Assessing North Korea’s Five-Year Effort to Develop 13 New Nuclear and Missile Systems

In his January 2021 report to the Eighth Party Congress of the Korean Workers’ Party, Kim Jong Un set out goals to develop 13 previously unrevealed nuclear and missile weapons systems.[1] Four of those 13 systems probably have been operationally deployed over the subsequent five years, two may currently be operational, three are undergoing testing, and the status of the remaining four is unknown. These results reflect the high priority and resource allocations, steady efforts, and determined foreign technology acquisitions North Korea had been making since well before the Party Congress rather than new ambitions.

Solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), tactical nuclear weapons, and land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs)—all probably deployed since January 2021—have made the most important contributions to North Korea’s military capabilities. Of the other systems, multiple-warhead strategic missiles would offer the greatest potential to increase the North’s nuclear strike capability. Most of the remaining systems in Kim’s report would make only incremental contributions to the diverse force of road-mobile ballistic missiles and fission nuclear warheads North Korea has been deploying for over 30 years.

The Ninth Party Congress expected within a few weeks should provide further insights into the ongoing development programs and any new program goals, given Kim’s January 2026 statement that the upcoming Congress “will clarify the next-stage plans for further bolstering up the country’s nuclear war deterrent.”

Operationally Deployed (4 of 13 systems)

Solid ICBMs. Kim in January 2021 set a task to “push ahead with the development of solid-fuel engine-propelled inter-continental … ground ballistic rockets as scheduled.” North Korea’s first solid-propellant ICBM, the Hwasong-18 (HS-18), was initially flight-tested in April 2023 and probably was operationally deployed by December 2023. A longer solid ICBM, the Hwasong-19, had its first and thus far only flight-test in October 2024. The North displayed the “next generation” HS-20 solid ICBM, purportedly with a more powerful first stage motor, in October 2025, and indicated that same motor would be used in an upgraded version of the HS-19. The advent of solid ICBMs is a notable achievement underscoring North Korea’s prowess in solid-propellant technology established through a highly successful series of solid short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) developed since 2019. Solids are easier and safer to operate in the field than road-mobile liquid missiles, and have a smaller logistical footprint that makes them somewhat less vulnerable to detection when field-deployed.

Tactical nuclear weapons. Kim’s January 2021 report was the first to set out tactical nuclear weapons as a development objective; Kim also claimed the North had the technology to “miniaturize, lighten and standardize” nuclear weapons. By Fall 2022, the North was emphasizing that it had an operationally deployed, reliable, and varied delivery capability for such weapons. In March 2023, Pyongyang revealed a tactical nuclear weapon designated Hwasan-31 said to be used interchangeably with several different types of delivery systems (i.e., “standardized”). According to the Institute for Science and International Security, the warhead had an outer diameter of some 40-45 cm and an estimated yield of about 10 kilotons. Outside analysts widely assess that such a warhead is within North Korea’s capabilities given the nuclear testing it has already conducted, even if the Hwasan-31 itself has apparently not best tested. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that some number of “tactical nukes” have been produced and deployed.

Land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs). Kim reported that the North had “proceeded to develop…intermediate-range cruise missiles whose conventional warheads are the most powerful in the world.” Pyongyang’s first LACM reportedly was flight-tested in September 2021 with a claimed range of 1,500 km. An updated missile with a claimed 1,800 km range was flown in January 2022. In February 2023, the North unveiled the Hwasal-2 LACM with a claimed 2,000 km range (thus implying the earlier models were Hwasal-1s), and suggested road-mobile ground-launched LACMs had been operationally deployed. A third model, the “Pulhwasal-3-31,” was unveiled in January 2024, including in a submarine-launched version (apparently fired from a torpedo tube), as well as a “super-large” LACM warhead (almost certainly conventional) in February 2024 for at least the “Hwasal-1 Ra-3” missile. The North also has launched LACMs from surface combatant warships, including the Amnok-class corvette in August 2023 and one of the new Choe Hyon-class destroyers in April 2025. LACMs provide an important supplement to North Korea’s much larger force of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, in both nuclear and conventional roles. Basing LACMs on different land and sea platforms adds to the survivability, diversity, and flexibility of the North’s overall missile force. Low-flying, maneuverable LACMs will further complicate Allied regional air and missile defense efforts— especially in attacks coordinated with ballistic missiles.

Reconnaissance satellite. Kim reported in January 2021 that the design of a military reconnaissance satellite had been completed and it was needed “in the near future.” After the North reported launches of testbed boosters for recon satellite development in February and March 2022 (which the US revealed actually were related to the HS-17 ICBM), Pyongyang attempted an unsuccessful launch of the “Malligyong-1” reconnaissance satellite in May 2023. The launch used the new three-stage liquid-propellant “Chollima-1” space launch vehicle (SLV), with its first stage based on the HS-17. After another failed attempt in August 2023, the Chollima-1 successfully orbited a Malligyong-1 in November 2023. The North announced in May 2024 that the launch of a “Malligyong-1-1” reconaissance satellite on a “new type carrier rocket” with a “newly developed liquid oxygen + petroleum engine” failed during first stage operation. There have been no subsequent known launch attempts despite Kim’s January 2021 goal and the North’s subsequent stated intentions to launch additional recon satellites. Such satellites remain a priority, however, and so further launches are highly likely. It is reasonable to assume that the current level of North Korean technology would yield an imaging satellite with modest resolution, helping Pyongyang detect and track a buildup of allied forces but probably making only a modest contribution to all the other intelligence information North Korea receives. Whether Russia has or will assist this program is unclear, as is the impact of any such assistance.  The North would need an operational network of five or so satellites for regular coverage.

Possibly Operational (2 of 13 systems)

Nuclear-armed UUV. Kim’s report included a task to “possess … an underwater-launch nuclear strategic weapon which will be of great importance in raising the long-range nuclear striking capability.” At the time, Kim was assumed to be referring to an ICBM-range submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM; see below). But in retrospect, he probably was referring to the “Haeil” nuclear-armed unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) unveiled in March 2023. A “Haeil-5-23” variant was announced in January 2024, and Haeils have featured in North Korean parades as recently as October 2025. It is unknown whether North Korea considers the Haeil operational, how many are deployed, or where the UUVs would be launched from. In any case, the Haeil would still be substantially inferior to North Korea’s nuclear-armed ballistic and cruise missiles in terms of time-to-target, accuracy, and lethality. Its range limits it to coastal targets in South Korea and southeast Japan, where it would be vulnerable to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) attacks. The UUV would appear to have much more political than military utility, allowing the North to show it has diverse nuclear delivery capabilities that cannot be prevented from retaliating.

Medium-range recon drones. Kim’s report referred to the need to “conduct in real earnest the most important research to develop reconnaissance drones and other means of reconnaissance capable of precisely reconnoitering up to 500 km deep into the front.” In July 2023, the North revealed at an arms expo and parade the medium-sized “Saetbyol-9 multi-purpose attack drone” akin to the US MQ-9 Reaper, and the large-sized “Saetbyol-4 strategic reconnaissance drone” akin to the US RQ-4 Global Hawk. Several of each type of unmanned air vehicle (UAV) have subsequently been shown in North Korean media, most recently at a display Kim visited in honor of the 80^th anniversary of the Korean People’s Air Force in November 2025. It is unknown how many of these UAVs have been or will be produced, and more importantly how capable their reconnaissance sensors and underwing conventional weapons are. But the two new types of UAV would provide North Korea with worthwhile new capabilities compared to its previous drones if they are produced and deployed in sufficient numbers, although they would be extremely vulnerable over allied airspace in wartime.

Under Testing (3 of 13 systems)

Medium-sized submarine. Kim’s report noted that “the standard of the goal in the modernization of medium-sized submarine was set correctly and it was remodeled experimentally to open up a bright prospect for remarkably enhancing the existing subsurface operational capabilities of our navy.” In retrospect, it is now clear Kim was foreshadowing the conventionally-powered Sinpo-C class “tactical nuclear attack submarine” that was rolled out of its construction hall in September 2023. That sub, originally shown by the North under construction in July 2019, was almost certainly remodified since then (i.e., “remodeled experimentally”) from a configuration mounting three medium-sized ballistic missiles in its sail to the ultimately revealed lengthened hull having a “turtleback” section aft of the sail with launch tubes large enough for four small-to-medium ballistic missiles and six probable land-attack cruise missiles. The Sinpo-C has still not yet set out on sea trials, 6-12 months of which generally are required prior to deployment. Although Kim suggested all of the North’s remaining Romeo-class conventionally-powered subs would be converted to Sinpo-Cs, it is not clear whether any other conversions currently are under way.

Hypersonic glide vehicles. Kim reported that the North had “finished research into developing… hypersonic gliding flight warheads for new-type ballistic rockets and was making preparations for their test manufacture” and was to “develop and introduce hypersonic gliding flight warheads in a short period.” Pyongyang launched a medium-range liquid booster it called “Hwasong-8” in September 2021 carrying an arrowhead-shaped hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV)/boost glide vehicle (BGV) with stubby wings. Another HGV was launched in April 2024 on the solid-propellant Hwasong-16 IRBM, with a repeat HS-16 HGV launch in January 2025. In October 2025, the North claimed to have launched “hypersonic projectiles” to SRBM range, implying  these were the “Hwasong-11E,” a newly-exhibited system using the larger, heavier-payload version of the KN-23 SRBM (designated HS-11C) to carry a small HGV. The North also claimed to have launched an unidentified type of hypersonic missile to a range of 1000 km on January 4, 2026. Although the North now routinely displays and parades theater missiles carrying HGVs, there is no clear open-source evidence it has ever successfully flown one. HGVs are a very demanding technology given the need to cope with the temperatures and pressures of sustained hypersonic flight, compounded by the maneuvering needed to evade missile defenses (the comparative advantage of HGVs over other payloads). Pyongyang would likely need at least several successful flight-tests to truly develop HGVs. It might choose for political and propaganda reasons, or in an effort to complicate allied planning, to claim HGVs are deployed even though they remain under development.

Multiple-warhead missiles. In 2021, Kim reported the North was in the final stage of “conducting research into perfecting the guidance technology for multi-warhead rocket.” It is possible that North Korean launches in February and March 2022, which the North said included testing of “attitude control systems” for reconnaissance satellites but subsequently were revealed by the US as likely intended to test elements of what apparently was the HS-17 large liquid ICBM, could have been useful in the development of a post-boost vehicle (PBV) to dispense multiple, independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). In June 2024, the North claimed to have launched a testbed booster that dispensed three reentry vehicles (RVs) and a decoy, but South Korean video of the launch shows it probably failed before any objects could have been released. Although the test shows that North Korea remains committed to developing multiple-warhead missiles, at least several successful flight tests over a minimum of a few years would likely be required before MIRVs could be deployed. Successful MIRV development would underscore North Korea’s technical prowess, further complicate the task of allied missile defenses, and increase the number of targets that its missile force can strike with a given number of missiles and launchers.

Status Unknown (4 of 13 systems)

Nuclear-powered submarine. Kim Jong Un reported in January 2021 that “the design of new nuclear-powered submarine was researched and was in the stage of final examination…And the tasks were brought up to… possess a nuclear-powered submarine.” In September 2023, Kim stated that “we should give greater impetus to the building of nuclear-powered submarine [sic].” In January 2024, Kim reportedly “learned in detail about the building of a nuclear submarine… discussed the issues related to the building of a nuclear-powered submarine… indicated the immediate tasks to be carried out by relevant sectors and state measures to be taken, and made an important conclusion on the ways to implement them.” In March 2025, Kim reportedly “learned about the building of a nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine, which is being pushed forward according to the decisions of the Eighth [Party] Congress.” That report was accompanied by photos that showed the lower portion of part of the hull of the reputed nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). North Korean press in December 2025 reported on a recent visit by Kim to the construction site for a “8,700-tonnage nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine.” Associated photos taken inside a construction hall showed most of the submarine looking up from below.

Although possibly retouched, the new photos appear credible. They reveal a high, extended-length sail containing 5-10 probable ballistic missile launch tubes. The high sail suggests the new sub is intended to accommodate SLBMs that are much longer in size—at least 0.5 m and even 4.5 m longer—than the 13.5 m SLBM displayed by the North in April 2022, the longest seen to date. A longer missile may be needed to reach intercontinental range, an objective set out by Kim in January 2021 (see below).

There is no open-source reporting that North Korea has yet built or tested a submarine nuclear reactor, and the new photos do not reveal whether one is installed in the new sub. At this point, the idea that the hull is equipped with an operable nuclear reactor should be regarded with great skepticism, although this possibility cannot be ruled out. There have been reports alleging Russia provided the North Koreans a reactor or extensive technical assistance, but these reports have not been corroborated. Even if the sub is reactor-equipped, a year or two of fitting out probably would be required before it rolled out of the construction hall ready to begin sea trials, with additional time required to reach operational status.

ICBM-range SLBM. Kim in January 2021 set a task to “push ahead with the development of solid-fuel engine-propelled inter-continental underwater … rockets as scheduled.” North Korea has not flight-tested a true submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)—as opposed to a sub-launched KN-23 SRBM—since October 2019, and that was the medium-range Pukguksong-3 solid SLBM. The best known candidate for a North Korean solid ICBM-range SLBM is the unnamed missile paraded in April 2022. That missile was about 2.21 m in diameter and 13.2 meter long, roughly the size of Russian, Chinese, and Western ICBM-range SLBMs. The reasons why the North has not yet flight-tested this or another such SLBM are unknown, but may be related to the current lack of a large enough submarine to serve as an operational deployment platform or (as noted above) that the North has shifted to developing an as-yet unseen longer SLBM.

ICBM accuracy. Kim’s January 2021 report “set a goal of…further raising the rate of precision good enough to strike and annihilate any strategic targets within a range of 15,000 kilometers with pinpoint accuracy.” Although the liquid Hwasong-17 and all of the North’s solid ICBMs are assessed to have a range of at least 15,000 km, there is no evidence any of its ICBMs have what would be commonly regarded as “pinpoint accuracy.” Pyongyang has not flown any ICBM on an operational trajectory that might permit drawing conclusions about accuracy at intercontinental range. Its current ICBMs probably use blunt, robust RVs that provide substantial confidence the payload would survive intercontinental-range reentry without full-range testing—but that impose substantial accuracy penalties.

North Korea’s use of maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs) on medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) might foreshadow a future ICBM MaRV with the potential for high accuracy, but its ICBMs have yet to be associated or tested with MaRVs and the accuracy such MaRVs actually could achieve at ICBM ranges is unclear. In any case, the North is unlikely to pursue a “counterforce” strategy against the continental US requiring high accuracy to destroy US ICBM silos and other hardened targets. A “countervalue” strategy targeting US cities and thus requiring only modest ICBM accuracy is much more likely. Kim’s claimed goal of “pinpoint accuracy” was thus much more likely advanced for political and propaganda purposes than to posit a serious design objective for North Korean ICBMs.

Super-large hydrogen bombs. In January 2021, Kim reported that Pyongyang had the technology to “complete the development of a super-large hydrogen bomb,” and that the ability to “make nuclear weapons smaller and lighter…will make it possible to…continuously push ahead with the production of super-sized nuclear warheads.” Since then, North Korean media has provided no more information on this project. Although the North claimed its January 2016 nuclear explosive test and its final such test in September 2017 were related to thermonuclear (hydrogen) weapons, it is unclear whether further explosive testing would be required for Pyongyang to be able to deploy such weapons. The large, liquid-propellant Hwasong-17 ICBM first flight-tested in March 2022 would be ideal for “super-large” warheads. Although such weapons would make great city-busters, the North’s current fission warheads may well provide an adequate countervalue capability against US, Japanese, and South Korean cities.

The Bottom Line

All 13 nuclear and missile systems reported as part of Kim Jong Un’s five-year plan were almost certainly under development to various extents before the 8^th Party Congress in January 2021, and thus reflected the high priority and resource allocations, steady efforts, and determined foreign technology acquisitions North Korea had been making in the preceding years rather than new ambitions. They also reflected the maturity and natural diffusion of the 1940s- to 1970s-vintage technologies underlying these systems. Nonetheless, the addition of solid ICBMs, tactical nuclear weapons, and LACMs to the North’s arsenal since January 2021 can make important contributions—assuming deployment in substantial number—to the credibility and survivability of its nuclear force, its options for escalating and responding to escalation in a crisis or conflict, and (for LACMs) its conventional warfighting capabilities.

If the North can improve the resolution of its imagery reconnaissance satellites and put enough in orbit, it can make important improvements in its situational awareness and wartime targeting capabilities. Of the developmental systems, MIRVs offer the greatest potential to increase the North’s nuclear strike capability assuming successful testing and the production of enough nuclear warheads. Most of the other systems not yet deployed, even SSBNs carrying ICBM-range SLBMs, would make only incremental contributions to the diverse force of road-mobile ballistic missiles and fission nuclear warheads North Korea has been deploying for over 30 years. The Ninth Party Congress expected within a few weeks should provide further insights into the ongoing development programs and any new program goals, given Kim’s January 2026 statement that the upcoming Congress “will clarify the next-stage plans for further bolstering up the country’s nuclear war deterrent.”

1. [1]

   Kim’s report also noted two types of missile systems that had already begun flight-testing or deployment by January 2021: the “super-large” multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) the US designated as KN-25, and “new-type tactical rockets” that presumably included the KN-23, KN-24, and small Hwasong-11D SRBMs.