Russia-DPRK Relations: Strategic Partnership or Opportunistic Alliance?
Europe’s deadliest armed conflict in nearly 80 years has put Russia-DPRK relations into overdrive, with Russia’s need for outside assistance fueling the development of deep military cooperation. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) leader Kim Jong Un have established a personal rapport with each other, one driven in large measure by a shared animosity of US foreign policy and what both perceive—rightly or wrongly—to be an overbearing United States desperately seeking to maintain hegemony in Europe and East Asia.
Two questions naturally arise. First, how deep does the Russia-DPRK relationship go? And second, can it now be categorized as an alliance in the same vein as what the United States shares with South Korea and Japan? The answers are not mutually exclusive; just because Moscow and Pyongyang are collaborating more seamlessly than they have in the past does not necessarily mean either one expects a full-scale alliance to be established as a result or that they are even interested in such an arrangement. What the two countries boast at the present moment is, if anything, a marriage of convenience fueled by self-interest, a desire to counter Washington’s strengthening of its own alliance system, and a firmly-held belief in Moscow and Pyongyang that the United States is trying to link the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe with its bilateral alliances in East Asia. The war in Ukraine, where Japan—which signed a 10-year security agreement with Kyiv in June with an accompanying $4.5 billion in non-military aid—and South Korea (to a more limited extent) are members of the US-organized sanctions regime against Russia, only reaffirms this belief in the minds of Russian and North Korean officials.
North Korean Troops on Their Way to Ukraine
US experts increasingly describe the Russia-DPRK relationship as a key node in a broader axis of authoritarians aiming to upend the so-called rules-based international order. News of North Korean troop deployments to Russia has reinforced the discourse. On October 17, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky alleged that roughly 10,000 North Korean troops were being mobilized to join the war in Ukraine on Russia’s behalf. Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, assessed that North Korean personnel would be ready to enter the fight by November 1. South Korea’s National Intelligence Service went a step further in its own assessment, claiming that 3,000 North Korean troops are already training inside Russia for combat operations.
How those troops will be used is still a mystery. As Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin suggested, it is possible Putin could deploy the North Koreans as shock troops on the frontline, particularly in Donetsk, where ongoing Russian offensives near the Ukrainian towns of Chasiv Yar and Pokvrosk have caused extensive casualties on the Russian side. Others speculate that North Korean units might be stationed in Russia’s Kursk province, a portion of which the Ukrainian army continues to hold ground after a surprise August offensive, in order to free up Russian personnel for duties at the front.
Yet for Washington and Seoul, how Russia chooses to deploy North Korean reinforcements is less important than the fact that Moscow and Pyongyang are now gearing up to fight on the same side. Even before news of the North Korean troop movements emerged, US Deputy Secretary Kurt Campbell stressed that the Kim regime’s material support to the Russians was “creating further instability in Europe.” The Biden administration has spent well over a year arguing that the nexus between these two authoritarian powers is a danger not only to European stability but to the stability of East Asia as well. This is consistent with the emerging conventional theme percolating in Washington, Berlin, and Tokyo that security in Europe and Asia is inextricably linked.
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s administration is even more emphatic about the risks of Russia-DPRK military ties, calling it both unacceptable and illegal given the multiple United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions prohibiting such activity, regardless of the treaty the two countries signed in June. On October 21, the South Korean Foreign Ministry summoned the Russian ambassador in Seoul and demanded an immediate withdrawal of North Korean troops; a day later, the Yoon administration threatened to provide Ukraine with direct military assistance if military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang continued, a countermeasure Yoon reiterated personally this week. Such a course of action, however, is easier said than done for South Korea, which is barred by law from exporting lethal weapons to a country at war.
Russia-DPRK Relations Rise to New Heights
North Korean troops fighting in Ukraine would be an unprecedented situation. While Pyongyang has been involved in third-party conflicts in the past—North Korean pilots aided North Vietnam during the 1960s, for instance—never before has the Kim regime ordered so many North Korean ground personnel into a war that, objectively speaking, is of tertiary importance to North Korea’s own security. Whether or not Russia proves victorious in Ukraine is immaterial to the Kim regime’s longevity or Kim Jong Un’s own rule. The question, therefore, must be asked: knowing this, why would Pyongyang inject itself into a war of attrition over 4,200 miles away?
The most straightforward explanation is that Kim is fully invested in bolstering his strategic relationship with Putin’s Russia and believes the cost of North Korean casualties—an inevitable result if the troops are sent to Donetsk—is worth the benefits of keeping Moscow close to Pyongyang. Although some will brand this as overly simplistic, there is some merit to the argument. North Korea, after all, has already been involved in Ukraine, albeit in an indirect capacity, since at least September 2022, when the first reports of North Korean munitions shipments to the Russian army surfaced publicly. According to C4ADS, a global security nonprofit, more than 74,000 metric tons of North Korean munitions were shipped to Russian ports in the Far East between August 2023 and January 2024. In August, South Korean military officials estimated that Pyongyang delivered 13,000 containers to Russia through the port in Rason, a significant uptick from the previous estimate of 7,000 containers in March. North Korean munitions factories are reportedly working around the clock to produce the basic munitions and artillery shells the Russian army needs to maintain its offensive in the face of formidable Ukrainian resistance. Moscow has also occasionally employed North Korean short-range ballistic missiles against Ukrainian targets, although their effectiveness is suspect.
Outside of Ukraine, North Korea and Russia have elevated their bilateral relationship. Senior Russian and North Korean officials now meet on a fairly regular basis. In July 2023, a Russian military delegation led by then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu flew to the North Korean capital; two months later, Kim Jong Un made the trip to Russia’s far east, his first foreign visit in more than four years, where he toured the Vostochny Cosmodrome with Putin as well as an aircraft plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. Putin’s June 2024 trip to North Korea was even more substantive in terms of deliverables, culminating in the signing of the comprehensive strategic partnership agreement that commits both sides to deeper collaboration in the military domain and mutual security assistance if either was attacked by a foreign power.
The Kim regime, of course, is not doing any of this for free. Like any leader who makes an arrangement with another country, Kim is expecting the agreement to bring about benefits to his regime—in other words, Russia needs to compensate Pyongyang if it wants to maintain the present state of the relationship or improve it to new heights. Fortunately for the North Koreans, the Russian government is following through.
On the political front, Russia’s obligations to North Korea are most prominently displayed at the UN Security Council, where Pyongyang is used to being ostracized by the great powers over any number of sins, from the development of its nuclear and missile programs to its ongoing human rights abuses. Due in large measure to Russia’s diplomatic support, the UNSC has become paralyzed on North Korea, with sessions on Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program having long descended into unproductive finger-pointing. The Russians (with backing from China) have repeatedly blocked the passage of new sanctions on North Korea at the Security Council and continue to call for an easing of sanctions for humanitarian purposes. This March, Moscow used its veto power to kill the UN Panel of Experts monitoring the implementation (and evasion) of sanctions against North Korea, an action that was also self-serving given Russia’s own sanctions violations, including the importation of North Korean arms and the export of refined petroleum above Security Council-mandated levels. With the Panel in tatters, the United States, South Korea and Japan have been forced to construct an alternative multilateral monitoring mechanism outside the UN system, adding to the difficulty of monitoring and enforcing the sanctions.
A Hostile Alliance in the Making?
Considering the state of the Russia-DPRK relationship today, prominent US foreign policy experts are increasingly employing the word “alliance” to categorize it. Still, others have boldly labeled the arrangement a “full-fledged military alliance circa [the] Cold War,” claiming the obligations embedded in the comprehensive strategic partnership accord will be durable over the long term. The pending deployment of thousands of North Korean foot soldiers to Russia will only amplify these arguments in the days and weeks to come.
Yet “alliance” is a loaded term. It suggests, for instance, that Russia and North Korea have identical—or at least similar—values and interests, are obligated to fight for one another during a security crisis and at the very least will sustain current ties decades into the future. In reality, the strategic partnership is built on a weaker foundation than is presently assumed, motivated by a common adversary in the United States and fueled by a combination of desperation, convenience and a lack of other alternatives. Russia and North Korea are strengthening their bonds not out of a shared affinity for each other but rather because both sides view the relationship as in their respective self-interests. The unique geopolitical circumstances of the day help as well. Putin views Kim as useful for the moment, while Kim likely views Putin as a big chip to be played in his dance with Washington, Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing.
North Korea’s direct participation in Ukraine is no exception to the rule. Russia’s foreign policy machinery and its defense-industrial base are now, seemingly, in complete service to the war in Ukraine. Every other Russian foreign and defense policy priority is subservient to the objective of winning the war or at least ending it on terms Moscow finds acceptable. Russia’s willingness to sustain such punishment for the sake of victory demonstrates just how vital the war is to the Russian political elite. The costs have been significant. Economically and politically, the war has burned Russia’s bridges to the West, which up until 2022 was Russia’s biggest buyer of crude oil, for the foreseeable future. Geopolitically, Moscow is more reliant on China than ever—and despite Chinese President Xi Jinping’s proclamations of a Russia-China partnership without limits, Beijing is seeking to exploit its superior position vis-à-vis Moscow to finalize bilateral projects—like the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline—on the cheap.
Notwithstanding the recent territorial advances in Donetsk, Russia’s military losses are astronomical. While the accuracy of war-time projections should always be challenged, US officials gave a provisional tally of more than 600,000 Russian dead and wounded since the conflict began. September was reportedly the bloodiest month of the war for the Russians, with Moscow losing about 1,200 personnel a day. These casualties are coming at a time when Putin, wary of provoking unrest in places like Moscow and St. Petersburg, is doing everything short of a full-scale national mobilization to re-pad the Russian army’s ranks. While 12,000 North Korean soldiers will not do much to alleviate Russia’s workforce issues, their deployment would nevertheless give the Kremlin some additional time to reassess its options. Putin needs as many bodies as he can get, no matter where they come from or even how effective they may be on the battlefield.
On the surface, Pyongyang looks like it gets the short end of the stick. North Korea, after all, is making most of the sacrifices. If reports are correct, the Kim regime is making a deliberate decision to potentially sacrifice thousands of its own citizens in a war whose outcome will not impact North Korea’s security situation. Yet it is not a total loss for the Kim regime either; indeed, if it were, Kim would not consider a deployment, let alone authorize it.
First, any North Korean troops sent to fight in Ukraine will acquire the kind of battlefield experience that the Korean People’s Army (KPA) currently lacks. This should not be understated; the last time the KPA fought a large-scale conventional conflict was the 1950-1953 Korean War. The Kim regime has devoted a significant portion of its annual gross domestic product to its military and weapons of mass destruction programs in the seven decades since but remains grossly under-funded and under-equipped on the key defense platforms—fighter and bomber aircraft, air defense systems and logistics infrastructure to name a few—required to wage a successful military campaign. Indeed, one of the primary reasons why the Kim regime spends so lavishly on its nuclear and missile programs is because the KPA’s conventional capability is qualitatively inferior to its adversaries. Assisting the Russians in Ukraine can provide the KPA with the institutional knowledge of what systems, tactics and procedures are needed for modern-day warfare.
Second and just as importantly, the Kim regime wants Russia in its corner. Moscow’s support is a geopolitical coup for Pyongyang, granting North Korea more flexibility and freedom of maneuver in relation to its dealings with the United States and China alike. Comfortable that it can rely on Moscow’s support, North Korea is even less worried about additional economic sanctions today than it normally is. More specifically, Pyongyang is likely receiving technology it has long coveted to develop its military satellite program, a core component of Kim’s defense modernization plans. And as relations with Russia strengthen, Kim reduces the vulnerability that comes with dependence on China, a country whose own relationship with North Korea goes through periods of romance and frostiness.
Conclusion
There is no doubt Russia-DPRK relations are at their most elevated in years, if not decades. North Korean troop deployments to Russia, North Korean arms shipments to the Russian army, Moscow’s support of Pyongyang’s position in international forums and the regular meetings between Russian and North Korean officials are a testament to this state of affairs. However, international relations is a fickle beast, and history has proven that countries aligned today may find themselves unaligned tomorrow. As long as the war in Ukraine persists, Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un are unlikely to have that problem. But when the war does end—and it will eventually end—the commonalities now binding Moscow and Pyongyang could give way to divergences.