipkwonja].”[3] Similarly, North Korea omitted any direct reference to the United States in connection with its operations in the Kursk region and issued meek criticism of US bombings of Iranian nuclear sites. More recently, North Korea’s subdued anti-US rhetoric marking the start of the Korean War—as shown by its front-page “article [글; article]” and the scale of its anti-US rallies—also pointed to the same trend.[4]
Context and Implications
This ongoing trend suggests that North Korea is leaving some maneuvering space for diplomacy with the Trump administration for when the time is right.[5] However, creating diplomatic space is not the same as being receptive to US demands. Despite the seemingly positive sign, the bilateral relationship remains severely challenged, even with Trump’s return to the White House. For one, at a year-end Party plenary meeting in 2024, Kim characterized the United States as “the most reactionary state” and called for “the toughest anti-U.S. counteraction to be launched aggressively by the DPRK for its long-term national interests and security.” A review of North Korean propaganda shows this policy has not changed despite its softened anti-Trump rhetoric. Second, North Korea has consistently reaffirmed, at the most authoritative levels including Kim Jong Un himself, that it will continue to bolster nuclear capabilities in accordance with its “nuclear weapons state” status as codified in its constitution in 2023. Another point of note is that Pyongyang has been closely tracking the Trump administration’s tensions with allies over tariffs and interest in acquiring or reclaiming foreign territory. In that vein, a prominent North Korean “international affairs analyst’s” assessment of Trump’s “America First” policy seemed to reinforce the North’s already deep mistrust of the United States. The analyst’s conclusion was that “one must be strong in order to defend oneself” and reiterated North Korea was doing just that by “bolstering up its strength with tighter grip on the treasured nuclear sword of justice.”
Russia
North Korea continued to strengthen relations with Russia at all levels and across various sectors, from student, news agency, and military delegations’ visits to Russia and Russian ministerial and communist party delegations’ visits to North Korea, to Kim Jong Un’s back-to-back meetings in June with Sergei Shoigu, secretary of the Russian Security Council and Putin’s close confidant.[6] North Korean media also gave prominent coverage to Russia’s Victory Day and the first anniversary of the North Korea-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Two key events underlined the state of the bilateral relationship. First, in late April, North Korea for the first time publicly acknowledged troop deployment to Russia. It described the military operations in Kursk as demonstrating “the highest strategic level of the firm militant friendship between the DPRK and Russia and the alliance and fraternal relations.”
Second, Kim gave a speech at the Russian Embassy to commemorate Russia’s Victory Day, where he emphasized the North’s “alliance” and “blood-sealed bilateral relationship” with Russia, justified his troop deployment, and declared he would “unhesitatingly issue an order on using the armed forces of the DPRK” should Russia come under another assault, in accordance with their treaty. Kim’s visit to the Russian Embassy marked his third to a foreign embassy in Pyongyang, following his visits to the Cuban Embassy in 2016 to mourn Fidel Castro’s death, and the Chinese Embassy in 2018 to express sympathy to the victims of a car crash in North Korea.
Context and Implications
Kim Jong Un’s repeated public affirmations of commitment to Russia, coupled with the North’s continued attempts to institutionalize relations at all levels across various sectors, indicate that strengthening this bilateral relationship will remain a priority for Pyongyang. These moves are consistent with North Korea’s efforts to give longer-term, strategic framing to its relations with Moscow, particularly since the signing of the new treaty during Putin’s visit to Pyongyang in 2024. A visiting Russian Communist Party delegation’s rare meeting in April with the director of the North Korean Party’s International Department, whose main portfolio is China and overseeing party-to-party diplomacy, may be understood in the context of North Korea’s effort to give an ideological foundation to the relationship.
How North Korea has been invoking the new treaty—and apparently coordinating policy with Moscow—is indicative of how it may use the document in the future. North Korea has stated that Kim’s decision to send troops to Russia was based on Article 4 of the treaty.[7] The North Korean Foreign Ministry’s statements on the Israel-Iran conflict in June, issued shortly after Kim’s meeting with Shoigu, appeared to have been coordinated with the Russian position. Article 2 of the North Korea-Russia treaty stipulates that the two sides “shall exchange views on the issues of bilateral relations and international issues of mutual concern through dialogue and negotiations” and “intensify concerted action and cooperation in the international arenas.”
South Korea
In contrast to its sustained criticism of South Korea in regional security contexts, North Korea continued to show little interest in Seoul’s internal affairs. This was exemplified by a two-sentence report on South Korea’s June 3 snap election, without providing any commentary or background. This terse coverage stood in contrast to its meatier reporting of the 2017 snap election in South Korea, also held in the aftermath of a presidential impeachment.[8] North Korean media did not report or comment on South Korea’s new Lee government for more than 50 days since their single reporting on the June election.[9]
Context and Implications
North Korea’s continued public indifference to South Korean internal affairs, coupled with its ongoing criticism of Seoul, indicates Pyongyang remains uninterested in improving relations with the new South Korean government despite the latter’s conciliatory measures, such as the suspension of loudspeakers at the demilitarized zone and broadcasts into North Korea.[10] North Korea’s subdued handling of the latest South Korean presidential election and the new Lee government is in line with its low-key media coverage of Yoon’s declaration of martial law in December 2024 and the political confusion that followed. North Korea since the martial law declaration has limited its media coverage of South Korean domestic affairs to news reports on key political milestones, all the while continuing criticism of South Korea for its security cooperation with the United States and Japan. This appears to be part of Kim Jong Un’s two Koreas policy, which he first announced in December 2023.[11] In October 2024, North Korea confirmed that its constitution defined South Korea as a “hostile state.”
- [1]
For example, Kim Yo Jong said, “… [I]t will only give unlimited justness and justification to the advance of the DPRK aspiring after the building of the strongest nuclear force for self-defence. The DPRK will make steady responsible efforts to thoroughly defend the supreme interests of the state and ensure regional peace and stability, given that the U.S. has gone to extremes in its nuclear threat and its nuclear alliance is getting desperate in its confrontational moves as days go by.” See “Press Statement of Kim Yo Jong, Vice Department Director of C.C., WPK,” Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), April 9, 2025, http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/79006337b832c7f7308b2c04f733b1eb.kcmsf. The North Korean Defense Ministry said, “We … are making sustained and practical efforts to possess a war deterrent capable of actively coping with any security instability resulting from its [US] nuclear arms buildup. The DPRK armed forces will thoroughly contain and control all sorts of military threats from the enemy countries in the future, too….” See “Press Statement by Chief of Policy Office of DPRK Ministry of National Defence,” KCNA, May 25, 2025, http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/7814962e12328ec63931b157c5b3d5ceead166184a3dccadcf9a25986ed6d4a8849dcbab0a7b04376b9c3fd971bede61.kcmsf.
- [2]
“Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un’s Speech at Ceremony of Launching Destroyer of Navy of Korean People’s Army,” KCNA, April 26, 2025, http://www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/aaeed682a4cba15d70ede85a48bf38a1.kcmsf; and “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Speech at Ceremony of Launching Destroyer of Navy of Korean People’s Army,” KCNA, June 13, 2025, http://www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/9e8aba4f8c82a15d3f892d0b5389ae03.kcmsf.
- [3]
Ri Kyong Su, “서방식민주주의의 취약성을 폭로한다 [Exposing the Vulnerabilities of Western-style Democracy],” Rodong Sinmun, June 5, 2025.
- [4]
While the front-page “article” in the Party daily Rodong Sinmun on June 25, 2025 included a brief criticism of the United States, its main focus was the importance of bolstering “strength.” By contrast, the Rodong Sinmun editorial on June 25, 2024 used more detailed and stronger language in reference to US military activities in the region and the North Korean people’s will to retaliate. In 2024, North Korean media reported that “more than 100,000” people attended the June 25 anti-US rally in Pyongyang; this year, North Korea did not report on the number of attendees in the main rally held in Sinchon, suggesting a smaller rally. It should be noted, however, that Choe Tong Myong, secretary of the Workers Party of Korea, and “other senior Party and government officials” attended the Sinchon rally. For the 2025 article, see Rim Jong Ho, “<6.25가 다시금 새겨주는 철리> 강해지고 또 강해져야 한다 [The Lesson the Korean War Impresses Upon [Us] Once Again: [We] Must Become Stronger and Even Stronger],” Rodong Sinmun, June 25, 2025. For the 2024 editorial, see “1950년대 조국수호정신을 필승의 무기로 틀어쥐고 우리 국가의 존엄과 국익을 억척같이 수호하자 [Let Us Firmly Seize the 1950s Spirit of Safeguarding the Fatherland as an Invincible Weapon and Resolutely Safeguard the Dignity and National Interests of Our State],” Rodong Sinmun, June 25, 2024.
- [5]
Kim Yo Jong on July 29 issued a “press statement” indicating North Korea may be open to dialogue with the United States if it drops the demand for North Korea’s denuclearization. See “Press Statement of Kim Yo Jong, Vice Department Director of C.C., WPK,” KCNA, July 29, 2025, http://www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/f09697cbd57fc50ca8b79a88ccfd9309.kcmsf.
- [6]
“Delegation of Russian Ministry of Interior Arrives Here,” KCNA, May 27, 2025, http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/65e93d8a71e2fc200437c1459d7e15085bf7a4b27f4e49b1eff1105df563e67b680e40b40899891bbe75a7072e3285e7.kcmsf; “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Meets Russian Minister of Culture and Enjoys Art Performances,” KCNA, June 30, 2025, http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/674c05ed022f5b3925c150b4d1305302.kcmsf; “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Meets Secretary of Russian Security Council Sergei Shoigu,” KCNA, June 5, 2025, http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/d6956a1a327129692244c7170f890c54.kcmsf; and “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Meets Secretary of Russian Security Council Sergei Shoigu,” KCNA, June 18, 2025, http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/641e7544737011ee8d71b8efa56e1859.kcmsf.
- [7]
Article 4 of the treaty stipulates: “In case any one of the two sides is put in a state of war by an armed invasion from an individual state or several states, the other side shall provide military and other assistance with all means in its possession without delay in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and the laws of the DPRK and the Russian Federation.”
- [8]
“남조선에서 제19대 《대통령》선거 진행 [19th “Presidential” Election Held in South Korea],” Rodong Sinmun, May 11, 2017.
- [9]
Kim Yo Jong on July 28 issued a “press statement” on the Lee Jae Myung government, marking North Korea’s first commentary on the new South Korean government since it reported on Lee’s election. See “Press Statement of Kim Yo Jong, Vice Department Director of C.C., WPK,” KCNA, July 28, 2025, http://www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/8c4b1d1e8a32e3c00798c9612ac1682d.kcmsf.
- [10]
This would seem to be supported by Kim Yo Jong’s July 28 press statement rejecting Lee’s overtures and reaffirming Kim Jong Un’s two Koreas policy. She said: “… [T]here can be no change in our state’s understanding of the enemy and they can not turn back the hands of the clock of the history which has radically changed the character of the DPRK-ROK relations. We clarify once again the official stand that no matter what policy is adopted and whatever proposal is made in Seoul, we have no interest in it and there is neither the reason to meet nor the issue to be discussed with the ROK.”
- [11]
Since the announcement of this policy in December 2023, North Korea has ceased using “South Korea [남조선; namjoson],” replacing it with South Korea’s formal name, “한국 [hanguk]” or “대한민국 [taehanminguk],” or the “Republic of Korea,” in order to emphasize it as a separate country.