Xi Jinping’s Visit to Pyongyang: Regional Roundup
Stimson experts weigh in on Chinese President Xi Jinping’s June 8-9 visit to North Korea and its implications for bilateral relations, regional dynamics, and global security more broadly.
Kim’s Diplomatic Boost, Xi’s Partner Management
Framed around the 65th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, readouts of the Xi-Kim summit emphasized the enduring nature of their bilateral alliance and a recommitment to building on that history into the future in both symbolic and practical ways. Given this framing, it was unlikely that highly sensitive issues, such as denuclearization or even relations with the United States, would have been on the agenda, despite coming so soon after the Trump-Xi summit in May. North Korea’s actions in the lead-up to Xi’s visit also sent strong signals that its nuclear program was off limits.
This raises questions about what each side thought it would gain from this summit. For Kim Jong Un, this visit provided multiple benefits. It served to both reflect and further boost his already elevated public profile, cultivated largely through an expanding strategic partnership with Russia and reinforced last year at China’s 80th Victory Day celebrations in Beijing, where he was showcased side by side with both Xi and Putin. Xi Jinping traveling to Pyongyang as his first overseas trip this year reinforces Kim’s growing perception of himself as a global actor helping shape the evolving multipolar order.
While commitments were made to restart exchanges across a range of sectors, North Korea’s readout of the summit focused on the political, economic and cultural aspects. There are areas where increased activity has already been in motion, especially growing trade and preparations for restarting Chinese and North Korean exchanges. Framing these practical measures, which have direct benefits to the people, within the context of summit deliverables provides Kim the ability to present them as a product of his diplomacy, helping boost his diplomatic profile to domestic audiences as well.
Moreover, Kim’s ability to engage in high-level diplomacy with China, in Pyongyang, and on an agenda that brings tangible benefits to the people without either discussion of its nuclear program or seemingly the constraints of sanctions, moves North Korea another step closer to being accepted as a more normal country.
For China, the summit appeared to be a continuation of a process that started last year to pull North Korea back into its orbit both as a key ally in an increasingly fraught geopolitical environment, but also in case of future US-DPRK engagement. This was the catalyst for the first summits between Xi and Kim back in 2018 and is likely influencing China’s approach to North Korea now as well. How Beijing sees potential US-DPRK rapprochement at this point is unclear given the numerous challenges it faces with the US, but shoring up its alliance with Pyongyang ahead of any such scenario is certainly in its interest.
That said, despite the symbolism and pageantry of the summit, Xi and Kim do not appear to have a deep rapport with each other although they both understand the strategic value of their cooperation. Given the discrepancies in how each side framed the summit’s outcomes, there still seems to be a lot of ground to cover in rebuilding this relationship.
Pyongyang Prioritizes Restoration of Ties, but Questions Remain
North Korea’s coverage of Xi Jinping’s visit focused on restoring and advancing bilateral ties. Kim gave Xi and his wife a warm reception, similar to their last visit to Pyongyang in June 2019. Kim reaffirmed that relations with China were “the most important top-priority strategic work” for his country, echoing what he told visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on his April trip to Pyongyang. Xi’s first visit to the Workers’ Party Central Cadres Training School was clearly intended to highlight the two countries’ historical socialist bond and their resolve to nurture it for generations. Notably, North Korea’s readout of the Kim-Xi talks said the two leaders “reached a satisfactory consensus of views”—alignment language that was conspicuously absent from their last summit in September 2025. North Korea’s drive to improve ties likely reflects the foreign policy decisions reached at the Ninth Party Congress in February 2026.
If Kim has differences with Xi or simply wishes to maintain flexibility, the signals may lie in what North Korean media omitted rather than what they said. The alignment language marked progress, but the gap between Pyongyang’s “satisfactory consensus of views” and Beijing’s “a series of new important consensus,” may be worth noting. Moreover, North Korea’s readout acknowledged agreement to strengthen exchanges across the political, economic, and cultural fields but omitted Xi’s proposal to enhance “military affairs” exchanges. North Korean media routinely withholds details, and this was not the first time Kim and Xi agreed to expand military exchanges—they did so at their January 2019 summit—but the omission stands out given how rarely a Chinese leader makes such a proposal in public.
The summit aside, North Korea’s pre-visit posturing was equally revealing, suggesting Pyongyang was proactively positioning itself for negotiations. North Korea signaled greater alignment with China on Taiwan and Japan, Beijing’s core security concerns, while simultaneously warning Xi against raising denuclearization by showcasing its growing nuclear capabilities on the eve of his arrival. Taken together, Pyongyang appeared to be approaching this relationship from a position of greater confidence than at any point in recent years.
It is easy to get carried away by summit fanfare and diplomatic platitudes, but a summit is only a milestone. More important is what comes next. How faithfully will the two sides implement their agreements? For example, will they take concrete steps toward “military affairs” exchanges, as Xi proposed? Will their commitments be institutionalized, as North Korea and Russia have done across all levels over the past two years? An early litmus test will be how the two countries commemorate July 11, which marks the 65th anniversary of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.
For China, Xi’s North Korea Trip Was About Managing Relationships
Chinese media coverage of Xi’s trip to Pyongyang was notably restrained compared to the interest evident in international news reports. State media focused largely on pageantry and familiar talking points that resemble readouts of previous summits with Kim Jong Un. Most noteworthy was what the readout omitted—any talk of denuclearization. But this is not new—China’s readout of Kim’s 2025 trip to Beijing similarly avoided the issue.
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to interpret this muted tone as reflecting official disinterest. Given how infrequently Xi travels abroad, his decision to make the trip underscores the importance Beijing assigns to its sole formal ally, despite the complexity that has long-characterized the relationship.
Beijing entered the summit with modest expectations and likely viewed the outcome as satisfactory. While North Korea depends on various forms of Chinese support, Beijing’s interests are served simply by preserving its relationship with—and leverage over Pyongyang. Xi’s trip helped advance this objective in at least three ways.
First, it reinforced the ideological foundations of the bilateral relationship. Xi and Kim participated in a series of symbolic activities highlighting their countries’ enduring ties. Chinese state media emphasized their shared invocation of the “great spirit of the [Korean War],” during which the two fought side by side against what they still officially describe as “U.S. aggression.” The timing was particularly opportune to reinforce these messages, with 2026 marking the 65th anniversary of the China-North Korea mutual defense treaty.
Second, the summit likely helped China mitigate some of the negative impacts of North Korea’s deepening ties with Russia. Beijing does not oppose Pyongyang’s engagement with Moscow, nor does it fear being supplanted—Russia cannot replace China as North Korea’s primary economic partner, nor can it match Beijing’s capacity to provide sustained political backing. Nevertheless, Beijing is uneasy with Pyongyang cultivating a second great-power patron. It is especially concerned that closer Russia North Korea ties are strengthening defense coordination among the United States, Japan, and South Korea, which it views as a threat. In this context, direct leader-level engagement serves to mitigate any erosion of Chinese influence stemming from Kim’s warming ties with Vladimir Putin.
Finally, it is possible that Xi may have used the trip in part to preempt potential US-North Korea engagement. President Donald Trump has openly expressed interest in reengaging Kim, though Pyongyang has shown little interest in a meeting. Some observers have speculated that Trump may have raised the possibility of a meeting during his May discussions with Xi. Such prospects tend to make China’s leaders uneasy, and it’s questionable whether Xi would help facilitate a meeting. However, if Beijing anticipates the possibility of a Trump-Kim summit, it has an incentive to get ahead of it. After all, Xi did not begin meeting with Kim until 2018, after Trump first announced plans to do so.
Closer But Not Fully Aligned—The Alliance Must Plan and Remain Vigilant
On June 8, 2026, Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Pyongyang for his first visit in seven years.The summit produced a lengthy list of agreements and warm rhetoric, but for policy planners, the more important question is what it reveals about the China-North Korea relationship and what it means for the US-ROK alliance.
On its face, the two sides agreed to deepen cooperation across a broad range of areas, including trade, agriculture, construction, science and technology, healthcare, education, culture, tourism, sports, and people-to-people exchanges. Xi called for injecting “powerful momentum” into bilateral ties and pledged unwavering support for Kim. Most notably, the official Chinese readout made no mention of denuclearization, perhaps due to the fact that the US may be coming to terms with this reality. This also follows various developments leading up to the summit, such as the resumption of flights and cargo delivery between the two countries, that suggest the two sides may be rebuilding the foundation of bilateral ties.
These developments, along with Xi’s recent visit, suggest the two sides are getting closer but are not fully aligned. Some initial reporting and analyses noted that while China’s readout emphasized practical state-to-state cooperation, North Korea framed the summit as a pact between equal partners. North Korea’s growing ties with Russia have also given Kim more strategic room to maneuver, reducing his reliance on China.
A common cause or crisis could change this picture rather quickly. History, for instance, offers a sobering reminder that General MacArthur’s discounting of China’s involvement during the Korean War proved catastrophically wrong. Fast forward to today, China and North Korea’s shared interests for preventing US influence in the region would likely override any gaps in their strategic alignment.
This has direct implications for the US and ROK as they undergo OPCON transfer and alliance modernization. These are not merely technical realignments of the command and-control structure; they can also function as signals for alliance credibility and readiness. If there is a combination of an escalatory crisis and closer coordination between Pyongyang and Beijing, the alliance could face a significant security challenge.
In short, the summit is a useful reminder that planners must maintain watchful eyes on Pyongyang and Beijing while considering ways to address contingencies as they move forward on implementing necessary changes to the alliance.
Latest Xi-Kim Meeting Contrasts With Japan’s Alternative Approaches to North Korea
Chinese President Xi’s two days of meetings with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un earlier this week revealed no significant news for Japan’s stymied efforts for direct engagement with North Korea over a wide range of concerns, instead underscoring the importance of Japan’s alternative ways to address these issues through allies and partners.
North Korea’s growing diplomatic engagement with Russia and now China has resulted in a weakening of the existing sanctions regime on North Korea for its nuclear activities, but Japan continues to work with like-minded states to demonstrate that these goals have not been abandoned. Examples include the May 29 Joint Statement on DPRK Sanctions Accountability issued jointly by 10 European and Indo-Pacific states and the European External Action Service, as well as in in-person dialogues between Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and South Korean President Lee Jae Myung in May and with President Donald Trump in March. Japan’s Foreign Ministry website lists five telephone meetings in 2026 to -date between the foreign ministers of Japan, South Korea, and the United States to coordinate North Korea policy.
Japan’s stated goal of “complete denuclearization” of North Korea’s nuclear weapons capabilities was dealt another blow by the lack of mention of this topic in the readout of the Xi-Kim meetings, despite China’s previous support of this longstanding Japanese (and US) goal. Such a reality underscores the merit of a two-track approach to dealing with the nuclear weapons issue, as articulated in a March Stimson commentary by Professor Michiru Nishida. Under this approach, Japan continues to push for this primary goal while also working to deter North Korea’s growing nuclear weapons and missile capabilities together with its allies and partners, particularly through closer military cooperation with the United States and with South Korea.
Another pillar of Japanese policy toward North Korea, the return of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korean agents in the 1970-80s, continues to be pursued firmly by Japanese leaders but with no acknowledgement by North Korea. Prime Minister Takaichi recently renewed this issue at a political rally on May 30, calling on Kim Jong Un to take a “courageous step” to address the matter, despite the only cases of victims being returned to Japan taking place over two decades ago in 2002.
Japan’s continued and growing frustrations with North Korea contribute to the efforts underway in the Japanese government to update its national security strategy and related documents earlier than expected, with drafts currently being circulated and new policies expected to be announced by the end of the year. These drafts were discussed between the United States and Japan at an Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD) that took place as Xi and Kim met across the Sea of Japan. It is expected that the increased coordination between North Korea, China, and Russia—among other hostile actors—will be emphasized to bolster the case for Japan further increasing its spending on defense, development of enhanced military capabilities, and deepened military cooperation with like-minded states in the region and globally.