Sister Before Daughter: Kim Yo Jong and the Normalization of Female Paektu Authority for Kim Ju Ae

Kim Yo Jong is arguably North Korea’s most powerful woman. However, existing explanations of her role do not fully account for her sustained prominence today. She is most commonly understood as either Kim Jong Un’s trusted spokesperson or potentially his contingency successor. This is juxtaposed to the rise of Kim Ju Ae since her introduction in November 2022; some consider the latter to be the likely successor. What is driving both women’s prominence remains unclear; their positions could reflect succession considerations, Kim Jong Un’s reliance on female family members, or other dynamics in an unprecedented political environment. If succession is part of the equation, it is unclear why a regime usually so careful with succession politics continues to sustain Kim Yo Jong’s prominence and relevance today as Kim Ju Ae increasingly appears to be positioned for a greater role.

One possible framework for understanding the significance of this pattern is a conditioning effect: Kim Yo Jong’s sustained prominence has normalized female Paektu authority in a deeply patriarchal system, producing a conditioning effect. The framework does not require Kim Jong Un to have deliberately elevated his sister in preparation for his daughter’s rise. What is observable is that Kim Yo Jong has remained central and relevant as the circumstances around Kim Ju Ae’s profile have evolved. Rather than treating Kim Yo Jong and Kim Ju Ae as separate or competing narratives, this framework considers how the sister’s years-long demonstration of authority may have reshaped the political terrain for Kim Ju Ae’s growing political life.

Female Paektu Legitimacy Meets a Patriarchal System

The Paektu bloodline – the direct line of descent from Kim Il Sung – is the core of North Korea’s hereditary succession. The Ten Principles for the Establishment of the Party’s Unitary Leadership codified the principle of family succession but does not prohibit a female heir. A North Korean propaganda booklet states, “Male or female, young or old, a person with exceptional qualities can be selected as successor.” In principle, bloodline reigns superior above all, including gender.

Political culture, however, presents a greater obstacle. Historically, women occupied few senior political positions—just 6 of 260 cabinet members between 1945 and 2000 were women—while state ideology emphasized their role in raising loyal revolutionaries rather than leading them. North Korean ideology appears to permit what the political culture has resisted.

Previous Paektu women illustrate that tension. Kim Kyong Hui – Kim Il Sung’s daughter and Kim Jong Il’s sister—held various senior positions, ranging from the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) International Department’s deputy director to head of the Light Industry Department in 1987. She was highly trusted; Kim Jong Il reportedly considered her words his, and she became Kim Jong Un’s unofficial guardian after Kim Jong Il’s health collapse in 2008. Her profile receded sharply after her husband Jang Song Thaek’s banishment for an alleged coup attempt, proving that a Paektu woman’s prominence can be reversed. Separately, Kim Jong Il reportedly considered his daughter Kim Sul Song a candidate for succession, arranging for her to observe a meeting with then South Korean politician Park Geun Hye as an example of female leadership. Despite being a direct Paektu-bloodline descendant, social barriers appeared too high for Kim Sul Song to become successor. The same cultural and political resistance appears to remain today.

The environment under Kim Jong Un is different. He publicly introduced his wife Ri Sol Ju in 2012, appointed Choe Son Hui as North Korea’s first female foreign minister in 2022, and promoted Kim Yo Jong to various senior party roles throughout the years. In November 2022, he introduced his daughter Kim Ju Ae to the world at a Hwasong-17 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) site, making her the first Kim dynasty child to be publicly introduced at such a young age. While defector testimony indicates that women’s participation in political life has somewhat increased under Kim Jong Un, they remain uncommon in high-level positions and continue to face barriers to advancement. The UN similarly noted in 2021 an “overwhelming lack of women in the country’s highest decision-making bodies.”

Clearly, North Korea has not reached gender equality, nor is the unprecedented visibility of Kim Yo Jong and Kim Ju Ae necessarily indicative of succession. There is, however, more sustained visibility of women near the top and, for Kim Yo Jong, the demonstration of consequential authority by a Paektu woman.

What the Spokesperson and Contingency Arguments Explain Yet Miss Today

Kim Yo Jong’s role as Kim Jong Un’s trusted mouthpiece is widely accepted. She issued 12 official statements in her own name from March to November 2020, including three on behalf of Kim Jong Un—a rare delegation of authority. When South Korean activists launched leaflets into North Korea in 2020, she followed through on her threats, demolishing the inter-Korean liaison office in Kaesong. Her statements carry political flexibility her brother’s do not: they can be escalated, amended, or walked back.

Her prominence has also fueled speculation that she could serve as a contingency successor, particularly in 2020 when Kim Jong Un disappeared from public view amid reports about his health. Kim Yo Jong was seen as a credible alternative at that time. Given the suddenness of Kim Jong Un’s own succession, elevating his sister may have provided a contingency in the event of an unexpected leadership vacuum, particularly before any of his children were publicly introduced.

While these arguments capture important dimensions of Kim Yo Jong’s rise and relevance, neither fully explains the significance of her sustained prominence to this day, especially if viewed through a succession lens. North Korea’s succession doctrine runs vertically, from Supreme Leader to offspring, not laterally. If Kim Ju Ae is meant to become the successor, the contingency rationale for Kim Yo Jong’s prominence should subside. Yet, she still remains in close orbit to her brother.

Following the February 2026 Ninth Party Congress, Kim Yo Jong was moved from the Propaganda and Agitation Department (PAD)—the same department where Kim Jong Il worked and one responsible for the state’s ideological control—to the General Affairs Department (GAD), and was reinstated as an alternate Politburo member. While Kim Yo Jong has moved up and down the party hierarchy previously for reasons unclear, her latest movement nevertheless generated competing interpretations of her standing. Some viewed her departure from the PAD to the GAD, widely known for handling storage and party documents, along with her removal from the State Affairs Commission, as marginalization. Others viewed her director-level appointment to the latter as a promotion.

While a transfer out of the PAD is notable, the GAD’s overhaul with Kim Yo Jong as its leader makes the latter interpretation particularly important. North Korea leadership expert Michael Madden highlights GAD’s functions expanding from logistical support to broader responsibilities supporting information control, decision-making, and strategic communication. He also notes this as Kim Yo Jong’s first formal role in charge of domestic policy. She has continued issuing high-profile statements since taking the position to this day. While her precise balance of power remains contested, her continued political relevance is not.

The Conditioning Effect

The conditioning-effect framework shifts the question from what led to Kim Yo Jong’s earlier rise to what her sustained elevation has produced today: normalization of female Paektu authority. North Korean elites and the public have now had repeated exposure to a Paektu woman holding real authority, issuing statements moving foreign governments, and receiving deference from senior officials. Repeated exposure gradually lowers cultural, ideological, and political barriers as the country becomes accustomed to strong female Paektu authority.

This conditioning effect operates differently across two audiences. For the North Korean public, conditioning occurs through repeated media exposure and symbolic weight. State media incorporated Kim Yo Jong into the heroic Paektu narrative. In 2019, Kim Yo Jong rode her horse alongside Kim Jong Un up Mount Paektu, with her horse bearing the same five-pointed star as the Supreme Leader’s. When Ri Sol Ju made the same climb the next month, her horse was not awarded such insignia.

Moreover, South Korea’s Institute for National Security Strategy analysis of Kim Yo Jong’s statements between 2020 to 2022 found that while her personal or diplomatic messages appeared only through the external-facing Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), statements containing serious threats were released to both the KCNA and the domestic-facing Rodong Sinmun.[1] Subsequent analysis of her 2020 to 2026 statements revealed that, unlike other senior officials, Kim Yo Jong consistently issued public statements against the regime’s top foreign threats—the United States and South Korea. Her authoritative voice is reaching the public.

For political elites like party officials and military generals, the mechanism is more experiential. During the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, North Korea’s nominal head of state Kim Yong Nam deferred to Kim Yo Jong on protocol matters and offered her the seat of honor despite outranking her. Notably, author Sung-Yoon Lee noted in 2023 that no North Korean government entity has officially referred to Kim Yo Jong as Kim Jong Un’s sister. Over the years, elites have repeatedly watched a female Paektu leader exercising significant political authority, from pivotal roles in inter-Korean affairs to a leadership role in the GAD. She is becoming increasingly familiar with time and remains institutionally relevant.

Kim Yo Jong’s institutional trajectory may offer further clues about the audiences experiencing that authority. Her earlier role placed her inside the system shaping ideology and public messaging; her new GAD position places her more directly within an elite-facing information and decision-making sphere. Her movement therefore matters not only for what it reveals about her own standing, but also for which constituency is increasingly exposed to the conditioning effect.

This framework would weaken if Kim Yo Jong’s GAD role proved hollow and her institutional authority receded without a comparable replacement. It would weaken further if she were publicly purged or discredited, undermining the female Paektu normalization her prominence had built. Credible evidence that sustained exposure reinforces resistance to female Paektu leadership, rather than lowering barriers, would also undermine this interpretive framework.

From Sister to Daughter

No matter how symbolically staged, it would be difficult for Kim Ju Ae to single-handedly normalize female Paektu leadership. While she has legitimacy for succession as the direct offspring of Kim Jong Un, lineage alone does not eliminate the cultural and political novelty of a female supreme leader in a system that has never seen it.

Defectors have expressed confusion at the possibility of a young female leader, with older men specifically reacting negatively. Scholars highlight the longer lead-up time required, if succession is in her future, and Kim Ju Ae’s frequent attendance at military events to overcome gender biases. North Korean state media’s language for Kim Ju Aehas also evolved since her introduction, changing from “beloved child,” “most honorable,” to “Joseon’s Morning Star Female General.” [2] By 2024, the honorific “guidance,” typically reserved for the supreme leader or designated successor, was used to describe Kim Ju Ae.

These developments show an increasing willingness to present a young female Paektu descendant in authoritative settings. However, because no previous Kim child has been publicly introduced at such a young age, there is little precedent for interpreting these changes. The evolving titles and staging may signal a deliberate political trajectory or reflect experimentation with how to integrate the child into the regime’s political narrative.

The visual relationship between the sister and daughter is also changing. Kim Yo Jong escorted Kim Ju Ae to her seat in August 2024. When Kim Jong Un distributed rifles to senior party and military officials in February 2026, Kim Ju Ae helped hand them out while being captured in standalone images. In previous similar settings, such as during an inter-Korean summit, Kim Yo Jong assisted Kim Jong Un in handing him a pen to sign with. In released photographs, Kim Yo Jong appeared only in group photos. From sister to daughter, the visual center of gravity appears to be shifting.

The two trajectories do not need to compete. Kim Yo Jong demonstrates what a female Paektu leader can do today, while Kim Ju Ae increasingly demonstrates what the next female Paektu generation might become.

Conclusion

North Korea has now spent years with a female Paektu figure visibly exercising consequential political power. This does not mean North Korea has gender equality; it means a subsequent Paektu woman exercising authority at the highest levels will no longer be as unprecedented.

North Korea’s signals are limited but rarely accidental. The unusual development worth watching is not the rise of Kim Yo Jong or Kim Ju Ae individually, but the sustained prominence of two female Paektu figures at the same time before different audiences and amplified at different times. Kim Jong Un’s intent for sustaining Kim Yo Jong’s prominence is still unclear. What matters is whether Kim Yo Jong’s authority sets a precedent with observable consequences for what follows and the political environment she leaves behind. The sister may be the architecture on which the daughter can build her political life.

The views expressed here are those of the author alone and do not represent those of the US Air Force, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the US government.

1. [1]

   The INSS reports that Kim Yo Jong’s statements containing serios threats were released to both the KCNA and Rodong Sinmun. See: “북한 김여정 담화 분석 [North Korea Kim Yo Jong’s Statement Analysis],” Institute for National Security Strategy, Report No. 199, December 1, 2022, http://www.inss.re.kr/publication/bbs/js_view.do?nttId=410593.

2. [2]

   “[그래픽] 김정은 둘째 딸 김주애 주요 매체 호칭 변화’ [[Graphic] Changes in Major Media Titles for Kim Jong Un’s Second Daughter, Kim Ju Ae],” Yonhap News Agency, November 29, 2023, https://n.news.naver.com/mnews/article/001/0014360182.